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Abstract
The electric power industry in the United States is in the midst of a dramatic trans-
formation toward a deregulated structure. Transmission line imposed constraints
have been viewed as one of the main obstacles to opening transmission access and
creating free electricity markets across large geographical areas.
This thesis presents a systematic framework for managing transmission system
congestion in the competitive electricity markets. Under this framework, markets
for transmission are functionally separated from generation markets. Proposed
usage-based pricing strategies for short-term and long-term transmission services
provide economic incentives to network users to adjust their requests so that flows
on transmission lines remain within the technical limits with high probability. A
near-optimal market equilibrium is achieved by means of interactions between the
decentralized optimization processes performed by individual market participants
and the coordination provided by transmission owners. This design makes it possi-
ble to maintain system security in an open access environment while each network
user is attempting to optimize its own benefit.
A new probabilistic optimal power flow (POPF) method, which projects long-
term values of transmission links and line flow probability distributions based on a
given load duration curve and the public knowledge of power plant characteristics,
is developed by linearizing the AC OPF equations at different system load levels.
The probability information calculated using POPF assists an ex ante estimation of
the availability of transmission facilities and indicates market risks for both network
users and transmission companies.
A priority-based transmission service based on a bottom-up auction mechanism
to purchasing long-term transmission service is posed here as a dynamic decision
making problem under uncertainties. A dynamic programming-based formulation
is given for an efficient relief of network congestion in real-time operations without
violating prior obligations in long-term transmission right markets.
Thesis Supervisor: Marija D. Ilid
Title: Senior Research Scientist
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Introduction
The electric power industry in the United States is in the midst of a dramatic
transition from a vertically integrated structure toward an industry in which power
suppliers compete for customers and are functionally or corporately separated from
the transmission system providers. Under this new structure, customers generally
have more freedom to select their power suppliers much in the same way as sup-
ply/demand contracts (transactions) are established in other competitive industries.
Seen from a transmission provider side, the newly evolving industry is an "open ac-
cess" industry, in which all transmission and/or distribution users must be served
according to the same criteria [38]. However, unlike other industries, these contrac-
tual transactions established in an energy marketplace may not be physically im-
plementable because they may lead to violations of transmission system constraints
(such as line power flow constraints or voltage limits). Therefore, these transactions
could cause system reliability problems if implemented without any consideration for
these operating constraints. A violation of one constraint could lead to a cascading
disconnection of other pieces of the transmission system components (transmission
lines, generators and customers) as their over-current and/or over-voltage protec-
tion activates. This is a setup for infamous systemwide blackouts during which a
power system disintegrates into individual (groups of) components. For the rea-
sons of this type, transmission system provision under open access should be based
19
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on the well-understood and agreed upon principles. Generally, the transmission
system users view these reliability-related constraints as an obstacle to their most
economic energy market opportunity. It is, therefore, essential to define mechanisms
for providing open access equitably to all market participants.
This thesis responds to this overall need. It concerns the basic problem of manag-
ing the electric power transactions within technically acceptable transmission limits
in an open access environment. The problem of the "transmission congestion man-
agement" in a restructuring industry is new, primarily because of the change from
managing all resources (generation and transmission) in a coordinated way to the in-
dependent decision making by the system users and system providers, respectively.
As a competitive energy market is created, each market participant will tend to
make various types of contracts to sell or purchase power most economically. This
often involves transferring inexpensive electric power from generation-excess regions
to deficient, high-demand regions. The transmission line-imposed constraints on the
most economic deals are viewed as the main obstacle to a truly open access and to
creating free electricity markets across large geographical areas.
The transmission paths between points of inexpensive generation and the elec-
tricity user obviously have more value than the paths between the expensive gen-
eration and the same user. Therefore, once the power supply becomes competitive,
the generation patterns and flow on transmission lines will change more dynam-
ically than at present to accommodate active trading across distant parts of the
transmission system. Transmission line overloads are expected to occur much more
frequently and at unforeseen locations since the transmission system was not de-
signed for the competitive market needs. While the load pattern may not change
significantly, the geographical and temporal distribution of power supply meeting
this load may change significantly. This change is particularly created by the re-
placement of very large power plants by many smaller power plants, as economies of
scale become less pronounced in power plants. All these changes have created new
need for conceptual solutions to the transmission provision under open access.
The main objective of this thesis is to propose a simple, systematic transmission
management framework for serving the needs of the system users (generators and
21
Transrnission
zu- Network
Figure 1-1 An illustration of the development of electric transmission net-
works.
loads) under open access.
1-1 Development of Electric Transmission
Systems
The electric power system in the United States has become highly interconnected
as the transmission networks owned by the individual utilities have begun to connect
over the past several decades. In the early days of the development of electric
power systems, utility companies tended to locate generation stations near their
local customers, with power exchange only with the neighboring areas. As the
larger got built power plants, these utility companies found that it is more economic
and more profitable to place and operate these large plants further away from the
demand-concentrated areas. Transmission networks, therefore, were developed to
serve as the media for delivering electricity. Figure 1-1 illustrates this role.
Through a transmission network, a utility company could use a group of genera-
tion stations to serve a large number of customers. By doing this, some advantages
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were gained:
) With a transmission network in place, large generation plants were allowed to be
built close to the locations which are convenient for fuel acquisition (either the
original production areas of fuels or the transportation hubs). In addition, some
power generating technologies which use renewable energy sources such as hydro-
power stations and wind turbines also could easily integrated into the generation
system.
@ Generation stations were no longer needed to follow individual loads accurately;
instead, all generation resources were jointly scheduled and planned to meet the
total system demand. This has improved the efficiency of generation management
significantly since utility companies could use some power plants whose genera-
tion cannot be changed very fast, such as nuclear plants, to produce inexpensive
electricity and supply the major portion of total demand and, in addition, use
several generation plants that can be ramped up and down fast as load-following
units to compensate the real-time generation/demand imbalance.
@ When an unexpected equipment outage occurred, loads could still be served by
available generation and transmission facilities without any interruptions.
For similar reasons, utilities recognized that they could serve their loads more
reliably and achieve savings at the same time by interconnecting their transmis-
sion systems, Figure 1-2. This would allow these interconnected utilities to reduce
amount of generation capacity reserved for the unexpected outages.1 Because of
these benefits, gradually larger and larger sets of generators, transmission facilities,
and distribution stations were interconnected over increasingly large geographical
'Based on the North American Electric Reliability Council's (NERC's) security criteria, each
control area (comprising one or more utilities) should operate its generation resources to provide
for a level of operating reserve sufficient to account for load forecasting error, as well as for the
generation and transmission outages. Following loss of any major transmission line or a generator, a
control area should take appropriate actions and still be able to provide relatively reliable electricity
that meets the disturbance control standard (DCS). It also should take prompt steps to protect
itself against the next contingency [83]. This requirement is usually referred to as the (N-1) security
criterion in the current industry. Meeting this criterion is not mandatory; however, all attempts
are typically made by the system operators to comply with it by cooperating with the neighboring
control areas.
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Figure 1-2 Interconnection for reliability
regions. This trend required increasing coordination and cooperation among utili-
ties to maintain the system-wide security. Over time, the electric utility industry
became vertically integrated, fully regulated, and composed of a limited number
of entities which shared common systems and were coordinated for grid operation
and use. A typical hierarchical structure of such vertically integrated utilities which
owned and operated generation, transmission, and distribution facilities is shown
in Figure 1-3. Due to the substantial growth in the scale economies, these utility
companies could finance and manage large construction and expansion projects; on
the other hand, some small companies could hardly enter the market and compete
with existing utilities because of small market shares. These large utility compa-
nies, therefore, have operated as natural monopolies in their own administrative
operating areas and have been obligated to unconditionally serve the load directly
connected to their networks. 2
2These loads are sometime referred to as the "native loads."
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Figure 1-3 A vertically integrated power utility.
1-2 Congestion Management Problem in an
Electric Power Network
To ensure secure operations of the entire interconnection, the power flows
through thousands of transmission lines within the large geographic regions must be
controlled in a coordinated way. Transmission lines have certain capability limits;
operating beyond these limits shortens the life of a line or causes damage on the
transmission equipment. Some of these transmission capability limits are not hard
limits and can be exceeded for a short period of time. However, if the violation is
sustained over a significantly long time, transmission equipment will be damaged
due to the overloading. The thermal line-flow constraints are in particular of this
type and are can be thought of as "soft" constraints [49]. The property of "soft con-
straints" is very important. It will be re-emphasized while we design the proposed
hierarchical congestion management framework in the later part of the thesis.
Generally, the congestion problems in the electric power networks are harder to
manage than in other kinds of transportation networks. For example, unlike tele-
phone or computer-communication networks, the transmitting paths of individual
electric power transactions from the sending to the destination nodes cannot be
25
assigned or specified. Also, unlike the flow volume going through a natural gas or
water pipelines that can be adjusted by valves, the amount of electric power flow
in a transmission line is determined solely by basic Kirchhoff's laws and the line
characteristics, and is, therefore, not directly controlled. 3
In addition, although typical electricity transactions are specified in terms of
real power and/or energy, each transaction is inherently accompanied by the reac-
tive power produced, consumed and/or lost in transport. In order to deliver real
power, which is directly utilized by the customers, the reactive power should also
be managed adequately in order to support voltages throughout the transmission
network. This makes congestion management of the electric power networks even
more complicated and unique.
At present, there exist at least three basic methods for relieving congestion.
They are:
© Redispatch generation: Using generation redispatch to change the flow pattern in
a transmission network is the most frequently practiced congestion relief method
in the current industry. As the utility industry is becoming more market-based,
central control over all generation resources can no longer be automatically as-
sumed. Generators may not be willing to reschedule their outputs without some
kind of financial compensation.
@ Partial load shedding: Typically, reducing load or increasing generation at any
given network node has identical effect on the resulting line flows. Partial load
shedding has been used even in the regulated industry as a means of maintaining
system within the acceptable operating limits. However, all effort is made to avoid
effecting the loads unless this is absolutely necessary for keeping the system intact
under the emergency conditions. In the competitive electric power industry, a
load becomes an active decision maker, and there is no longer assumed that the
load will be served unconditionally. An electricity consumer will have the option
to contract with its load serving entity (LSE) to be served as an interruptible
load. When the electricity market price is high, the interruptible customers may
3 An exception to this is the use of transmission control technologies capable of direct flow control,
generally known as flexible alternative-current transmission systems devices (FACTS) [7].
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be willing to reduce their power consumption to avoid high electricity bills, this
feature known as demand elasticity [113]. In this sense, load shedding would be
one of the regular congestion relief methods in a deregulated power industry.
@ Network topology reconfiguration: This is generally a complicated corrective ac-
tion. In the past, this practice has been carried out by the experienced system
operators. Opening or closing of a transmission line results in a re-distribution
of network flows, and if done correctly could result in a congestion relief.4
1-2.1 Congestion Management in a Regulated Utility
In this thesis, only a congestion management of thermal line flow limits is of
interest. Stability-related transmission system management is very complex prob-
lem. For the time being, it is viewed as a strictly technical problem; no sufficient
fast price signal would be implementable for stabilizing system dynamics on-line.
Moreover, separating the effects of various system users on system-wide instability
is a very difficult problem. Without the solution of this problem, it would not be
possible to give right signals to the main users causing instability.
In this section, we briefly review how the steady-state congestion problems are
formulated and managed in a regulated industry. Generally, utilities manage and
schedule available generation in advance to meet the expected total demand within
their administrative areas. Since these utility companies have full control over all
generation units, congestion management is done by means of generation dispatch
based upon the least cost criterion subject to all technical (security) constraints. The
basic methods for determining these schedules are the security constrained dispatch
and more recently the optimal power flow (OPF) method [19, 47]. Mathematically,
the OPF problem can be formulated as follows:
Given electricity demand at each load bus, PL f PL 1 ,* , Ln }T, solve for the
4 Another type of network topology reconfiguration could be done by fast closing or opening of
some lines. This action is generally done for eliminating voltage and/or phase angle (dynamic)
instabilities on the system, and it is much more difficult to implement. In this thesis, we are only
concerned with the steady-state security limits.
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optimal generator outputs that minimize total production cost, i.e.,
NG
P* = arg min cGi (PGi) (11)
PG
This optimization process is subject to the real and reactive power balance con-
straints at each network node (bus) i, known as the load flow equations,
Pi = Pi (1-2)
Q,= ZQj+V2 B (13)
j i
and other security operation constraints such as,
Pij < Piax (1_4)
Pin < p <p Pfax (1-5)
Vmin V mVnax (1-6)
Qif" < Q, < Qmax i Eall buses,i 7 4j (1-7)
where
cGi (.) is the production cost function of generator i;
Pi and Qi are the real power and reactive power generated/consumed at bus i
respectively;
Pi and Qij are the real power and reactive power flows on transmission line i-j
respectively;
Pi= Gij (V 2 - V2V3 cos&Sg) + BiJViV sin -ig (1-8)
Qi= Bij(V 2 - VV4 cos 6,j) - GijViV sin 6ij (1-9)
Yi= Gi- jBi is the complex-valued admittance of a branch connecting buses i
and j;
Vi, 6i are voltage magnitude and voltage phase angle at bus i, respectively.
In real time, when actual system loads deviate from the forecasted values and
cause congestion problems, several generation units are being redispatched to re-
lieve the congestion caused by this load fluctuation. The power produced by each
generator is based on its production cost and it is subject to the observed line flow
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marketer marketer
Figure 1-4 An illustration of contractual transactions made in a deregulated
power industry.
constraints. This procedure is known as a constrained economic dispatch (CED)
[35].
In a vertically integrated utility structure, the generation cost of producing elec-
tricity, Equation (1--1), and the cost for relieving congestion in transmission system,
Equation (1-4), are bundled. A utility company recovers these costs by billing its
own customers at the end of each month. This electricity rate typically includes the
average costs of investment and operation and it does not depend on location or
time of use.
1-2.2 New Challenges in the Evolving Industry
We start by observing that in a restructuring industry the ownership and op-
eration of generation and transmission systems are generally separated from each
other. New generation entities, such as independent power produces (IPPs), are al-
lowed to compete with the utility-owned generators for market share and revenues in
electricity markets, Figure 1-4. Power marketers, which do not physically generate
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electricity or serve loads, are important components in the evolving energy markets.
In addition to the expected marketers of power supply, so-called load-serving enti-
ties (LSEs) are being formed for purchasing electricity on behalf of groups of power
users. Under this market structure, competition is likely to replace regulation as the
primary mechanism that determines the price of electricity. The main objective of
restructuring is to promote competition in energy markets which should ultimately
result in the lower electricity prices than today. Competition generally leads to
more efficient supply in part by providing incentives for new technological devel-
opments. On the power supply side, many new breakthroughs have already taken
place; the most important one is the development of cost-effective small scale power
supply technologies. These range from the combined cycle gas power plants through
wind power plants, fuel cells, photovoltaics and so-called micro-turbines intended
for producing power close to where needed. The objectives of power producers and
consumers are generally characterized as distributed objectives, independent from
the objectives of the others.
To realize a fully competitive market, the transmission firms are required by law
to ensure the availability of transmission services on a non-discriminatory basis to
all. It is, therefore, necessary to provide technological enforcement of the existing
transmission system to serve the needs of the energy market while maintaining an
acceptable power quality. At the same time, right economic incentives should be
in place for the transmission firms to serve customers as customers specify their
requests for the transmission system use. Some customers may be willing to be
interrupted when it is critical, if they are required to pay less for using transmission
than the customers who request an unconditionally firm access to the grid. More-
over, depending on the type of contractual agreements for purchasing and selling
power in the energy markets, various system users will request to be served by a
transmission provider over different time periods in the future. These may range
from requests day ahead through season ahead, or longer. Consequently, a transmis-
sion provider will be expected to project system conditions and best technologies for
implementing these various requests, while, at the same time, operating the system
securely. When certain users requests are not implementable because of technical
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constraints, the system provider will have to deny system use to some parties. Sys-
tematic criteria for this curtailment process will need to be established as well. In
this sense, the actual implementation of a transaction curtailment will depend to
a certain extent on a type of energy market contracts. More specifically, a curtail-
ment of a bilateral transaction should imply that both customer and supplier are
denied the transmission use simultaneously. In a coordinated energy market, such
as various evolving poolcos, the implementation will depend if a system user (load)
or power supplier has entered in the agreement with a system operator for system
access.
Second, under competition generation cost curves in a deregulated environment
become confidential. Therefore, a system provider cannot be expected to automati-
cally optimize total cost of generation while ensuring operation within the technical
constraints. Additional mechanisms, including pricing for transmission services, be-
come necessary in this environment.
Finally, the number of transactions requesting transmission service will be very
high. The patterns of these transactions are likely to vary over time as the sys-
tem demand and supply availability changes in response to the electricity prices.
Consequently, system conditions are expected to vary more dynamically than in
a regulated industry. All these factors pose new challenges to the reliable system
operation, and to the necessary transmission planning.
1-2.3 Need for Information and Coordination
The functional and/or corporate separation of generation, transmission and dis-
tribution generally leads from a coordinated system operation performed by a utility
company to a large number of decentralized decision makers at a supply/demand
energy market level. If the transmission capacity constraints are not accounted for,
the short-term optimization problem, defined in the Equations (1-1)-(1-7), can be
done by the individual market participants with respect to a single decision variable,
i.e., amount the electric power generated and/or consumed [74]. It can be shown
that under certain assumptions, such as large number of small decision makers, the
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amount of electricity generated and/or consumed at each bus determined by the in-
dividual decision makers should equal to the result of a coordinated (unconstrained)
power dispatch [74].
However, once the transmission constraints are taken into account, the sys-
temwide optimization objective functions of individual decision makers are coupled
via these constraints. In this case, near-optimal distributed decision making is con-
ceptually possible either (1) by introducing coordination mechanisms of the system
users and the system providers or (2) by grouping together system users whose
decisions are strongly coupled through transmission constraints, and which are oth-
erwise not very much affected by the remaining system users. In this thesis only (1)
is studied. Coordination mechanisms between the system users and a transmission
provider could be technical and/or economic. The technical signals should reflect
the system proximity to the likely constraints. The economic signals could take on
some form of pricing for using the system. In both cases, signals should discour-
age system users from violating technical constraints, and therefore enable reliable
system operation. The system users would respond to the signals given by a trans-
mission provider to avoid being denied access to the system and/or to reduce prices
charged by a transmission provider. If the technical and economic signals are given
with a well defined objectives, the users response should be indifferent if the signal
is technical or economic. Thought of differently, the on-line information reflecting
the transmission congestion status would help system users internalize the effect of
the system status on their own distributed decision making. It will be shown that
under some assumptions this decision-making process results in a near-optimal cost
obtained as when solving a coordinated optimization problem defined in Equations
(1-1)-(1-7).
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) of the United States has
recognized the importance of a timely information in a free electricity market and it
currently requires each transmission owning public utility company to create a real-
time information network to disseminate information about the availability and the
price of transmission service to help market participants understand the transmission
system conditions. This information system is currently known in some parts of the
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United States as an Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS) [39].5
Even though some OASIS sites were established and started operating in 1996,
many questions concerning sufficient and necessary information remain open [56].
1-3 Contributions of the Thesis
This thesis proposes a basic framework for efficient transmission congestion man-
agement in a competitive electric power industry. This framework is practical, flex-
ible and adaptive to a variety of energy market structures. At the current stage
of power industry restructuring in the United States, various energy market struc-
tures have been adopted and implemented; however, the question regarding which
type of market structure is superior to others is still under an intensive debate. For
this reason, an efficient congestion management scheme compatible with different
types of electricity market structures is essential. The framework developed in this
thesis, therefore, is a necessary step toward providing open transmission access to
the competitive electric power market participants. The thesis contributions are as
follows:
First, we investigate the technical and economic roles of a transmission system
provision in serving competitive energy markets. This is done by reviewing first in
Chapter 2 a notion of the optimal transmission provision under uncertainty in a
regulated industry. Based on this notion, we claim that transmission system should
be evaluated and managed over the prolonged time horizons (five years, ten years
or longer).
- We assume in this thesis that markets for transmission services are separated
(at least functionally) from the power markets. The main reason is that if the
transmission and generation markets are bundled, as demonstrated in Chapter
3, (which is the case in the most of poolco-type energy markets in the United
States, such as Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM), New York (NYISO),
51t is estimated that all public transmission systems in the United States can be represented by
20 - 35 OASIS nodes [23]. The entire network is expected to be connected through the Internet
and to be heavily used by both wholesale transmission customers and transmission providers.
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and New England (ISO-NE)), a generator can increase its own profit by simply
shifting its bidding curves in anticipation of a system constraint violation. This
encourages strategic bidding and gaming in the energy market and then, further,
restricts the incentives for optimal transmission system expansion. This thesis
demonstrates that it is conceptually possible to unbundle these two markets so
that the value of transmission services is appropriately priced.
- In this thesis, we also demonstrate that a near-optimal systemwide efficiency can
be achieved by using only systematic technical or estimated economic information.
Unlike the poolco market structure proposed in [46, 20], which requires each
market participant to bid its supply curve, no information regarding energy costs
or price bids for scheduled transactions is needed for this to be achieved.
The second contribution concerns a hierarchical framework for short-term opera-
tions and long-term transmission management for the electric power industry under
restructuring.
- The emphasis of the proposed framework is on the market-based transmission
congestion management. This framework provides financial incentives to the sys-
tem users to maintain the system reliability. A usage-based congestion charge
allocation scheme based solely on the technical information is developed to serve
as the primary function underlying a possible transmission congestion relief mar-
ket. The system users are given an opportunity to learn the impacts of their
transactions on the system congestion and to make adjustments accordingly in
response to these usage-based transmission signals.
It is also shown that a technical signal reflecting impact of system users on the
congestion status could be used interchangeably with a usage-based pricing signal
proposed to maintain reliability and to approach a near-optimal cost (Equation
(1-1)). For these signals to be used interchangeably, it is essential to define
nominal (most desired) operating conditions as the optimum.
- In this thesis, theoretical setups for implementing so-called transmission "rights"
are introduced. A transmission provider needs to respond to the market partici-
pants requesting the system use for some future period of time (typically season
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or year ahead). This is in addition to the responsibility to manage daily, or
hourly, shorter-term requests for access. The approach taken is similar to the
recently proposed priority-based insurance scheme. The actual implementation of
this scheme is proposed here for the first time. Estimation of the available rights
between certain nodes in the transmission network for the future season is defined
in terms of the essential information such as the location of the likely congestion,
degree to which well-defined groups of system users contribute to this congestion,
and the projected value of these rights to the system users.
The proposed congestion management framework is designed based on a hybrid
energy market structure which allows both coordinated poolco-type generation
dispatch as well as the bilateral and/or multilateral transactions. This makes
our approach compatible with the currently evolving market structures in the
electric power industry. The proposed congestion management framework is a
necessary step toward the successful implementation of open transmission access
to the power markets.
The third part of thesis contributes possible algorithms and software both for as-
sisting short-term congestion relief and for projecting long-term system conditions.
- Specifically, we derive formulae for computing the contributions of each economic
transactions to the congestion interface of interest in the steady-state operation.
The proposed congestion distribution factor (CDF) technique solves the slack bus
problem that exists in traditional distribution factor methods. In addition, the
CDF technique developed maps the physical localized response of a power network
to a disturbance into a supporting software.
- The congestion clusters based on the CDF technique introduced in this thesis
provide meaningful interpretation of so-called congestion zones. In the present
industry debate, congestion zones are viewed as a means of aggregating groups
of users for locational simplification of an otherwise very large electric network.
However, the same term is used to signify different grouping. It is used to de-
note groups of users belonging to the same utility (and separated by possible
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inter-utility congestion) [17], groups of users whose nodal prices are very simi-
lar based on the historic cost and technical data [107], or groups of users which
effect the congestion interfaces in a similar way. We point out a qualitative dif-
ference between zones as currently defined (according to administrative division,
or according to nominal nodal prices) and the congested line-dependent concept
first defined in this thesis. As congestion changes it location with the operating
conditions, the members of these clusters (zones) could change. This enables a
transmission provider to adapt signals sent to groups of system users in response
to changes in the system conditions.
A probabilistic optimal power flow (POPF) method developed in this thesis serves
as a means of computing likely congestion locations necessary to know for sys-
tematic long-term transmission provision. Several newly opened energy markets
such as Pennsylvania-Maryland-New Jersey (PJM) and California markets have
started offering long-term transmission rights. The prices for these rights are cur-
rently determined through auction processes based on what system users offer in
their bids for purchasing these rights. It is suggested in this thesis that a trans-
mission provider has to be an active decision maker in this auction process as well.
It is essential that the provider's decisions be based on some realistic estimates of
how many rights are likely to be available and of the price at which these rights
should be sold. The proposed POPF algorithm is the basic tool to a transmission
provider for this purpose.
- Consequently, the CDFs, congestion clusters and the probabilistic information
calculated using the POPF algorithm, should be posted on OASIS and made
accessible to all market participants. This information not only helps system users
in monitoring their technical impact but it also takes into account a near real-time
nature of an increasingly competitive market. We consider the availability of this
information to be essential for the development of a liquid transmission market.
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Figure 1-5 Hierarchical congestion management for a deregulated power in-
dustry.
1-4 Organization of This Thesis
Figure 1-5 outlines a basic structure of the hierarchical congestion management
introduced in this thesis. As shown in this figure, we partition the overall con-
gestion management problem into two major parts: a short-term and a long-term
management. In each of these two parts, we discuss in detail the transmission mar-
ket structure, congestion pricing mechanism as well as the information needed to
facilitate the proposed congestion management scheme. Finally, the necessary coor-
dination between long-term and short-term operations in order to optimally manage
transmission over a long period of time is recognized. Theoretical conditions un-
der which this hierarchical layout approaches the benchmark optimal operations
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and planning measure under full coordination (reviewed in Chapter 2) need fur-
ther studies. Following this basic structure, the thesis is organized in the following
format:
Before discussing the details of the proposed framework, Chapter 2 describes
the congestion management issues under restructuring in light of this benchmark
optimal performance measure. We first review the composite problem of operations
and planning for the regulated electric power network as a single stochastic optimal
control problem assuming no stability problems in moving from one system equi-
librium to the next [74, 118]. A decomposition of this complex problem into more
manageable subproblems is posed next. This decomposition reveals issues and crit-
ical conditions under which congestion management and transmission investment
problem can be decoupled based on the temporal separation. In this thesis, further
temporal decomposition of the congestion management is introduced assuming a
given network design, that is no investment decisions. The basic decomposition is
into (1) short-term (operations) daily or hourly decision making, and (2) long-term
decision-making for issuing and valuing transmission rights for the next period, say
season. Moreover, a method is formulated for deciding between denying short-term
market requests or paying back to the users who are holders of seasonal transmission
rights.
In Chapter 3, the main concepts proposed in this thesis are illustrated on a very
small power system. The rest of the thesis concerns algorithms necessary for making
the proposed framework feasible in the real-life electric power networks comprising
large number of nodes and transmission lines.
To start with, Chapter 4 presents a CDF-based method for efficient grouping
of system users according to their impact on the congestion interfaces. A set of
congestion distribution factors (CDFs) is developed first to serve as an analytic tool
to define the impact of each power transaction to the congestion interfaces. Next,
the proposed congestion clustering algorithm for computing congestion zones for a
particular transmission line of interest is described. The method is based on the
use of the proposed CDF technique. In the end of this chapter, we illustrate these
clusters on both IEEE 39-bus system and 2000-bus New England system.
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In Chapter 5, we describe conceptual use of congestion clusters for effective
transmission management. First, we demonstrate a feasibility of the functional
separation of the proposed transmission management from the energy market. Then,
a basic spot market for congestion relief is introduced. As argued in this chapter, the
locational-based marginal price (LBMP) congestion pricing as proposed in [46, 8] is
a specific sub-case of this market in which each transaction offers a bundled bid for
electricity and congestion to the same market. A particular example of this can be
found in the New York ISO proposal which uses incs and decs of the system users
willing to be re-dispatched at a price when congestion occurs.
In the second part of Chapter 5, a hybrid transmission market is described, in
which both system users and a transmission market coordinator actively evaluate
transmission service and its availability. A particular example of this can be found
in the California ISO which has a two-step iterative auction for re-dispatch in case
it is necessary for congestion management [17]. This demonstrates the use of a
closed-loop price signal which allows each market participant to make decisions in
a competitive market without depending upon the centralized control structure of
the traditional power system.
The last part of this thesis concerns issues regarding long-term transmission
provision and management as well as the necessary coordination between long-term
(seasonal) and short-term (hourly, daily) transmission markets.
Chapter 6 re-visits the composite operations/planning problem in light of pos-
sible algorithmic approaches to transmission provision under open access. In par-
ticular, a method for predicting long-term system conditions using a probabilistic
optimal power flow-based approach is introduced as an essential tool for long-term
transmission provision. This probabilistic information could help system users to
estimate the transmission related risks while making their electricity contracts.
Next, in Chapter 7, we show how the probabilistic information based on the
method introduced in Chapter 6 could be used by a system provider to design
menus for selling priority insurance service of different firmness for the next season
use. Once the menus are in place, it becomes necessary to make short-term deci-
sions concerning the tradeoff between denying new short-term requests for using the
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system or paying back the owners of priority service for not being served. This prob-
lem is posed as a dynamic programming problem that needs to be solved, keeping
in mind the cumulative effects of short-term decisions over the entire season.
Chapter 8 offers overall conclusions and identifies many open questions.
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Optimal
Transmission
Provision and Its
Temporal
Decomposition
The main objective of this chapter is to revisit the operations and plan-
ning of an electric power system, and, more specifically, of its trans-
mission system. The intent is to formulate the underlying problems as
decision-making procedures with specific performance objectives. Once
this is done, it becomes possible to identify open research questions on
this subject, including their dependence on the overall industry struc-
ture.
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2-1 Introduction
Transmission provision for the electric power industry under restructuring has
become one of today's hottest topics. System users are concerned with grid avail-
ability as they establish power trades in the electricity markets. System providers,
on the other hand, are concerned with the reliability of transmission systems. A
transmission provider is asked to provide short-term access to the power spot mar-
ket participants at the rate at which these markets evolve, typically only one day
ahead. In addition, new power plants often request longer-term use of a transmis-
sion network. The problem of transmission system expansion necessary to serve
probable market requests evolving at different rates is a very difficult theoretical
and practical problem. At the same time, the main responsibility of a transmission
provider remains keeping the system intact continuously.
The need to simultaneously serve short-term market requests and make commit-
ments to new entrants for future system use is hard to meet with presently available
computer methods. At present, tools for transmission system planning do not allow
a view of the problem as one of dynamic optimization under uncertainties with well-
posed long-term performance objectives. Most of the methods are either useful only
for short-term optimal use of the network, like deterministic optimal load flow, or
for long-term planning methods but not capable of optimal scheduling in short-term
operations.
This chapter concerns several fundamental problems related to transmission sys-
tem operations and planning in a competitive power industry. The network plays a
basic coordinating role in this otherwise decentralized industry. Coordinating sig-
nals could be implemented as technical- and/or price-feedback over various time
horizons, from short-term operations to time horizons over which physical, financial
and planning processes are interwined.
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2-2 Transmission System Operations and
Planning as a Single Stochastic Control
Problem
As the industry restructures, it becomes necessary to formulate the coupled op-
erations and planning problem. While it appears sufficient for a system operator
to manage only short-term transactions optimally and not to have any systematic
decision-making approach to expand a transmission system, we argue that, without
an approach which links short-term transmission operations and investment deci-
sions, the ultimate longer-term benefits of electricity users will be hard to ensure in
the new industry. In this section, we conlsider the problem of optimal transmission
provision as a single stochastic control problem comprising short-term decision-
making and planning.
As a rule, any real-life transmission network is likely to be congested due to
some load patterns and certain equipment outages. A theoretical formulation of
transmission system operations and planning as a single decision-making problem
capable of quantifying the cost tradeoffs between using more expensive generation
to supply load demand under the transmission constraints or enhancing the system
design is not available at present.
In this section, we propose one possible formulation for the composite operations
and planning problem for the regulated electric power industry. The problem is
posed as a stochastic optimization with the system-wide objective of minimizing
the total expected operating and investment cost of meeting the uncertain demand.
2-2.1 Problem Formulation
Consider an electric power system with n nodes whose net generation/demand is
controllable and the remaining nd nodes whose power injections are uncertain load
demands.
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Figure 2-1 Total electricity demand in the NEPOOL area on June 3rd, 1997.
Historically, utilities have viewed the load demand as an uncertain system in-
put; various forecasting methods have been developed for forecasting hourly, daily,
weekly, seasonal and, to a lesser extent, annual cycles in load demand changes.
Power system operations and planning were carried out with the main objective
of supplying this forecasted demand. Without loss of generality, we formulate the
control problem by representing the uncontrolled portion of the load as an uncer-
tain disturbance PL(t), and the controllable portion of the load demand (including
its responsiveness to change in the price of electricity) as a negative, controllable
generation.1
The demand of electricity usually presents the "multiple periodicity" property
[29, 30]. Here we use realistic data to illustrate the representative load demand char-
acterization and its periodicities. 2 Figures 2-1, 2-2, 2-3 show the daily, monthly, and
annual total electrical demand of 1997 in the New England power pool (NEPOOL)
area. Based on these figures, one can observe at least three periodicities relevant to
our problem formulation:
) one-day oscillation: typically the electricity demand pattern presents two peaks
at noon and evening; the lowest valley occurs around 4 am in the morning, Figure
2-1.
'This amounts to replacing the social welfare criterion with controllable cost; it is easy to include
price-elastic demand as an active decision variable if desired [113].2The data are downloaded from the FERC world wide web page. [40].
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Figure 2-2 Total electricity demand in the NEPOOL area in the month of June
1997.
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Figure 2-3 Total electricity demand for 1997 in the NEPOOL area.
@ one-week oscillation: working day load pattern and weekend pattern occur cycli-
cally every 7 days, Figure 2-2.
@ one-year oscillation: Spring, Summer, Fall and Winter load patterns occur re-
peatly, Figure 2-3.
Using Figure 2-3 type of plots to depict the long-term load tendency (season,
year) is apparently not efficient. In the current electric power industry, a probabilis-
tic representative is usually employed, i.e., so-called load duration curves. Math-
ematically, a load duration curve is simply a cumulative probability function; it
indicates the occurrence probability of each corresponding load level. The annual
load duration curve constructed from 1997 NEPOOL load data is shown in Figure
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Figure 2-4 The annual load duration curve constructed from NEPOOL data
of 1997.
2-4.
Depending on the optimization period T of interest, one can model demand as a
diffusion-type process characterized with different load duration curves (probability
distribution curves). For instance, if one is interested in the short run demand, e.q.,
hourly load fluctuation ph,,,, the load demand model could be represented as a
diffusion process of the form [29, 30]:
dhPo ur = b(T, Pjour)dT + v/dWr (2-1)
Similarly, the diffusion model for seasonal demand could be modeled as:
dPseason = b(7,Pleason)dr + -dW (2 2)
1( p
where e 26 W, is a Brownian motion.
The coordinated operations and planning problem is a combined problem of
short-term generation scheduling and investment in new generation and transmission
to balance load demand deviations ranging from hourly through seasonal and long-
term with the lowest cost. A possible mathematical formulation is as follows:
(Tmi + e Z (Ce(K, ( t)) dt (K2-3 (t), t))
to i
Zl ((K, (t), t) dt (-3+ to (t) 2
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subject to:
dK7T(t) - KI + T (t); KT(to) = Ko
dt
dKg(t) 
_ GK + I (t); Kg (to) = Ko
dt
IT (t) 2 0
Ig(t) > 0
Fi(PG(t),PL(t)) < K1 (2-4)
Pi(t) < Kg (2-5)
dA(t)n nd
dt = cspot(Z P(t) - E PL (t)); A(to)= 1 (2-6)
i=1 j=1
where
K7T(t) is the amount of installed transmission capacity for line 1.
Kg(t) is the amount of installed generation capacity at node i.
I7(t) is the rate of investment in transmission capacity for line 1.
I(t) is the rate of investment in generation capacity at node i.
C7'(K7', II7, t) is the cost of investment in line 1.
CP (KP, I, t) is the cost of investment at node i
Pi(t) is the production at node i, at time t; PG(t) = {PI(t) n (t)* T
ci(t) is the cost of this production, excluding capacity costs.
PL, (t) is the uncertain (uncontrolled) load at node j at time t; PL(t)
{PL1(t) ... PLfl (t)}T.
F1 (PG (t), PL (t)) represents the flow on line 1 as a function of generation and demand
system inputs.
A(t) is the spot electricity market price at time t.
p is a discount rate.
gT is the depreciation rate of a transmission line.
pG is the depreciation rate of a generator.
K1TO, KP", A0 are the initial transmission capacity, generation capacity, and spot
electricity price, respectively.
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The optimization period, T, corresponds to the longer of two time intervals
over which the generation or transmission investments are valued. A(t), Kr(t)
and K7(t) are state variables. The control variables are the rate of investment in
transmission capacity IT(t), the rate of investment in generation capacities I(t),
and the injection of power at each node PG(t). The uncertain portion of the load
at nodes j is the disturbance input PL(t) = {PLi (t) ... PLd (t)}T. The control is
bounded by the set of constraints described above. A set of Lagrange multipliers is
associated with each set of constraints.
In this formulation, the process of balancing total generation and demand is
represented with consideration of evolving electricity spot markets, and it assumes
that the market clears at the (economic) equilibrium. In this sense, (2-6) represents
a sequence of daily spot market equilibria. This simple formulation is used to stress
the fact that even the daily market-clearing process should be viewed as a dynamic
process in composite operations and planning decision-making, see [106]. The effect
of longer-term bilateral transactions taking place outside daily spot markets is mod-
eled as a more slowly evolving process, as described in the later part of this thesis
devoted to the more complex industry forms under restructuring.
This problem formulation, in spite of its apparent complexity, captures many
well-known trade-offs relevant to the efficiency of the power industry. First, the
discount rate reflects the time value of money. Everything being equal, it is better
to spend money now than later. Thus, the investment timing balances the trade-
off between the costs and benefits over time. Second, this formulation shows that
different generation facilities at different locations can be used to produce power.
Thus, for a given load duration curve, the ratio between variable costs and capacity
costs for each of these generation resources determines the optimal pattern and
mix of generation. Third, generation capacity can be substituted for transmission
capacity. The main trade-off between saving on generation costs and investing in
transmission capacity is also encapsulated in the problem. The level of transmission
capacity is not based on the maximum yearly flow. A trade-off between the costs of
congestion and the costs of transmission capacity must be considered. Finally, the
problem stated above is an uncertain problem. The stochastic formulation reflects
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the value of flexible investment under uncertainties.
2-2.2 Optimal Transmission Management
This section demonstrates a dynamic programming formulation that can be used
to solve the optimization problem defined in (2-3)-(2-6). As formulated in the
previous section, the control variables in this problem are u = {PG, I T IG}T. The
optimization problem is to find the best control policy u*(Kr, Kf, PL) E U which
minimizes Equation (2-3), where U is the set of all admissible control policies. First,
we use V(.) to denote the objective function to be minimized, i.e.,
V(KG,K,PL)=
ITmm. &j -ePtTSC (t K T K G IT, 1GG PL)dt (2-7)UEu t" G
where TSC(.) is the total system cost:
Tsc(t,Kf,Kr,II 9 ,PG,PL)=
Zci(t, Pi() + Cr (Kr (t), Ir(t), t)) + E (of (Ki (t), If (t), t)) (2-8)
Next, we divide the optimization time horizon [to, T] into N pieces.
AT = T (2-9)
Next, we use V(.) to denote the discrete-time cost-to-go function in the dynamic
programming (DP) algorithm. Then, the Bellman's equation for solving this DP
problem can be written as:
V*(kATK, KGPL) =
min TSC(kAT, Kf, Kr IT, I, PG, PL) AT
+V*((k+ 1)AT,K+ AKf, K + AK, PL + APL)} (2-10)
Then, it is possible to further expand V*((k + 1)AT, Kf + AKf, Kr + AKr, PL +
APL) into following terms:
V*([k + 1] AT, Kf + AKf, Kr + AKr, PL + APL)
T *( AT8P* K9L* K*
=QV*(kAT,K1 ,K?,PL) + -AT + AK1T+ K AK
+ A PLOPL
1 a2p
+ 1 P + H.O.T
2 &P2
(2-11)
In addition, system dynamic equations are also discretized at each AT time interval.
K7T [k+1] = KT[k]+(-gJKI+IT)AT
Kf [k +1] = Kf[k] + (-gGK + I )AT
PL[k+1] PL[k]+-b(PL[k])AT+ AW
E 8
(2-12)
(2-13)
(2-14)
Substituting (2-12)-(2-14) into (2-11), then we can re-write the equation into fol-
lowing form:
*([k +1] AT, Kf + AKT, Kg + AKg, PL + APL)
= Y*(kAT, K1T KG, PL) + AT + (-OTKf + I} a AT
at OKT
89*1 a9* AT
+(-gYGKi + I) KAT + -b A T +
OK E OPL
la&2p.I CV0frAT + H.O.T (2-15)2 e p2
Next, we can substitute (2-15) into the Ballmen equation, (2-10), and then take
limits on the both sides of the equation. The discretized objective function should
approach to the continuous one, i.e.,
lim V V
AT- 0,k->oo,kAT--+t
Therefore, the optimal cost-to-go function should satisfy
min TSC(t,K,KG ,J,I ,PG, PL)
VD (KT D V
+V(Kf,K,PL) + (- TK I +T)Kat OK1T
(2-16)
+(-gGKg + IG) av
aKg
I bav
+-b +
e8PL
Ia 02 V =0
1E a 2L
Then, the optimal control policy can be obtained by solving following Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellmen equation:
OV(KT, K, PL) +
at
IBV(K[,
e
K,PL)+min {AV(KI',K,PL)
usuI
+ TSC(t,KI,K,IT',IfPG,PL) = 0
av 1 a2v
= b((PL) V+ 2a -1
(2-18)
50
(2-17)
where
BV(KT, K ,PL) ( - 9)
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T&V 9VAV(KI,K,PL) = (-TKT+I )8K T GKIf ) K (2-20)
Notably, to obtain this solution, we assume that the system operator/planner has full
control over all the generation resources and always has sufficient capital to expand
certain amount of transmission or generation capacities whenever the investment
is considered necessary. In addition, this solution also implies the possibility of
continuous investment. In reality, power plants and transmission lines are built
in lumps of quantities at discrete instances and the time scale for transmission or
generation investment usually ranges from a season to as long as several years. On
the other hand, the generation dispatch is currently done in a hourly basis. Due to
this property, it is possible to decompose this full-blown problem formulation into
more manageable sub-problems.
2-3 Temporal Decomposition of the Problem
The most difficult tasks in transmission provision is to formulate the problem
as a stochastic dynamic problem evolving at vastly different rates. The question of
conditions under which the single problem can be decomposed into simpler subprob-
lems when the objective is the long-term optimization under uncertainties subject to
short-term operating constraints makes this problem a singularly perturbed stochas-
tic control problem [10, 64]. Establishing this formulation is potentially helpful to
define these conditions.
The anticipated load pattern is met differently depending on which industry
structure is in place. For example, in an industry which allows long-term bi-
lateral contracts between load and power suppliers, real-time operations concern
only adjustments of power produced and consumed around these patterns, so that
short-term load variations are compensated without violating transmission system
constraints.3 On the other hand, in a power market in which all power supplied and
consumed must be traded on daily basis, short-term operations concern generation
3 The basis for defining these constraints for a given system is outside the scope of this thesis.
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scheduling to meet the entire demand, including its long-term trends and short-term
deviations simultaneously.
In this thesis, we discuss transmission provision problems under the assumption
that a portion of the load is supplied through longer-term, pre-committed bilateral
contracts (since at present there are no active long-term markets for trading elec-
tricity; they are being formed), while faster variations are managed through daily
electricity spot markets. In this case, the long-term bilateral system users often
require an ex ante guarantee (a transmission "right") so that they will be able to
use the system in the future according to pre-specified conditions and independent
from actual system conditions.
The coupled operations and planning formulation is obviously complex because
it poses operations and planning as a single optimization problem evolving at the
same time t. In reality, however, the process of scheduling supply to meet demand in
operations typically happens much faster than the rate at which investment decisions
are made.
This observation is the basis for solving the two subproblems as if they were
decoupled. To formally introduce these two subproblems, assume without loss of
generality that the short-term (daily or hourly) decisions are made each hour [kTH],
and investment decisions are made each season [nTs], and k = 0, 1, - - -, where TH =
Ts . The problem defined in (2-3)-(2-6) can then be re-stated as an optimization
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problem subject to multi-rate discrete-time processes using techniques introduced
in [45]. The problem formulation (2-3) takes on the form
r T
TH
min E -pikis](ci (kTH, i [H] [kH])
ITf [nTs ],Iq [nTs ],pi [kT H
TS
+ ( e-P[nTs] C (K [nTs], Ig [nTs], [nTs])
i n=0
T
+ ( e-?"Is]CI'(K7'[nTs ], 17[nTs], [nTs]) (2-21)
1 n=O
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subject to:
K T[(n + 1)Ts]
K [(n + 1)Ts]
Ii'[nTs]
Ig [nTs]
F(Pi[kTH], PLj [kTH])
P[kTH]
A[(k + 1)TH] = MkTH]
= K7 [nTs] + ( -p KT [nTs] + I17 [nTs])Ts
= Kri[nTs] + (-GK[nTs] + I [nTs])Ts
K7'[0] = KTo K[0] = Kgo
> 0
0
K
--
K7'[nTs]
Kg [nTs]
n nd
espot Pi[kTH] - PLj kTH]); [O] A0  (2-23)
i=1 j=1
This problem can be interpreted as a stochastic optimal control problem for a
dynamic model in a standard discrete-time singularly perturbed form [45]
min JT(uf, us, w)
UfUs
(2-24)
subject to
dx = g1(x,u s ,w)dt; x(to) = xz
dz = g2 (uf,w)dt;
and
h(uf, x, w) < 0
where x = {K7', Kg}T and z = A are the state variables associated with the fast
and slow dynamics; x0 , and zo are toe corresponding initial states; uf {PG and
US = {f 1T, J}T are fast and slow control variables; and V/'dw = dPL - 0(t, PL)dt
is the disturbance drives the system.
Observe that the slow and fast variables are coupled primarily through load de-
mand (disturbance) dynamics. The multiple periodicities of the load demand set the
basis for separation of planning and operations objectives in the regulated industry.
Planning is the process of controlling the rate of investments in transmission and
(2-22)
z(to) = zo (2-25)
(2-26)
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generation, IT and If respectively, so that load demand evolving over longer-term
horizons (seasons and longer) is served at the lowest possible cost. (This is done
assuming that generation/demand scheduling in operations will be a stable pro-
cess.) Similarly, controlling use of available generation PG in real time operations
(hourly and shorter) is done to meet anticipated hourly demand at the lowest pos-
sible cost. The ultimate objective is to minimize the cost of both investments and
operations while meeting the uncertain system load demand PL(t). The theoretical
conditions under which the two subproblems are separable and the implications on
sub-optimality of JT have never been studied.
In what follows, we first describe the zero-th order (decoupled) short-term and
long-term stochastic control subproblems for the regulated industry. Next, in Sec-
tion 2-3.1 we show that much-debated nodal pricing as a proposed means of short-
term congestion pricing is a result of solving the fast control subproblem in the
near-optimal composite control of the coupled operations/planning problem.
In Section 2-3.2, we pose a computationally simpler version of the transmission
pricing problem for the next season so that at the end of the period a long-term opti-
mal investment is made. By solving the slow control subproblem of the fully coupled
operations/planning problem, the optimal periodical decision-making (once a sea-
son, or once a year) is determined. We point out that a stochastic peak load pricing
for transmission approach is equivalent to solving this slow control subproblem [74].
By much the same way as in any other composite control design for singularly
perturbed systems, one could study the conditions under which solving two sub-
problems makes sense. Moreover, inherent in solving the slow control problem is the
optimal solution of the expected fast control problem over the entire time horizon. 4
The point is made that, by viewing the composite operations/planning problem as
one and decomposing it into simpler dynamic decision subproblems under relatively
unrestrictive conditions, a near-optimal transmission may be possible.
4 In Chapter 6 an approximate computing method for obtaining the expected short-term optimum
is introduced by means of solving a probabilistic optimal power flow [118].
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2-3.1 Fast Control Subproblem: Congestion
Management Problem
The composite operations/planning problem formulation is used next to pose
the objectives of short-term transmission operations and planning as two decoupled
near-optimal subproblems evolving at significantly different rates.
Assuming that network and generation are given over the entire T, a zero-th
order fast control subproblem becomes a decision-making process about which units
to turn on and off and how to adjust the power generated in short-term operations.
In this section, we focus on the short-run operations of the daily spot power mar-
ket. This sub-problem formulation directly follows from the composite optimization
problem under the assumption thatTH < 1. The network topology and parameters,
K [nTs], as well as generation plants, Ki [nTs], are given. Assuming furthermore
that the daily power market is at its moving equilibrium (each day there is enough
generation to meet load demand and power is sold at the optimum clearing price
A(t)), a short-term operating optimization problem is the problem to
k=TTH nl
min ES ( (c(Pi[kTH],PL[kTH]) (2-27)
Pi[kTH] k=0 i=1
subject to the constraints:
n+nd
SHui(Pi[kTH - PL [kTH]) < K, [nTs] (2-28)
i=1
P [kTH| < Kg [nTs]
A[(k + 1)TH] A[kTH] +
n nd
CSPOt( P [kTH] - E PLj kTH); A [0] = AO (229)
i=1 j=1
Here, a simplified DC load flow approximation is used to express line flow con-
straints. H is the matrix of distribution factors [66] and transmission losses are
neglected.
This problem is also a stochastic control problem; a fast control (decision) vari-
able is the controllable power injected into individual network nodes in response to
very fast random fluctuations in load demand given in equation (2-1). This prob-
lem is a dynamic control problem which could be solved using various computing
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methods [11, 12].
Presently, this sub-problem is solved as a static optimization problem. At each
[kTH], given the system demand PL [(k ± 1)TH] for the next hour, a system operator
optimizes generation, PG [(k + 1)TH], to meet the total demand at the lowest possible
cost. This problem is known as the optimal power flow (OPF) problem. The result
of solving the OPF problem is given as:
dci (t)L
Pi(t) dPi(t) A(t) - (ZHiipi(t) (2-30)
dP 2 (t)l=1
The symbol A represents the price of power at the chosen arbitrary (slack) node.
L
The term Ei Hfip, where L is the total number of transmission lines, reflects loca-
l=1
tional differences in optimal prices. Even though pj is always positive by definition,
the term E Hlip, can be positive or negative. The value of A and the distribution
factors matrix depend on the choice of the arbitrary slack bus. However, the value
of nodal prices pi and of pIl are independent from this choice. The term P1 represents
the marginal value of the existing transmission capacity of line 1. In other words,
it represents the increment in total cost that would result from a unit transmission
capacity upgrade. This value is equal to zero, as long as the line is not congested,
and becomes strictly positive when the flow on line 1 is equal to the capacity K 1.
These formulae provide the basis for the so-called nodal or locational based marginal
price (LBMP) transmission pricing [98].
2-3.2 Slow Control Subproblem: Optimal Investment
Problem
Generally speaking, the notion of investment is inherently inter-temporal [21].
By investing a fixed amount of money today, the centralized utility reduces its costs
over time. For this reason, uncertainty issues are at the heart of investment theories.
The basic existence of risk is taken into account through the choice of the discount
rate p: the more uncertain future pay-offs are, the higher the discount rate and the
lower the optimal investments.
To pose the investment problem as an active risk management problem, we view
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it here as a slow optimal control subproblem of the coupled operations/planning
problem given in equations (2-3)-(2-6) as follows:
T
min £ ( e-pikTS](ci[kTH], Pi [kTH)
I [kTs],IG[kTs] k=0
T
+ ( e-Pl["'s Cf (K 9 [nTs], I [nTs], [nTs])
i n=O
T
TS
+( ( e-PlnTIsC7(K7 [nTs], 17 [nTs], [nTs]) (2-31)
1 n=O
subject to:
K T[(n + 1)Ts] = K7[nTs] + (- eTKT [nTs] + I [nTs|)Ts
K ± [(n + 1)Tsl = KP [nTs] + (- PGK[nTs] + IP[nTs])Ts
K [0] = KTo, K5[0] = KP"
I'[nTs] > 0
I5[nTs] 2 0 (2-32)
Relation to stochastic peak-load pricing for transmission
Drawing from the work of Kleindorfer and Crew [28], a definition of an optimal
grid in a static and deterministic set-up was introduced in [69, 70]. Knowing the cost
functions of generators and demand function in the future, it is possible to define
the cost functions ci(t, P), as well as the total cost function, as time dependent
functions.
At t = 0, investments in transmission capacity are made to minimize both the
discounted costs of generation over the planning horizon and the initial cost of
investments. If T is a planning horizon and p the appropriate discount rate, then the
optimal transmission investments K7' result from solving the following optimization
problem:5
5 In this formulation, only transmission investment is of interest; generation is assumed given.
For optimal generation/transmission investment see [74].
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K T -P'TC(t, K1,.. K) jdt +( CIT(KT) (2-33)(1T L
subject to K > 0 where the total cost function is defined by:
n
TC(t,KT,..K) =min ci(t,Pi) (2-34)
Pi
The novel aspect of transmission pricing as a feedback design problem for a
dynamic system driven by uncertainties evolving at various rates can be interpreted
in the context of this basic problem formulation. An ex ante probabilistic peak-load
pricing for transmission introduced in [74] as one possible way of evaluating the
tradeoffs between using more expensive generation or expanding the transmission
system has the same formulation as the long-term coordination problem described
here. This formulation leads to a possible notion of an optimal transmission grid as
a system in which the expected cost savings in long-term generation cost cannot be
larger than the cost of investing in the transmission system upgrades [70].
It is important to note that this definition is probabilistic even for normal op-
erating conditions if the equipment status is as designed. It further depends on the
initial conditions, in other words, on existing transmission at the time when new
investment is considered [75]. It is also a long-term notion because, for the expensive
transmission equipment to pay off, the long term savings on the cost of generation
must be analyzed. The longer time T over which the investment in transmission is
assessed, the more expensive equipment can be justified. On the other hand, the
prediction of load demand trends far into the future as well as the trends of the fuel
costs becomes less accurate. In addition, the new generation investments are highly
uncertain over prolonged future periods.
The investment problem is inherently a stochastic control problem. The evo-
lution of the random variables is modeled through a stochastic process and the
investment decisions are made based on the expected long-term costs. Contrary to
the stochastic model referred to in the static optimal grid model, the investment
planning problem is now characterized by inter-temporal considerations [33].
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2-4 Summary
This chapter states a general problem formulation of dynamic transmission pro-
vision in the competitive industry and reviews the objectives of a transmission
provider. It has been demonstrated in this chapter that this problem can be decom-
posed into two subproblems: the congestion management problem and the optimal
investment problem. In the remainder of this thesis, we study how to provide a
market-based solution for the fast sub-problem, congestion management problem,
in the newly evolving industry structures.
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Hierarchical
Congestion
Management for
the Power Industry
under
Restructuring
In this chapter, we introduce basic concepts underlying our proposed hi-
erarchical congestion management framework. Under this framework,
markets for transmission are functionally separated from generation
markets. Proposed usage-based pricing strategies for short-term and
long-term transmission services provide economic incentives to network
users to adjust their requests so that flows on transmission lines re-
main within the technical limits with high probability. A near-optimal
market equilibrium is achieved by means of interactions between de-
centralized optimization processes exercised by network users and the
price feedback provided by the grid operator. Most of the concepts are
illustrated on a small three-bus system.
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3-1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we have reviewed the overall objective of operating an
electric power network in order to accomplish the most efficient use of available
generation for supplying total system demand subject to given transmission and
generation constraints. This systemwide optimum is reachable (in theory) if all
generation resources are dispatched in a coordinated way, the way in which economic
dispatch (ED) process is implemented in a regulated industry. In other words, the
optimal use of generation is the result of solving a single coordinated optimization
problem defined in Equations (1-1)-(1-7).
However, as the industry restructures, the power is supplied to users according
to qualitatively different mechanisms. The decision to sell power is based on the
distributed criteria under which, for the expected price of electricity, each power
producer individually optimizes his own profit by deciding on the amount of power
to sell into an energy market. To start with, power producers and consumers are
not concerned with the technical status of a transmission system. Depending on
the rules and responsibilities under which the system users are allowed access to a
transmission system, their concerns may vary. These rules for transmission provision
may take following forms:
(1) system users are required to pay a fixed access charge to the transmission system
and expect to be denied access in case of insufficient system capacity;
@ system users pay a fixed access charge and, in addition, pay for congestion they
create in the actual operations;
© system users purchase a long-term service at a sufficiently high price, to ensure
themselves against the unpredictable congestion pricing or physical curtailment
in the actual operations.
Results of a coordinated dispatch and the interplay of the distributed optimization
processes by individual system users subject to these transmission provision rules
are generally not the same. The challenge in this thesis is the development of
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such transmission provision mechanisms which induce market equilibria close to the
results of the coordinated optimization, while letting individual system users make
their own decisions concerning participation in the energy markets.
A similar problem can be found in managing the use of communications or gas
pipeline networks [86, 63]. However, this problem is more complex in the electric
power network since there are no controllers capable of controlling individual line
flows directly. This problem is being recently referred to as a "loop flow" problem.
In this chapter, we describe conceptual setting for our proposed transmission pro-
vision network. This is done by reviewing two other major concepts proposed for
solving the same problem and by highlighting their differences and similarities to
our proposed framework. We start by reviewing the objectives of the individual
system users under competition.
3-2 Distributed Optimization in Energy
Markets
In this section, we review basic decision making criteria of the market partici-
pants without considering line-flow constraints. As shown in Figure 3-1, a genera-
tion cost curve is usually approximated by a quadratic function as follows: 1
cG(G) r= aiP + biPG1 + ci (3-1)
Thus, by definition, the short-run marginal cost (SRMC) of a generator is the first
derivative of its cost function with respect to the real power output, that is,
MCi(PGi) 0CGiG(PG) (3-2)
OPGi
= 
2 aiPGi + bi (3-3)
In the follows, we recall the result of the unconstrained economic dispatch in a
regulated power industry and then, review the result of the distributed optimization
'This approximation may results in larger errors for hydro or combined cycle generators. The
production cost for a hydro unit is relatively low (the fixed cost portion is much more significant)
and almost independent from the amount of power actually generated; A combined cycle unit
usually has a discontinuous, piecewise quadratic cost curve.
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Cc~i(PG)=ai PG+bPGi+ci MG (PGi) = 2ai PGi+ bi
Figure 3-1 A typical cost function of a generator and its associated marginal
cost curve.
by the individual market participants.
3-2.1 Coordinated Generation Dispatch in a Regulated
Industry
In a regulated power industry, the systemwide efficiency is defined as minimizing
total generation cost needed to meet the given demand. 2 If line-flow constraints and
transmission losses are not accounted for, the simplest setup of the economic dis-
patch process practiced by a utility company amounts to minimizing total generation
cost: 3 (ng
min cGi (PGi) (3-4)
PGi (ng
subject to the constraint that total generation equal given demand
ng n1
PGi PL (3-5)
This is a static optimization problem with an equality constraint and it can be
solved by various optimization methods. Since, in this analysis, the generation cost
curves are assumed quadratic, the convexity of this problem is guaranteed. This
also implies the existence and uniqueness of the global optimal solution. Based on
the necessary condition defined by the Lagrangian methods [13], at the systemwide
2This definition for systemwide efficiency will be adopted throughout this thesis. Implied in this
thesis is the assumption of inelastic load. However, most of the thesis results are generalizable to
relax this assumption.
3This process is usually referred to as unconstrained economic dispatch.
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optimum, all power plants operate at the same marginal cost, i.e.,
&cG1(PG1) OCG2(PG2) OcGng (PGng) _
OPG1 &PG2  - - OpGng
This marginal cost at the optimal operating point is called "system A." The system A
normally represents a lumped value of system generation produced at this operation
point.
3-2.2 Decentralized Optimization under Competition
In this section, we review the basic decision making process of individual par-
ticipants in a energy market and also examine the technical conditions under which
the same optimal dispatch is achieved as in a regulated industry.
The profit function, 7rGi, of each generator i can be expressed in terms of its
power output as:
WGi (PG) = pPGi - CGi(PGJ) (3-7)
where p is the price of electricity. The main objective of each generator is its profit
maximization, that is,
max rGi (PG). (3-8)
PGi
The maximum profit of a generator can be achieved by satisfying the first order
condition of (3-8):
O7rG-
p = P - MC(PGi) = 0 (3-9)OPGi
Based on this result, the best strategy for a generator is to sell power at its marginal
cost under the perfect market conditions. Moreover, without including any line-flow
constraint, the electricity prices in a competitive market should converge to the
same equilibrium price. Thus, at the market equilibrium, all generators should have
the same marginal costs. This result is identical with the result (Equation (3-6))
obtained when optimizing total generation cost.
Here, we use a simple three-bus example with two generators and a single load
to illustrate this process, Figure 3-2. In this example, we assume that the marginal
cost functions of two generators are MC 1 (PG 1 ) = 10 + 0.05PG1 and MC2(PG2 )
20+0. 1 PG2 , respectively. This makes G2 is relatively expansive comparing to G1. In
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Figure 3-2 A simple 3-bus example.
addition, all transmission lines are assumed lossless and have the same impedance.
Electricity demand at L is assumed price-inelastic and equals 800MW. Under this
setup, one can solve the most economic generation dispatch, which is {PG1 , PG 2 1
{600MW, 200MW}. The corresponding system A at this operating point is $40/MW.
As reviewed above, in a competitive energy market, since the best strategies
for both G1 and G 2 are to sell power at marginal cost, the market should clear at
the same optimal operation point as if generators are dispatched in a coordinated
way.4 For instance, for the 3-bus example, the same dispatch point {PG1 , PG 2 I =
{600MW, 200MW} is the market equilibrium and $40/MW is the market clearing
price.
Figure 3-3 is a graphic illustration of the market equilibrium point in this 3-bus
example. In this figure, values on X-axis and Y-axis indicate the amount of real
power sold by G1 and G 2 , respectively, and contours are drawn with respect to the
different total production costs, (cG1 (PG 1 ) - CG2 (PG 2 )). The solid line corresponds
to the equality constraint, PG1 + PG2 = 800MW. Since customer L is going to buy
electricity from both G 1 and G2 in order to meet the 800MW demand with spending
the least amount of money, effectively, L is searching for the lowest cost point alone
the solid line in Figure 3-3. The open circle in Figure 3-3 indicates this market
equilibrium point.
4 Again, this is under the perfect market assumptions.
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Figure 3-3 An illustration of the market equilibrium.
3-3 Accounting for Line-flow Constraints
Next, we recognize that the unconstrained optimization may result in the line
flow exceeding allowable operating limits. All line flows, Fi-j, are subject to the
load flow constraints:
Pi = Fij (3-10)
jEKi
where P is the real power injected at bus i; Ki is a set of buses directly connected
to bus i; and Fi-j is the line flow on the transmission line connecting buses i and j.
These transmission line flows are, furthermore, subject to congestion limits:
Fi_ I< Fj" a (3-11)
To illustrate the effect of transmission line constraints, a 400MW line-flow limit
is imposed on line G 1-L in the 3-bus example as shown in Figure 3-4. Namely, an
additional inequality constraints, FGi-L =PG 1 ±-PG2 < 400MW, is incorporated
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Figure 3-4
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A 400MW line-flow constraint on line G-L.
Figure 3-5 The new optimal generation dispatch point that accounts for
400MW line-flow constraint.
in the optimization process.5
In Figure 3-5, the dashed line indicates the 400MW line-flow constraint. Only
operating points on the left-hand side of this line are feasible solutions. Conse-
quently, the unconstrained optimal point, {PG1 , PG2 } = {600MW, 200MW}, is no
longer feasible and the constrained optimum now moves to the intersection of the two
constraints (the solid line and the dash line), i.e., {PG1, PG2 } ={400MW, 400MW}.
5 The coefficients , } are determined based on the transmission line impedances and the net-
work topology. These coefficients are usually referred to as distribution factors of transmission line
flow G1-L. More details regarding distribution factor techniques will be discussed in Chapter 4.
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In the regulated industry, the system operator can re-dispatch controllable gen-
eration to accommodate these constraints. However, as the electricity markets open
to competition, new market structures for managing flows within the network con-
straints have to be established.
Recently, several different models for congestion management in competitive
electricity markets have been proposed. However, the most suitable framework is
still under the intensive debate. Among these different proposals, the most widely
acknowledged ones are a bid-based poolco structure and a multilateral market struc-
ture. We next briefly review these two types of transmission provision structures.
3-3.1 Nodal Pricing as a Means of Managing Congestion
Applying nodal pricing method as a means of managing congestion in a poolco-
type energy market has been recently promoted and was adopted in parts of the
United States with different variations, such as energy markets in New York (NY-
ISO), and Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland interconnection (PJM) [46].
This design assumes existence of an independent system operator (ISO) serving
as a market coordinator. Customers sell and/or buy electricity to/from this market
via a coordinated auction process. Price-based bids from generators are directly
submitted to the independent system operator and then are selected in a merit order.
In such a way, the ISO dispatches generation to meet the total system demand and
also allocates transmission capacities at the same time. Mathematically, an ISO
applies the same economic dispatch scheduling method as described in (3-4) and
(3-5) with the difference of generation costs being replaced by the bids, that is
ng
min Gi (PGi) (3-12)
PGi{
subject to the same power-balance constraint
ng n1
Z Gi ~~ PL (3-13)
and line-flow constraints
Fij < Fj ax (3--14)
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where Gi (PGi) is the payment function which defines the price at which generator
Gi is willing to sell amount of power Poi.
Nodal prices, then, can be calculated based on the optimal pricing theory [98].
By solving a dual process of the cost minimization problem, a set of non-identical
short-run marginal costs at different buses is obtained at the constrained optimum.
Based on this theory, the nodal price at a generator is the marginal operation cost
(the marginal bid if it is bid-based), pi =OaGi and the nodal price at a load bus(9PGi
is its shadow prices, Pj =o [98, 46]. Theoretically, if the price at each node is
pre-specified in such a way, the market will settle to the optimal dispatch point after
reaching the equilibrium. 6
If there is no congestion, a single market clearing price, which equals the last
bid accepted, will be settled at the end of each auction period (usually each hour).
All consumers pay for the use of electricity at this price and all generators sell their
electricity at the same price. However, when a system constraint is reached (3-14),
congestion prices being paid to different power producers, and prices paid by power
users are different and depend on the geographic locations. These prices are known
as the nodal prices; recently, they have been called locational-based marginal prices
(LBMPs) [46, 80, 89].
We use next the same 3-bus example to simulate the operations of a poolco
market. Due to the additional line-flow constraint, the poolco market is forced to
clear at PG1 = 400MW and PG2 = 400MW as shown in Figure 3-6. Assuming that
both generators bid their marginal cost curves, the corresponding nodal prices at
the three buses are PG 1 =$30/MW, pG2 =$60/MW, and PL =$90/MW. Therefore,
customer L has to pay total of $72,000 for the use of electricity; G1 and G2 are paid
$12,000 and $24,000, respectively.
Since the electricity prices vary with different locations, the systemwide value
gained by using a transmission system can be viewed as the total benefit of moving
inexpensive generation from a low price bus to a high price bus. Based on this, one
6 The objective of optimal pricing is to maximize the total social welfare. In order to achieve
this, one can show that prices should be set at the marginal production cost.
$30/MW
400MW
$60/MW
$90/MW
Figure 3-6 The generation dispatch and the corresponding nodal prices in a
poolco type market.
Table 3.1 A summary of charges/payments based on nodal pricing in a poolco
market (3-bus example).
parties LBMP total $ paid total $ received
G1  $30/MW - $12,000
G1  $60/MW - $24,000
L $90/MW $72,000 1_-_1
ISO - -_$36,000
can define the value of a transmission link connecting buses i and j, pi,j, to be the
difference of the two nodal prices as follows [113],
pi=,j Pj - Pi (3-15)
In most of the poolco type markets, this portion of the total revenue is collected by
the ISO; therefore, an ISO gets paid (90 - 30) x 400 + (90 - 60) x 400 = $36,000.
Table 3.1 is a summary of congestion charges and payments in a poolco market.
Possibilities for gaming under congestion
It is interesting to analyze a possible strategy adopted by a generator in a poolco-
type market. Following the same analysis as in Section 3-2.2, without transmission-
line constraints, the best strategy for a generator is to bid its marginal cost curve,
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Figure 3-7 Possible gaming strategy for a generator in a bundled electricity
market.
MCi(PGi).7 Since the price bids submitted by market participants are close to the
marginal cost curves, an ISO has a clear measure of the system efficiency under its
jurisdiction.
However, in the cases of congestion, the best strategy for a generator is no longer
to bid its marginal cost curve. For instance, in the 3-bus example, the amount
of electricity that G1 can produce is primarily decided by the line-flow constraint
instead of by its price bid. Therefore, even if G1 changed its bid, the system will
end up at the same generation dispatch (as long as its bid is less expensive than
the bid by the generator G2 ). As shown in Figure 3-7, G1 can increase its revenue
by the amount of the dark rectangle area (b-c-e-d) if G1 slightly shifts up its bid.
In the extreme case, G1 can submit the same bid as G 2 and then the market will
clear at exactly the same {400MW, 400MW} point as if there were no congestion in
the system. In this case, the ISO collects no money. Under this scenario, the profit
allocation between power producer and the ISO is not the same as defined in the
optimal pricing theory [98]. The optimal operating point shown in Figure 3-6 can
no longer be assumed.
This scenario is, furthermore, an indication of the hidden issues related to a
71t is assumed in this analysis that all market participants are price takers. The gaming oppor-
tunities described here are strictly transmission congestion-related.
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poolco-type market structure. Generally, one should not assume that the fact that
nodal prices computed based on the price bids automatically guarantees the theoret-
ically optimal solution. Moreover, although the relation between the transmission-
related profit collected by an ISO and the actual transmission owners needs further
clarifications, the gaming by generators apparently results in inappropriate revenue
allocation in such type of markets.
3-3.2 Technical Protocols as a Means of Congestion
Management
The second approach is the so-called multilateral market model, which was pro-
posed by Wu and Varaiya [112] in 1996. Based on this approach, only after all sales
have been made, does an ISO check whether the total set of transactions is feasible
on the network, i.e., if the resulting line flows are within the technical constraints.
In case when all line flows remain within the acceptable operating constraints, one
considers the energy market requests (transactions) to be feasible. The transactions
in this proposal are generally multilateral, that is the contracts for selling and pur-
chasing power are among several participants. If the transactions are feasible, then
nothing further actions need be done. However, if at least one line flow exceeds the
maximum allowed limit, then the allowed transactions are initially curtailed by a
system operator to a feasible point.
Consider a sub-set of market participants g. All members of this set trade among
themselves so that
max { Gi (PG) + LE Lj (PLj) (3-16)PGi Li Gi69 LjE9
where
rGi(PGj) = PPGi - CG G(Pc); (3-17)
7L (PLj) = ULj (PLj) - PPLj; (3-18)
cG (PG) and ULj (PLj) are the cost function of generator Gi and the utility function
of load Lj, respectively. Formula (3-16) is a generalization of the formula (3-8) when
a single market participant makes decisions to purchase or sell electricity. Observe
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that prior to accounting for transmission line constraints, the result of the profit
optimization assuming perfect market conditions, is identical to the result obtained
as each individual market participant decides, once the market price p is known.
It has been proposed in [112] that an ISO imposes a technical constraint based
on a simple DC load flow as congestion lines place. This technical constraint can be
posed as
Fij ~ DP < F["q V(i - j) E constrained lines (3-19)
where P is a vector of real power injection into all buses, and D is a set of the
distribution factors. Under the DC-load flow assumptions, the relation between real
power injections, P, and voltage phase angles, 6, is
P(6) = B (3-20)
where B is the network susceptance matrix. If we denote the vector of network line
power flows as F, based on its relation to the phase angles, the distribution factors
D can be computed:
F = M6 (3-21)
= MB-'P (3-22)
- DP (3-23)
where M is a matrix dependent on the network topology and the line parameters.8
As a result, the followings are the three basic congestion management procedures
of this type of market:
All buyers and sellers negotiate in an open energy market in order to agree to
trades that benefit all participants.
© An ISO considers the complete set of proposed transactions and determines
whether the set is feasible, i.e., does not produce any transmission line flow ex-
ceeding the maximum limits. If the set is feasible, then no further action is
needed, and all proposed transactions are made. However, if any line-flow lim-
its are violated, then the ISO uses a technically-based protocol (3-19) to curtail
8The B matrix is generally not invertible. New techniques to overcome this problem are discussed
in detail in Chapter 4.
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Figure 3-8 An example of the congestion relieving process in a multilateral
market.
some or all the proposed transactions so that the line-flow limits are not exceed.
After the curtailment, the ISO will supply information to all market participants
on how further trades may be proceeded with without violating line-flow limits.
@ The information from the ISO would, for example, allows a load to purchase more
power from a generator, but only if load simultaneously sells a given fraction of
that power to a different generator. In this manner, sub-markets for electricity in
a post-congested network are formed. Trades take place in the new sub-markets,
and the resulting transactions bring the system to optimal generation dispatch.
In this scheme, an ISO does not involve in the trading process; namely, there is no
central entity which is in charge of setting prices for both generators and loads. The
prices are decided primarily by the principle of supply and demand.
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Figure 3-8 demonstrates this congestion relieving process on the 3-bus example.
At the first step, load L negotiates with both generators G 1 and G 2 freely in order to
serve the 800MW demand at the lowest price. The market equilibrium is expected
to settle at {600MW, 200MW} as if there is no line-flow constraint present in the
system. This dispatch produces an unacceptable 466MW flow on transmission line
Gi-L. Therefore, at the second step, only total of 700MW electricity contracts
are permitted by the ISO so that the flow on line Gi-L is kept within the limit.
Furthermore, the ISO provides the information to L that, in this example, the
only feasible way for L to purchase additional XMW electricity is selling XMW
originally acquired from G1 and buying 2XMW more from G2 simultaneously so
that the technical constraint FG1 -L =PG1 +-PG2 < 400MW is not violated. At
the final equilibrium, the system reaches the same {400MW, 400MW} dispatch as
that in a poolco market.
There are some technical difficulties with implementing this type of market.
First, it is very hard to differentiate between the fairness and efficiency at the initial
curtailment step when a physical limit is reached. The ISO can either curtail all
transactions an equal amount or only curtail the ones that have most impact on
deterioration of system conditions. Second, when applying this model to large net-
works, the trading in sub-markets becomes very combinatorial involving hundreds
of generators and loads. Due to the combinatorial nature of decision making, it is
unlikely that the market will fully converge to the optimal operating point within
a reasonable time period. It is more likely that the trades of electricity will be
suboptimal.
Finally, the initial version of the proposal made in [112] is based on a technical
protocol which uses a simplified DC load flow formulation. If a similar approach is
to be generalized to account for nonlinearities in the load flow and, in particular,
voltage constraints, the technical protocols would become much more difficult to
compute and communicate to the system users.
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3-4 Hierarchical Approach to Efficient
Congestion Management under Open
Access
In our approach, the process of transmission congestion management is posed as
a hierarchical process comprising several sub-processes. Depending on the specific
transmission system provision design, as well as on the type of power market served,
these sub-processes are separated geographically and temporally into different lev-
els of hierarchy. This hierarchical process reflects the interplay between, at least,
three major entities that have resulted as the power industry restructures: power
producing entities, load serving entities, and transmission providing entities. All
these entities make decisions at various rates and are also given signals by the other
entities.
In Chapter 2, the overall objective of an electric power system operations and
planning was defined as given by formula in Equation (2-3). This formula could
be viewed as a benchmark measure of a theoretically ideal objective. Depending on
the specific industry structure in place, this objective could be accomplished in a
coordinated way by planning and operating all entities jointly or it could be indi-
rectly achieved by the separated entities (power producers, power consumers, and
system providers) attempting their individual often conflicting sub-objectives. It is
conjectured in this thesis that it could be possible to have a systematic information
structure, among various levels of these entities, capable of facilitating near-ideal
optimal performance while allowing functional and/or corporate separation of these
entities. It is, moreover, suggested that such a meaningful information structure
would facilitate creation of liquid markets for energy as well as for transmission
provision. This feature is particularly critical during the transition from a regulated
to the competitive power industry.
Keeping in mind this general observation, we pose a general problem of trans-
mission congestion management as an integral of the overall power generation,
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consumption and delivery sub-processes. Each sub-process is characterized by its
decision making logic and dynamics ranging from short-term operations (hourly,
daily) through the long-term (seasonal, annual) and very long-term planning (multi-
annual).
In this thesis, we first claim that if a system operator serves power producers and
consumers whose interactions through the interconnected transmission network are
non-negligible, it is theoretically impossible to approach the system-wide industry
optimum (formula (2-3)) without coordinating decisions of the separate entities.
This coordination is generally hierarchical, in which system users are given infor-
mation about a transmission status (technical and economic) from a higher system
level (operator and/or owner). Moreover, this information is temporally separated;
decisions of each entity have to be made each hour, but also each season or for
longer periods into the future. The question of short-term congestion management
as well as the question of issuing transmission rights for the future system use, then,
become questions of meaningful information (technical status, economic value, etc.).
This information, at least in concept, could be generated by both system users and
providers, and exchanged at certain rates. This information exchange can be used
to convey a technical status of the system and/or to provide a congestion pricing
signal.
3-4.1 Temporal and Geographical Hierarchies in
Transmission Provision
Under the proposed hierarchical congestion management framework, a possible
setup for a hierarchical information exchange between system users and a system
provider is introduced. It is assumed that the energy market and the system provider
are functionally separated. Poolco-type market can be thought of as an extreme case
of the proposed setup in which the energy market and transmission provision are
bundled. Similarly, a multilateral market subject to technical protocols is also an
example of this general setup.
The unique feature of the proposed framework is the dynamic feature of the
temporal interactions between the short-, long- and very long-term decision making.
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Table 3.2 Type of transmission provision and the underlying level of aggrega-
tion (geographical and/or temporal).
geographical
individual groups of entire
users users system
short- congestion congestion congestion
term management management management
(nodal) (zonal)
temporal long- TCCs transmission transmission
term rights rights
very long- (none) generation transmission
term investment investment
Given a set of market requests, both nodal pricing and multilateral trading provide
one-time transmission system-level interaction with the users. One of the main
objectives of the proposed hierarchical framework is the impact of the coordinating
variables on the long-term system performance.
The geographical hierarchies of system users requesting transmission access
ranges from the individual power producers and users through groups of users and,
eventually, to the entire open access area. These hierarchies could vary with the
change of equipment status, such as a transmission line outage, as well as with
changes in system inputs resulting from the energy market activities. In particular,
these system inputs are a combined result of decision making by the market par-
ticipants or groups of market participants optimizing their own objectives, and the
(economic and/or technical) feedback signals received from a transmission provider.
The decision making process by the potential system users is generally repre-
sented in terms of power quantities, Ti,, for transactions from their locations i
to/from another set of locations j requested at certain acceptable price, pi,j, and
of certain probability of service, Rij. The potential system users arrive at their
decisions in many different ways, depending primarily on how much risk they are
willing to take in order to take advantage of various market opportunities. This
process is a subject of modeling in its own right and requires extensive modeling
and studies.
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For purpose of this thesis, we assume that these signals are given to a trans-
mission provider at arbitrary rates; namely, they could represent requests for the
short-term transmission service (hour or day ahead), or they could be long-term
ahead of time signals (season or year ahead) or the requests for very long transmis-
sion service (multi-annual). These requests could be characterized mathematically
by the information sets
Si,j[kT] = {T,[kT],pij[kT],Rij[kT]} (3-24)
Si,j[kTs] = {Ti[kTs],pi,[kTs], R,[kTs]} (3-25)
Si,j[kT] = {Tj[kT],pij[kTt],Ri,[kT]} k = 0,1,... , N (3-26)
where T, Ts, and T are the pre-agreed upon time units for transmission service
updates varying from short through long and very long periods of time.
There are many different implementations of the hierarchical interactions be-
tween the sets of information provided by all system users. No user could be pro-
vided transmission access without specifying its information sets Si,j[kT], Si,j[kT],
and Si, [kTt]. 9
For instance, consider a possible hierarchical framework necessary to assist a
typical ISO, which offers transmission support to the daily spot market and also
auctions so-called transmission rights to those users needing long-term service. We
claim that it is conceptually equivalent to having a hierarchical structure charac-
terized by the sets Si, [kT] and Si, [kT] supported by strictly technical feedback
provided by an ISO regarding the system proximity to the technical limits, say con-
gestion information set I{,. [kT] and I$[kT], on one hand, or a hierarchical structure
characterized by the sets Si, [kT] and Si, [kT] supported by the so-called congestion
price signals for using the system P(7 [kT] and P!. [kT], on the other. 10
In this thesis, we suggest that a well-designed usage-based congestion pricing
mechanism could be equivalent to a transmission managing scheme giving strictly
technical usage-based signals; both of them result in a theoretically near-optimal
9 Although many of these sets would be empty sets.
l 0This conjecture is usually implied in the work advocating multilateral markets [112], and its
proof is only attempted at the system equilibrium [85].
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operation as defined by formula (2-3)." These hierarchical frameworks are equiva-
lent with regard to their technical and economic performance over T, if investment
decisions are not considered.
The provision of signals P [kT], PS% [kTs], or Iq. [kT], Iq. [kT,] generally leads
to groups of system users who have similar requests for open access. This group-
ing can be carried out according to different criteria such as (1) similar impacts
on likely transmission system congestion, (2) achieving economies of scope in using
transmission, (3) grouping so that the rest of the system is not affected much by
the group members actions, or (4) even old administrative boundaries (control ar-
eas). Depending on how this aggregation is done, a so-called secondary level in the
hierarchy is formed. 2
Figure 3-9 shows the basic hierarchical framework introduced in this thesis.
This figure shows the spatial, hierarchical aggregation process in which individual
members of the virtual network are grouped according to the certain criteria. Math-
ematical formulation for this aggregating process is the algorithm assembling a large
number of economic or technical signals I4% [kT], I [kTs], or Pq. [kT], Pc. [kT] into
a small set of zonal signals Zc[kT], Z [kT,] based on the pre-specified criteria.
By posing the problem of congestion management as a hierarchical adaptive pro-
cess of this sort, one could begin to study the performance of a specific transmission
provision scheme as a function of design for providing information Iq, I4, Zp[kT],
ZF[kTs] and Pq[kT], Pq.[kTs], or alike. Extremely critical for a meaningful per-
formance analysis and the comparison of these different hierarchical designs is to
specify consistent initial (technical and economic) conditions. The interpretation of
various proposals, then, becomes very straightforward by using this general hierar-
chical framework. For example, it should be intuitively obvious that given certain
system inputs and real-time nodal pricing an equivalent of the theoretical optimum
" A more generalizable claim includes the planning process for the new investments, see [74]. The
major concern in this thesis, however, is with the operations planning aspects of the electric power
systems, excluding decisions of investments.
1 2 At present, much analysis is on establishing meaningful "zones" for open transmission access
[107, 116]. The term is used loosely, and it could imply different aggregation criteria.
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Figure 3-9 The basic hierarchical structure of proposed congestion manage-
ment framework.
is achievable over T,. However, (static) OPF-based nodal pricing as presently im-
plemented does not guarantee optimal performance for the next season, under any
type of system and/or market-type uncertainties.
3-5 Proposed Hierarchical Congestion
Management Framework
This thesis introduces a hierarchical framework designed for managing transac-
tions in an open access environment, under which an efficient congestion manage-
ment is the result of the interplay between the following three sub-processes:
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© Decentralized optimizations done by the (groups of) network users, given timely
system information and economic incentives provided by transmission service
providers.
© Minimal system-wide coordinations applied by a system operator to manage con-
gestion based on the strictly technical information or the estimated economic
knowledge revealed by network users through their market behavior.
© A real-time information system that not only assists system users to estimate their
transmission-related risks but also helps transmission service providers facilitate
congestion pricing and real-time congestion relieving.
The equilibrium of the iterative optimization is expected to approach to a central-
ized optimal solution under certain conditions. 13 Since the first sub-process is the
nature creation of a competitive market, the main effort of this thesis is toward de-
veloping the second and third components which are urgently needed but currently
missing in the power industry. In order to capture the temporal effects of dynamic
transmission provision in an open access environment, the overall system coordina-
tion is further separated into short-term (hourly, daily) operations and long-term
(seasonal, annual) transmission management.
In the following sections, we outline a basic structure and key features of the
proposed hierarchical congestion management framework, as well as the necessary
information exchange ( i.e., S( [kT], Sq [kT,], P [kT], P [kT,] or I [kT], I% [kTs]
at the rates [], ]) between different entities under this framework.
3-5.1 Short-term Congestion Management
In this thesis, a transmission congestion relief market (TCRM) is introduced to
provide systemwide coordination for relieving congestion in an hourly basis, i.e., T=
1 hour. In this market, certain amount of coordination is implemented to ensure the
transmission system security and to preserve the flexibility for system users to sell
1 3Gaming, exercising inherent market power, or collusions among market participants might drive
the market equilibrium away from the most efficient one [114]. How to prevent or mitigate the effect
of these market maladies is out of the scope of this thesis.
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and/or purchase electricity in the energy markets. Obviously, the coordination sig-
nals for transmission systems to which market participants will promptly respond in
a deregulated environment are congestion prices. In addition, based on the fact that
transmission line-flow constraints are not hard limits, a soft-constrained formulation
and a usage-based allocation mechanism are, therefore, proposed.
Usage-based pricing strategy
To start with, we recall the results obtained based on the optimal pricing theory
described in Section 3-3.1. In theory, the same optimal generation dispatch at
the market equilibrium could be achieved by assigning an equivalent price to each
constrained line instead of assigning a nodal price at each bus if these charges for
transmission are allocated to network users based on their physical impacts on these
lines. That is because, by applying such a usage-based pricing scheme, the equivalent
price of a constrained line, then, can be mapped back bus-by-bus and has the same
effects as a set of nodal prices. However, unlike nodal pricing, this congestion price
is now completely separated form the energy price.
Mathematically, these equivalent transmission prices are the values of Lagrangian
multipliers associated with the activated line-flow constraints, and they can be ob-
tained at the last iteration of an OPF program.
Under this usage-based pricing scheme, customers are charged based on the
amount of transmission capacity used to fulfill their transactions. Therefore, a
network user has the incentive to avoid using expensive transmission links (the most
likely congested lines) while making their electricity contracts so that the flows on
transmission lines remain within their limits.
The same 3-bus example is used to serve as a numerical example. Recall that
the flow on transmission line Gi-L can be split into two portions:
FG 1-L = FGL + FGL (3 27)
2 1
- PG 1 + IPG 2  (3~28)3 3
Therefore, a customer should pay 2 of the price for using transmission line Gi-3
L if transactions are made from G1 to L and, similarly, 1 of the same price if3
$30/MW $60/MW
Figure 3-10 Equivalent optimal usage-based pricing in the 3-bus example.
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of the proposed soft constraint-based congestion
transactions are made from G2 to L. In this example, the equivalent price for line G-
L is $90/MW. Consequently, the total energy prices (generation plus transmission)
seen by L are p = 30+ 290 =$90/MW if it is purchased from G1 and p"G
60+ 190 =$90/MW if it is purchased from G 2.14 Thus, by setting this equivalent3
transmission price, the optimal dispatch point {400MW, 400MW} becomes a market
equilibrium.
Soft-constrained congestion charge
However, in order to obtain the equivalent usage-based price for a transmission
line, generator cost functions, the network topology and the system load conditions
have to be known. This assumption is apparently not realistic since there always
1 4 Recall that based on the optimal pricing theory, the nodal price at bus L should be $90/MW
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uncertainties exist in power systems, such as real-time load fluctuation, and unex-
pected transmission line or generator outages. Due to the fact that transmission
companies can only estimate the value of transmission links within a certain de-
gree of accuracy, we propose a soft constraint-based congestion charge, which allows
transmission providers to accommodate this estimation error.
Figure 3-11 illustrates the idea of proposed soft constraint-based congestion
charge. As indicated in the same figure, under the optimal pricing method, a trans-
mission line has no value unless the flow on this line reaches its capacity limit [98].
A mathematical interpretation is that a Lagrangian multiplier has non-zero value
only if the associated constraint is activated. Due to the uncertain and dynamic
natures of a competitive market, when will a transmission line congest and what
is the exact value of this transmission line are not fully predictable. Therefore, we
propose a smooth charge curve (usually a quadratic function) so that the congestion
price gradually increases as the line flow approaching its limit. In such a way, sys-
tem users would notice the congestion conditions in the transmission network and
have certain lead time to adjust their transactions before the line flow actually hits
its capacity limit. Theoretically, this curve can be viewed as a supply function of a
transmission line.15
To illustrate the idea of soft constraints, we implement this pricing strategy on
the 3-bus example. Figure 3-12 shows that the electricity market settles to a near-
optimal equilibrium as the load adjusts to the usage-based transmission charge. This
usage-based, soft-constrained pricing strategy makes it possible to maintain system
security in an open access environment while every system user is attempting to
optimize its own profit. Figure 3-13 illustrates basic ideas of the price feedback and
market iterations.16
15 Detailed formulations will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
16In this figure, Ci indicates various types of electricity contracts made in energy markets and
RFj indicates the transmission relief fee charged by ISO. All the details will be further elaborated
in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
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(Z: generation+transmission cost)
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PG1
Figure 3-12 A near-optimal market equilibrium after applying the proposed
pricing method (3-bus example).
Figure 3-13 The basic idea of price feedback.
3-5.2 Long-term Transmission Service
Instead of exclusively managing short-term transactions optimally, proposed
framework is also developed for managing transmission on a long-term basis. This
design is primarily motivated by the need of hedging tools against short-term
congestion-related risks. By making long-term bilateral contracts, both generators
and loads can avoid selling and/or purchasing all their electricity in spot energy
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Figure 3-14 An example of long-term bilateral contract.
markets where the electricity price is volatile. However, proper transmission trans-
mission pricing mechanism for this kind of long-term transactions is not yet estab-
lished. Moreover, this problem becomes even more complex when both short-term
energy trading and long-term bilateral contracts coexist in the same market.
In this thesis, a priority insurance scheme based on the estimated probabilistic
information regarding the use of transmission system' 7 is developed for purchasing
and selling transmission services on a seasonal basis, i.e., T,= 1 season.
Priority-based insurance scheme for transmission services
A priority service scheme for energy markets was first introduced by Chao and
Wilson in 1987 [25, 109, 110]. It was further developed by Deng and Oren for
relieving transmission congestion in a spot electricity market [31]. In this thesis,
we adopt this kind of pricing technique for pricing long-term bilateral transactions
[118].
Proposed priority service scheme refers to an array of contingent forward delivery
contracts offered by a transmission service provider. Instead of given a single price
"A possible tool to provide this kind of probabilistic information is developed in Chapter 6.
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for the transmission service, each customer is provided a price menu that lists a set
of prices corresponding different levels of firmness. When the network is congested,
customers will be served in order of their pre-selected priorities; furthermore, if a
transaction is selected to be curtailed, certain amount of insurance payment to the
customer will be made as financial compensation. After selecting a priority level
from the menu, a customer indirectly reveals the value of the requested bilateral
transaction to the grid operator. Transmission providers then can learn the expected
demand function of a transmission link and update the price menu for the next
season. Detail formulations for the menu design can be found in Chapter 7.
3-5.3 Tools Developed for Implementing Proposed
Framework
Spatial aggregation tool: congestion clustering algorithm
In order to implement proposed congestion management framework in large
power networks and also to set a basis for the usage-based pricing scheme, a spatial
aggregation tool called congestion clustering algorithm is developed in this thesis.
First a set of congestion distribution factors (CDFs) to serve as indications of
relative contributions of individual transactions to a congested transmission line is
developed.s Congestion clusters are, therefore, determined based on these CDF
values. Typically, the nodes in the first cluster for creating congestion display very
8F-large and non-uniform CDFs, *F-j. Other surrounding clusters electrically distant
&Pk
from the congested line i-j are formed so that all nodes in each of these clusters have
the similar CDFs19 . By definition of CDFs, any bilateral transaction made within
a cluster causes negligible flow on the transmission line of interest.
In the proposed congestion management framework, the usage-based congestion
relief fee in a short-term transmission market is charged based on the congested line-
dependent clusters. Since transactions made within a clusters have small effects to
18These congested transmission lines are usually called congestion "flowgates" or congestion "in-
terfaces" in the current electric power industry.
19 within a small percent threshold, e.q., 5%.
90
the congested line, the congestion charges are only applied to the transactions across
different congestion clusters. Furthermore, long-term transmission rights could also
be sold based on a fixed set of clusters calculated with respect to the most likely
congestion interfaces.
This technique greatly reduces the computational complexity while applying
proposed pricing scheme to large networks. Instead of using potentially large number
of individual nodal prices [46), this simple, usage-based pricing scheme helps market
participant to respond to the congestion prices more efficiently.
Long-term provision tool: probabilistic optimal power flow
For a transmission provider to be able to efficient manage transmission system
on a long-run basis, the congestion-related uncertainties should be taken into ac-
count. In this thesis, we develop an analytic tool called probabilistic optimal power
flow (POPF) algorithm to evaluate the long-term (seasonal, annual) values of trans-
mission services. The proposed POPF algorithm is an efficient two-stage Monte
Carlo approach, which is capable of projecting the probability distributions of line
flows, nodal prices, congestion prices, values and the most likely congestion lines
etc. based on a estimated load duration curve and the public knowledge of power
plant characteristics. This effort also sets the foundation for the development of the
priority-based insurance service mechanism.
Coordination tool: dynamic programming-based management algo-
rithm
The problem of managing real-time congestion assuming the presence of long-
term bilateral contracts is formulated as a stochastic dynamic programming (DP)
problem. An DP-based coordination tool which optimizes transmission provision
over a long time horizon (season, year) by making decisions each hour is devel-
oped in Chapter 7. It is intended to facilitate transmission providers in deciding
between not serving system users who own long-term transmission rights of certain
firmness and curtailing short-term transactions in case there is congestion. By com-
bining proposed priority-based insurance service and short-term load forecasting,
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this framework can efficiently relieve the network congestion in short-term opera-
tions without violating prior obligations in long-term insurance contracts.
3-5.4 Real-Time Information System
Major and continuing advances in communication technologies allow market par-
ticipants to understand system conditions on a real-time basis. In this thesis, we
propose that at least two types of new information should be posted on the OASIS
to assist facilitating proposed framework:
) congestion clusters and congestion distribution factors (CDFs) that reflect real-
time status of a transmission system: For this hierarchical congestion manage-
ment framework to be implemented successfully, the primary requirement is that
network users are able to make decisions properly in response to the given pricing
signals. This simple cluster-based information developed in this thesis helps net-
work users to estimate ex ante the impacts of their transactions on the congested
lines so that they can intelligently request transmission services to avoid high
congestion charges.
@ the probabilistic type of information that reflects the possible long-term use of a
transmission system: Recently, several severe price spikes have been observed in
the newly opened energy markets [102, 104]. One of the major reasons causing
the price volatilities is that market participants are not able to foresee the sud-
den unavailability of generation and/or transmission resources limited by their
technical constraints. This kind of unexpected price fluctuation raises the risks of
purchasing/selling electric power and also provides the opportunities for gaming
in energy markets [114]. Therefore, the information regarding probabilities of
these contingency situations happening should also be provided.
With this information in place, system users are able to learn the contributions of
their transactions to the system congestion and then, they can avoid using these
congested lines while making their electricity contracts.
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Figure 3-15 An illustration of proposed hierarchical congestion management
framework.
3-6 Summary
Figure 3-15 depicts the basic structure of the proposed framework. As shown
in this figure, there are three different time-scale processes interacting simultane-
ously. The first one is the decentralized optimizations exercised by individual market
participants who are trying to maximizing their own profits by entering long-term
or short-term energy markets whenever needed. The second process is the short-
term congestion management provided by a transmission congestion relief market
(TCRM). This process take places at the same rate as spot energy markets clearing,
i.e., every hour. Furthermore, there is a long-term transmission market in which
seasonal transmission rights are sold in order to facilitate long-term bilateral con-
tracts.
There are three major analytic tools developed for implementing this conges-
tion management framework: (1) a spatial aggregation tool-congestion clustering
algorithm, (2) a long-term provision tool-probabilistic optimal power flow (POPF)
and (3) a coordination tool-an DP-based decision-making algorithm. However, the
emphasis here is that the the key to the success of our framework is a real-time
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information system which helps system users understand the status of transmission
systems and estimate their impacts to the congested lines so that they can respond
appropriately to the congestion prices.
This framework allows full freedom to a system user to make decisions regarding
both quantity and price of the overall transaction, including the charge of system
support without mandating a pre-specified pattern of power or price control.
In this chapter, all underlying concepts of the proposed hierarchical congestion
management framework are illustrated on a small three-bus example. In the follow-
ing chapters, detailed documentation of our method on a power system of general
topology and size will be discussed.
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Spatial
Aggregation:
Congestion
Clustering
Algorithm
This chapter presents derivations of basic formulae of proposed conges-
tion distribution factors (CDFs) and congestion clustering algorithm.
CDFs are developed to properly allocate the impacts of individual
transactions to the power flows on congested transmission lines. This
technique avoids the slack bus problem, which exists in the conven-
tional distribution factor techniques by using the the so-called localized
property of an electric power network.
In the second part of this chapter, we introduce a simple CDF-
based method for efficient grouping of system users into congestion
clusters according to the contributions to the power flow on the trans-
mission constraints of interest. These concepts are illustrated on the
large-size New England power network.
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4-1 Introduction
This chapter introduces a simple, computational tool for transmission congestion
management, which clearly identifies groups of system users having similar effects
on a transmission constraint of interest. This congestion clustering method is based
on a new distribution factor approach developed in this thesis called congestion
distribution factors (CDFs). Unlike traditional distribution factor techniques, CDF
technique is a general approach which eliminates the need for selecting a slack bus. 1
In the past, traditional distribution factor techniques, such as generation shift
distribution factors (GSDFs), have been generally accepted in the utility industry
and have been adopted in system security and contingency analysis. GSDFs are
simple in derivations and able to efficiently allocate transmission line flow changes
into individual generator's power outputs. However, the results of GSDFs depend
on the choice of slack bus, i.e., a reference generator.
In 1981, Ng introduced a so-called generalized generation distribution factors
(GGDFs) to correct the limitations of GSDFs [81]. GGDFs are based on the DC
linearized loadflow model and the superposition theorem. GGDF method can be
used to determine the impact of particular generators on line flows without requiring
a reference generator, nor the invariance of the total system generation. However,
while applying GGDFs, a conforming load change corresponding change in total
system generation is required. This assumption is apparently not realistic. Recently,
GGDF method has been widely recognized in allocating power flow on a transmission
line and has been adopted in MW-miles method [99, 76, 95].
CDFs developed in this thesis present a very distinct feature that the magni-
tudes die out with the electrical distance from the congested interface. Therefore,
system users with large CDFs (in magnitude) know that their own power injections
contribute significantly to congestion, while the users with relatively small CDF
magnitudes should not be actively concerned with congestion. Typically computed
'Slack bus is chosen to absorb any imbalance made by all the other buses in the system so that
the total generation and total real power demand remain balanced.
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standard distribution factors with respect to an arbitrary reference bus do not have
this characteristic.
Moreover, proposed CDFs are computed with respect to all buses (including
generator buses and load buses). Conventional distribution factor techniques usually
allocate the transmission line flow to generators only. This might be inappropriate
because in a competitive market every participant, generator or load, will deviate
from their schedule values and affect the line flow pattern. In this sense, it is proper
to claim that the line congestion actually results from injection/consumption of
every market participant so that the responsibilities of causing system congestion
should be shared by all network users.
Once these CDF values are calculated, groups of power generation/load nodes
that have similar impacts to congestion interfaces are determined. Here, we refer to
these groups of users as congestion clusters of type 1, 2, etc.2 A congestion cluster
of type 1 represents users with the strongest and nonuniform effects on the trans-
mission constraint of interest, type 2 represents groups of customers with smaller
and similar effects, and so on. Only transactions inside cluster 1 in which congestion
distribution factors (CDFs) are large and very nonuniform contribute significantly
to congestion. Otherwise, the congestion charge is to the transactions between
congestion clusters only. The inter-cluster transactions are, therefore, charged for
congestion and, moreover, could be effectively re-dispatched to help reduce conges-
tion.
The resulting concept is strikingly simple; contributions of transactions physi-
cally located in different clusters are simple to compute by using congestion pro-
posed distribution factors. This information could be used for exchanging tickets to
transmission rights, as well as for paying for usage-based congestion management.
2In this thesis, we call these groups of buses "congestion clusters" instead of "congestion zones"
to avoid confusion with current industry jargon.
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Figure 4-1 Types of contracts in electricity markets: (a) a pure bilateral con-
tract, (b) a multilateral contract.
4-2 Electricity Market Specifications
One of the basic responsibilities of a transmission system provider is to establish
clearly-defined contracts with the system users regarding location, quantity, service
priority and duration of their request for transmission use. Only balanced trans-
actions between parties are handled by the transmission provision market. The
balancing process (physical and/or financial) generally takes place through separate
trades in the electricity markets.
At present, there are varieties of electricity markets under development, ranging
from spot power exchanges day-ahead or even hour-ahead, through the longer-term
bilateral (direct) contracts between certain generation serving entities (GSEs) and
the Load Serving Entities (LSEs). Moreover, under the open access service these
transactions could be between entities inside a well-defined administrative entity
(such as a pool, ISO, utility, etc.) or between the entities crossing these administra-
tive boundaries. The transmission congestion management problem could be either
restricted to one of these administrative entities or comprising large geographical
area, such as an entire electric interconnection. A transmission provider is generally
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responsible for serving all types of requested transactions indistinguishably. Seen
from a system provider's point, all requests for transmission service are bilateral and
balanced [56]3. They, furthermore, have impact on the transmission line flows in the
portion of a power system for which the provider must maintain secure operation.
4-2.1 Contract Specifications
In this section, a mathematical representation of electricity contracts is stated.
We use a power injection vector to represent electric power generated/consumed at
all buses:
P )PG
- PL
where P is a vector of power injections at all buses including generation buses,
PG = {PG1 ,* ,p0 ng}T, and loads, PL = {PL1,... ,PLg IT. Note that the power
consumed at a load bus is treated as negative injection into a network.
For purposes of method derivation in this thesis, the simplest specification nec-
essary is the power quantity PGi = PL. of the bilateral transaction requiring the use
of the transmission system between a seller at bus i and the user at bus j.4 Math-
ematically, each bilateral transaction between a power seller at bus i and power
purchaser at bus j is of the following form: 5
Ck={ 0 Pci 0 ''0 -PL 0T (42
where
PGi -PL= 0 (4-3)
Ck indicates electricity contract k; PGi and PL3 stand for injections into bus i and
taken out at bus j respectively. Similarly, a multilateral contract involving more
3 Chapter 3: Galiana, F.D., Ili6 M.D. "Framework and Methods for the Analysis of Bilateral
Transactions."
4 The temporal aspects relating market requests and the congestion market rates are introduced
later in this thesis when the proposed transmission market structure is described.
5 Throughout this thesis, symbols {.} and [.] represent vectors and matrices, respectively.
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than one supplier and/or one consumer can be expressed as:
Ck ={ 0 0 P Gi c.i ' 0 -pLj ~pL± ''' IT (44)
where
PGi - Li = 0 (4-5)
Since each (multi)pair of candidate transmission users has to be balanced, it must
satisfy the equality
{1}TCk = 0 (4-6)
where {1} denotes a vector with all elements equal to one.
4-3 Measures of System Users Impact on
Congestion
On its side, a transmission provider is responsible for establishing a transparent
posting mechanisms regarding its equipment status and the anticipated proximity
to specific transmission line congestion. This information generally contains:
( Probabilities of lines most likely to be congested.
@ Groups of system users (clusters) according to their likely contributions to the
line congestion.
© Transmission system availability (at each cluster level) with various priority levels
of service, and the expected charge of re-dispatching to accommodate market
requests (when all transmission equipment is in service and/or when lines are out
of service)
How detailed this information is depends on the specific transmission provision
systems. The minimal information necessary concerns system equipment status and
indicators of the impact of various groups of users on the transmission congestion.
The sensitivity of system constraints with respect to the power quantities injected
into different buses as the transactions are implemented generally depends on both
the power quantity injected and on the electrical distance of the power injection
to the system constraint of interest. Because of this, it is necessary to develop
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sensitivity indicators that are easy to understand and use by both transmission
providers and by the system users. In this thesis, we introduce congestion clusters
for this purpose.
4-3.1 Congestion Distribution Factors (CDFs)
In this section, we introduce a novel type of distribution factors necessary for
computing the sensitivity of congested line(s) i - j in question with respect to the
bilateral transactions Ck defined above.
The follow-up analysis shows two significant qualitative differences of these newly
derived sensitivities, referred to as the congestion distribution factors (CDFs), when
compared to the currently used distribution factor methods [81, 95] that have been
adopted in system security analyses in the regulated utility industry.
First, instead of computing the effect of a power injection at a single bus, the
effect of a balanced transaction with power sent at one bus and received at some
other buses on the system is computed. This is consistent with the present efforts
by the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC). The power transfer
distribution factors (PTDFs) also evaluate effect of a bilateral transaction and not
of a single injection at a bus [84].
Second, the newly derived CDFs capture a localized property of the transmission
network response to a change in bus power injections [48, 111]. This property refers
to the fact that sensitivities of line flows with respect to the power injections at the
electrically closer buses are higher those at the electrically distant buses.
To derive the CDFs, start by defining real power line flows using lossless DC
power flow formulation;6 the power flow on a transmission line connecting buses i
and j is given as:
Fi-j = bij (6i - 6j) (4-7)
where bij is the susceptance of the transmission line linking bus i and j, and og is
6It is shown in Appendix A how the CDFs can be modified to account for the transmission loss
as well with the knowledge of generators participating in loss compensation (in today's industry
the loss is typically compensated by the regulating units.).
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the voltage phase angle of bus i. 7 This equation can be rewritten in a vector form,
Fi_= M713 6 (4-8)
where Mi-j is the sensitivity vector of the line power with respect to bus voltage
phase angle changes whose elements are zeros except the ith and jth are bij and
-bij respectively; 6 = {61, 62, - - , in}T is a vector of the voltage phase angles of all
buses including generators and loads.
Next, the equation describing the relationship between the bus voltage angles
and real power injections for a n-bus network is given as follows:
Pi B 1,1  B 1,2  ... B 1 ,n 61
P2 B 2 ,1  B 2 ,2  ... B 2,n 62
Pn L Bn,1 Bn,2 ... Bn,n in
P =Bo (4-9)
where B is the (n x n) susceptance matrix whose entries are
Bk,1 = -bk,l if k # l
Bk,k = Zbk,l (4-10)
1=0
As the result of (4-10), the susceptance matrix, B, is known to be singular with
rank one deficiency. Because of this property, given power injection vector P and
network susceptance matrix, B, the solution for 6 is not unique. In order to solve for
6, we typically choose bus n to be the reference bus; then the phase angles relative
to this bus can be solved in terms of P
6orl = B-IP_, (4-11)
where (.)_n represents a vector without its nth element or in a matrix form with,
correspondingly, its nth raw and column eliminated. Therefore, B-n is now an
invertible matrix. The actual phase angles can be rewritten by simply adding the
7 Under the DC power flow assumptions, the voltage magnitudes are equal to one and do not
appear in the formula.
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relative angles and the phase angle of the reference bus:
0
= [B ]-1  ]P + 6n{1} (4-12)
0 0
where 6n is the phase angle of bus n. Then, combining Equations (4-12) and (4-8),
the power flow on line i to j, can be expressed in terms of real power injections:
[B-n]~l 0Fi-j =MT [ P+6Mfig{1}
13 0 0 ijl
= DTP (4-13)
The second term is identical to zero because of the fact that Mj f{1} -0. Thus
the distribution factor, DPUJ, with bus n as the reference bus is obtained as
-T
D_= [ [ Mi_ (4-14)
Up to this point, the derivation is similar to that of traditional distribution
factors with respect to a reference bus n, D,j relating dependence of the line flow
of a congested line Fi-j on the vector of power injections at all buses P (including
n) as
Fi = D _ TP (4-15)
D!_1 is a function of transmission network topology, line parameters and the choice
of a reference bus only.
When the vector of power injections P equals the specified bilateral transactions
injection vector Ck, Equation (4-15) defines the line flow F_ contributed by the
transaction k as
F _=D1 TD (4-16)
The elements of the vector D, are well-known bus distribution factors associated
with line i - j now used to compute effects of two simultaneous injects.
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Observe that the nth element in this relation corresponding to the pre-specified
reference bus is always zero. Namely, the distribution factors computed with respect
to the reference bus n, DP, will be different from those computed with respect to
the bus m, DPn, if n 4 m. However, they are always related as described in the
following:
Claim 4.1: The distribution factors calculated with respect to different reference
buses differ from each other by a shift factor which equals to the mth element of
D,j or the nth element of DPnj with negative sign, i.e.,
Dn - Dm =/#"_'{1} (4-17)
and
#2,m' = PM ) -Dm_(n (4-18)
where DP (m) denotes the mth element of the vector D '.-
Proof: By the fact that the rank of matrix B is n - 1, the differences between each
elements, DP~U (m), of the distribution factors Di_, have unique solutions, i.e.,
(Di_,(m) - Dij(n)) = (Dj(m) - Dm_ (n)) (4-19)
Also based on the derivations above, DP_3 (n) = D7,"(m) = 0; therefore, D2_ 3 (m) =
-D(n). As DUj (m) and D1j (n) are determined, the relation of vectors D!_j
andD"_ follows Equation (4-18).0
4-3.2 Localized Response
Even though, based on (4-6), (4-16), and (4-18), different #3'Js do not result
in different impacts of individual transactions on the line flow F_ #3"'' does affect
the actual numerical values of the line flow sensitivities to the power injections at
individual buses. For CDFs to represent relative contributions of the injections at
individual buses to the line flow in a congested line accurately the magnitudes of
sensitivity of Fij with respect to injection at buses i and j should satisfy
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Figure 4-2 An illustration of the localized response.
09Pi > 09
- if k # ij. (4-20)
0 1PJ | Pk
These inequalities effectively describe the physical property of the localized response
of a transmission line i - j with respect to power injections at different buses.
OFi- aF - 8F -Consider - =a, '- = b, and *-' = c. lal, Ibi, and |cl represent the
aP, aPi aPk
magnitudes of the contribution of power injected into buses i, j, and k with respect
to the line flow F-j; the signs determine the flow direction. A meaningful magnitude
of a CDF is the one which satisfies (4-20) which is effectively localized response
property of a transmission line flow with respect to injection at various buses; buses
further away, k, should have smaller (in magnitude) impact on congestion than i and
j.8 This property usually does not show if one chooses an arbitrary reference bus to
calculate [81, 95]. To ensure that (4-20) holds, we propose to choose a very specific
8 This follows from the inequality a > c > b which always holds if the power flows from bus
i to j because only the portion of Pk that reaches bus i or j enters line i-j; therefore, la - cl or
lb - cl cannot be larger than Ia - bl. In other words, the power transaction between buses i and
j should have a larger portion contributing to the line flow connecting these two buses than any
other transactions; if the flow direction changes, the relation is the other way round, i.e., a < c < b.
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shift factor #i-j so that CDF values at bus i and bus j have the same magnitudes
but opposite signs, i.e.,
Dn_ j(i ) + D!_' j)
#D-j±= 2 , (4-21)
This Oi-j makes Ja| = |bI > |c|, so Equation (4-20) is always satisfied. Consequently,
the choice of #i-j results in a transparent localized response property of a power
network with respect to balanced bilateral transactions.
With this result in mind, we define the congestion distribution factors (CDFs)
as follows:
Definition 4.1: congestion distribution factors (CDFs) for transmission line from
i to j is defined as
= ± + 1{1} (4-22)
where D is the distribution factors calculated with respect to a reference bus n
and
D j (i) + D_ j 
-)#i- =2 ,(4-23)
Then, the same as (4-16), for transaction k specified by Ck (Equation (4-2)), the
portion of the line flow Fi-j on the transmission connecting buses i and j contributed
by this transaction, F _- can be calculated as
F %= DT'~ Ck (4-24)
Based on the above derivations it follows that the magnitude of a CDF at each
bus computed for a transmission line indicates the sensitivities of the line flow with
respect to the power injection of a bilateral transaction; the sign of the CDFs at each
bus indicates if the power injection at that bus will increase or relieve the congestion
of the line of interest. 9
90f course, the actual impact of a transaction is determined by both power sending and receiving
buses and follows the formula (4-24).
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4-4 Congestion Clusters
We propose that effective measures of system users' impacts on transmission
congestion can be established by computing transmission congestion clusters. This
is done by computing congestion distribution factors first and then using them to
determine congestion clusters.
Clusters are computed for each congested transmission line (congestion inter-
face). Considering, for instance, a line connecting buses i and j for which clusters
are computed, any bilateral transaction originating or ending at bus k in a conges-
tion cluster 1 has a large CDF, , i.e., it is electrically close to the congested
a9Pk
line i - j for which clusters are computed. Therefore, transactions within the first
cluster have a critical and often unequal impact on the line flow Fi-j. The con-
gestion clusters 2,3 and higher surround cluster 1 and are electrically further than
buses in the first cluster from the congested line i - j. They are formed by grouping
all buses 1 in each zone Zm, m # 1 to have similar, and considerably smaller (in
magnitude) CDFs. Therefore, any bilateral transaction within zone Zm, m > 1
contributes very little to the flow Fi-j (it is straightforward to double-check that
if the CDFs are identical, the intra-cluster flow created by a transaction between
any two buses is zero). Consequently, only inter-cluster transactions are considered
to contribute significantly to the line flow. As explained later in this chapter, use
of congestion clusters reduces the computational complexity associated with both
physical curtailments necessary for transmission loading relief by a system provider
in case of emergency and the adjustments of system users themselves under normal
conditions.
We point out a qualitative difference between the various notions of transmis-
sion zones based on system divisions identical to the existing control areas [20] or
determined by prices of electricity [107] and the congestion clusters as defined here.
The congestion clusters are re-computed as the system conditions vary according to
the electrical distances from the congested line(s) of interest.
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4-4.1 Definitions of Congestion Clusters
Based on the above derivations it follows that the value of a CDF computed
for a transmission line indicates the sensitivity of the line flow with respect to the
power injection of a bilateral transaction; the sign of a CDF at each bus indicates
if the power injection at that bus will increase or relieve the congestion of the line
of interest. 10
Given the value of CDFs at all buses of the network, one could separate these
buses into two groups: one group with positive CDFs and the other with negative
CDFs. Next, it follows from (4-24) that if all buses associated with a particular
transaction have similar CDF values, the net impact of that transaction on the
congested line would be very small. In order to reduce complexity, the transactions
that have an impact less than a certain percentage, e.q., 5%, could be neglected. 1
Based on this, we can then define congestion clusters.
Definition 4.2: The congestion cluster 1 for line i - j is defined as the set of buses
whose CDFs are very large and are electrically closest to the line of interest.
Definition 4.3: Congestion clusters number 2, 3 and higher for line i-j are defined
as sets of buses having similar CDFs with respect to line i - j and the differences
of these CDF values are smaller than 5%.
Buses in the first congestion cluster generally have CDFs much larger and un-
equal (in magnitude) than the buses in the higher enumerated clusters. Ultimately,
buses electrically very far away from the line i - j will have relatively small CDFs
and their impact on the congested line may be negligible. This localized effect of a
1 00f course, this is a general argument. The actual impact of a transaction are determined by
both power sending and receiving buses and follows the formula of Equation (4-24).
115% is about the same order of magnitude as the transmission losses. Since the mechanism for
exact computation of losses created by each transaction is not known, it is implausible to predict
flow beyond 5% accuracy.
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Figure 4-3 IEEE 39-bus system.
bilateral power transaction cannot be seen without introducing an appropriate shift
factor defined in (4-21).
The result of creation of these congestion clusters on a very large power system
network that contains thousands of buses is that one has to only look at the clusters,
instead of individual buses. It will be demonstrated in the next chapter that how
this greatly simplifies on-line congestion management by both system users and the
system provider.
4-4.2 Numerical Examples
Here we illustrate the proposed concepts using the IEEE 39-bus system and the
New England 2000-bus system.
The IEEE 39-bus system
The IEEE 39-bus system shown in Figure 4-3, is a simplified representation of
the 345 kV transmission system in the New England region; the model consists of 10
generator and 29 load buses. 12 For this system, two congestion cases are analyzed.
1 2The detailed system data are documented in [36, 115].
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Figure 4-4 Congestion case 1: line 16-19.
In the first case, the congested line of interest is the line connecting buses 16 and
19 as shown in Figure 4-4. Since this line is the only connection to the rest of the
network for the subset of buses (19, 20, 33, and 32), these buses form a separated
cluster, cluster 2, if the line 16-19 is congested. The CDFs for buses in this cluster
are 0.500 and for the other buses are -0.500. In other words, if a bilateral transaction
is between any buses only within cluster 1 or cluster 2, there will be no power flow
through the congested line; if a bilateral transaction is made across clusters, 100%
of the transaction will flow through the congested line. In this case, there are only
two clusters and the boundary is the congestion interface 16 - 19.
The second case of congestion clusters is a more general one. In this case, we
consider a line of interest 4-14 as shown in Figure 4-5. Unlike case 1, buses on
both sides of the congestion interface are still connected to each other via other
uncongested lines. The CDF value for each bus and clusters are listed in Table .
In this case, cluster 1 is the congestion-sensitive cluster and the other three clusters
are less sensitive congestion clusters. All buses in cluster 4 are connected to the rest
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Figure 4-5 Congestion case 2: line 4-14.
of the system via bus 16; therefore, they all have the same CDF values as bus 16.
We remark here that the 39-bus system is still a relatively small system com-
pared to a realistic power network. All buses in this system are tightly connected.
Therefore, in some congestion cases, the entire system is a single congestion clus-
ter 1. This indicates that significant simplifications can only be seen on very large
networks as described next.
New England 2000-bus system
The New England 2000-bus system is chosen as an example for large systems.
This system has 1808 buses, 296 of which are generators, and 2565 transmission
lines.
In this case, we simulate congestion on the 345 kV line connecting load at Car-
penter Hill to the power plant Millbury No. 3. Due to congestion, there are 13
I
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Table 4.1 CDFs and clusters for IEEE 39-bus system (case2: line 4-14).
Congestion Sensitive Cluster (Cluster 1)
bus bus-3 bus-4 bus-5 bus-6 bus-10 bus-11 bus-12
CDF -0.1512 -0.3372 -0.1280 -0.0894 0.1087 0.0449 0.1087
bus bus-13 bus-14 bus-15 bus-17 bus-18 bus-31 bus-0
CDF 0.1725 0.3372 0.1468 -0.0076 -0.0625 0.1087 -0.0893
Cluster 2
bus bus-1 bus-2 bus-7 bus-8 bus-9 bus-25 bus-30
CDF 0.1210 -0.1254 -0.1041 -0.1115 -0.1157 -0.1120 -0.1254
bus bus-36 bus-38
CDF -0.1120 -0.1184
Cluster 3
bus bus-26 bus-27 bus-28 bus-29 bus-37
CDF -0.0606 -0.0364 -0.0606 -0.0606 -0.0606
Cluster 4
bus bus-16 bus-19 bus-20 bus-21 bus-22 bus-23 bus-24
CDF .0668 0.0668 0.0668 0.0668 0.0668 0.0668 0.0668
bus bus-32 bus-33 bus-34 bus-35
CDF 0.0668 0.0668 0.0668 0.0668
Table 4.2 Average CDFs of cluster 2-13.
cluster Ave. CDF cluster Ave. CDF cluster Ave. CDF
2 0.2766 6 0.0515 10 0.0519
3 0.3412 7 -0.1208 11 0.0817
4 0.2765 8 -0.0457 12 0.1595
5 0.1645 9 0.0170 13 0.2278
congestion clusters formed, Figure 4-6. Except for cluster number 1, the CDFs
within the other clusters are similar. The average CDF values are listed in Table
4.2.
Most of the buses in the New York system belong to cluster number 9 since
the main tie-lines from New York are the 345 kV lines connecting to New England
(13)
(12)T
RPENTER HILL
MILLb I UVN
4------
Figure 4-6 Clusters in New England 2000-bus system.
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system at Berkshire, Long Mountain, and Norwalk Harbor.1 3 All these three buses
are located in cluster 9.
Note that the partition of these congestion clusters follows neither the boundaries
of states nor the boundaries of utilities. Therefore, by definition, when the region of
congestion-sensitive cluster (cluster 1) covers more than one utility, the traditional
congestion management procedure initiated by utilities individually would not be
able to efficiently alleviate the congestion.
Clustering patterns also vary with the line outages or the system topology
changes. For example, in the summer of 1997, Connecticut suffered a power short-
age problem due to the nuclear plant outages. To alleviate the shortage situation,
the following corrective actions are applied: the North Bloomfield to Bloomfield
and the North Bloomfield to Bloomfield Jct 115 kV circuits are separated from the
North Bloomfield bus14 and the circuits from North Bloomfield to south Agawam
Jct and North Bloomfield to Southwick are closed. In this case, buses in North-
ern Connecticut are transferred from cluster 9 to cluster 7 due to these corrective
actions.
The impact of interface loading on congestion patterns could also be significant.
During a high power transfer from New York to New England, the 345 kV circuit
connecting Pleasant Valley, New York, to Long Mountain Connecticut, is the most
likely congested tie-line [117]. Based on the same analysis, if congestion occurs, the
northeastern corner of New York and a significant portion of the western side of
Connecticut are grouped as one congestion-sensitive cluster (cluster 1). All power
injections at buses located within this area need to be handled more carefully while
attempting to increase the bulk power transfer between New York and New England.
However, if the contingency "Long Mountain stuck breaker" (the fault on one
of the circuits terminated at Long Mountain sub-station and the failure of a circuit
1 3The Long Island Cable between Norwalk Harbor, Connecticut, and Northport, New York.
1 4These circuits remain in service and connected to each other at North Bloomfield.
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Figure 4-7 An example of multi-congestion clusters.
breaker to operate) 15 occurs, the Long Mountain to Pleasant Valley 345 kV tie-
line is disconnected in order to protect the transmission equipment. Consequently
the originally tightly inter-connected areas within the congestion cluster 1 are now
separated and belong to two different clusters due to the loss of connection. The
clustering patterns before and after the contingency are significantly different in this
case.
4-4.3 Multi-congestion Interface Clusters
The clustering method described above is also applicable if more than one trans-
mission line congestion condition is present in the system. Since the proposed clus-
tering method is based on the DC load flow assumption and, furthermore, no slack
bus is involved, the congestion clusters of a multi-congestion case can be obtained
15 This contingency has been identified by the Northeast Utility Co. as one of the most severe
contingencies in New England. Present recommendation is to open the following lines: Long Moun-
tain to Pleasant Valley, Long Mountain to Forst Bridge and the Long Mountain to Plumtree 345
kV circuits [117].
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Figure 4-8 Typical congestion interfaces in New England.
by superposing the clusters corresponding to the individual line congestions. For
instance, in the IEEE 39-bus system example, if the congestion case 1 and case 2
happen simultaneously, then there will be five clusters formed in the system; buses
19, 20, 33, and 32 are separated from cluster 4 and form a new cluster, Figure 4-7.
4-4.4 Congestion Interfaces in New England
Based on the analysis done by New England Power Pool (NEPOOL), the New
England transmission grid is designed to accommodate typical power flow for normal
day to day operations. In this normal state, the transmission system is basically un-
constrained. However, under certain transmission equipment or generator outages,
constraints may occur [79]. Once constraints are observed, NEPOOL engineers la-
bel these congested paths and areas that typically import or export power via these
paths. The borders between areas are the so-called congestion interfaces. These
pre-defined congestion interfaces and congestion areas are depicted in Figure 4-8.
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As mentioned above, these interfaces are not normally limiting but under certain
conditions could constrain power flow between these areas in New England. For
instance, there are several key transmission paths that allow power to flow into the
Boston area. Consequently, the total demand that can be served within the Boston
area is limited by the transmission capacities of these interfaces and the availability
of the Boston area generation. When one of these transmission path is out of service,
generation in Boston area has to be increased to meet the demand [79].16
Note that even though the newly formed New England Independent System
Operator (ISO-NE) continuously monitors the transmission paths that import or
export power to or from these areas and re-defines these congestion areas and in-
terfaces if necessary, the congestion interfaces defined by NEPOOL are static in
nature. These congestion interfaces do not change within the period of this evalua-
tion process (usually a season). For the sake of comparison of these interfaces with
the proposed CDF-based cluster computations, we study the following scenario:
Assume that the typical congestion interfaces in New England area are currently
experiencing significant congestion:
O Boston load pocket: Between 1400MW and 2000MW electricity is imported to
serve load within Boston area.
@ South Connecticut/Norwalk: This is a heavy load pocket, with north-to-south
congestion in the southern Connecticut area.
@ Maine/New Hampshire: When power imported from New Brunswick is not con-
sumed in Maine, there is a constraint that forms between Maine and New Hamp-
shire, restricting the flow of power toward the south and Massachusetts.
Figures 4-9, 4-10, and 4-11 show the clusters computed with respect to the three
main congestion cases. One main observation based on these figures is that due to
the topology of New England transmission grid, the resulting congestion clusters are
local and simple. The remaining parts of the system are unconstrained when any
of these three cases experiences major localized congestion within a single cluster.
16 Since the generation in Boston area is relatively expensive, such action is not economically effi-
cient. This portion of generation is usually referred to as "out of merit" or sub-optimal generation.
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Figure 4-9 Cluster analysis on New England system-casel: Boston load
pocket.
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Figure 4-10 Cluster analysis on New England system-case2: South Connecti-
cut/Norwalk.
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Figure 4-11 Cluster analysis on New England system-case3: Maine/New
Hampshire.
These clusters are dynamic and change as the system loading condition varies. This
type of information in the form of congestion clusters is both more accurate and
simpler to understand and use by the system users than the congestion-related
information provided by the congestion interfaces.
More generally, each region in the United States has built a relatively robust
transmission system to serve anticipated power demand patterns without violating
any transmission line limit, as long as all other equipment is functional, that is, no
contingencies. This makes clusters of users fairly stable with respect to the changes
in power inputs as long as there is no major transmission line outage. The congestion
clusters could be recomputed regularly to account for the likely large line outages
for maintenance, etc.
4-4.5 Variability of Congestion Clusters
Majority of the transmission systems are designed so that the system constraints
are not violated as they serve the most likely economic generation dispatch and the
anticipated system demand. Some constraints become active under a single major
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equipment (generator or transmission line) outage. For these reasons, the system is
typically operated sub-optimally with respect to the the total generation cost when
meeting load demand to prevent violations of system constraints in case a single
contingency occurs. This is a well-adopted preventive operating mode, known as
the (N - 1) security criterion [83]. The (N -1) security criterion is observed without
allowing for any on-line re-dispatch in case a contingency occurs.
The rationale behind this is that the time is a critical factor when a contingency
occurs, and, because of this, it would be too risky to rely on additional actions. In
reality, however, most of the contingencies only lead to so-called steady state system
violations, in particular violations of thermal line flow limits, or static voltage limits.
In both of these cases the time is not critical, and a very temporary violation of the
limits can be tolerated as long as the on-line cure for the problem is implemented.
It is straightforward to document that majority of so-called critical contingencies is
of this type.
This raises an important question concerning the preventive control practices
under competition. Relying on real-time actions as a system change takes place does
not necessarily lead to a reduced security. It just has to be done more carefully.
This closer look into the reasons for unconditional observance of the preventive
mode (N - 1) in its present form clearly points into the direction that, by design, the
constraints are not likely to be violated frequently (unless a contingency occurs).
Moreover, even when many of the contingencies occur, the operator could afford
to rely on on-line actions to operate the system less conservatively prior to the
contingency.
We suggest that any situation in which time is not critically involved (even un-
der contingency) should be viewed as a normal operating mode in which on-line
adjustments could be made in response to both economic (electricity) and technical
(proximity to constraint violations) signals [117]. We propose here that as long as
the congestion management can be carried out in response to signals within the
transmission market (primary and/or secondary), the system is still in a normal
instead of in an alert, or emergency operating mode. Only in exceptional cases
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when time is critical, the system is in an emergency operating mode, and the sys-
tem provider ought to be allowed to make decisions independent of their economic
impact. The clustering method presented here is useful for decision making in both
operating modes; it is critical for a system provider to have a simple picture of
cause and effect in any operating mode. The clusters developed here provide just
this. They, moreover, if publicly posted could provide valuable information to the
system users th adjust to the likely transmission system constraints.
4-5 Summary
The objective of this chapter has been to propose a simple method for commu-
nicating to both a transmission provider and system users the physical effects of
individual and independent transactions on the transmission lines and interfaces of
interest. This information could, in turn, be used for many purposes. In the next
chapter, three examples of its use for setting a transmission congestion management
in normal operating mode will be presented. It is our general conjecture here that
availability of this information is essential for the development of a liquid transmis-
sion market of one sort or the other. Moreover, it is likely that with such transparent
information many seemingly different transmission management concepts proposed
so far would lead to very similar results.
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Congestion
Cluster-based
Transmission
Management
Markets
This chapter shows how the aggregation method introduced in Chapter
4 could be used for facilitating either a spot transmission management
market, independent of the electricity market, or an entirely decentral-
ized transmission market. A usage-based congestion charge allocation
provides economic incentives for system users to avoid and/or relieve
congestion. Possible applications of the proposed market would be for
on-line transmission loading relief (TLR) in the normal operation.
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5-1 Introduction
The electric power restructuring has led to a variety of new questions concern-
ing methods for reliable and low-cost provision of electricity. On-line management
of transactions requested by the electricity market participants in the presence of
system constraints has been one of the major challenges during the electric power
industry restructuring. It has been observed that unsatisfactory management of
transactions could create risks to the market; at the same time, typical discrepancy
between the contractual agreements for system use and the physical flows through-
out a transmission system may lead to violations of system security for which a
transmission provider is responsible [9].
In order to avoid violations of transmission system constraints in real time op-
erations one should take one of the following two approaches:
@ Provide timely information regarding the probability of having a particular line
congested and economic incentives to system users to adjust their requests and
remain within the system constraints, and/or
@ Physically curtail transactions.
All solutions proposed so far for this so-called "congestion management" can be
identified as belonging to one of these two general approaches. While the two ap-
proaches may seem equivalent to a system operator, the financial implications of
choosing one over the other are generally very different.
These two types of congestion management approaches can also be interpreted
as being different with respect to:
(Dhow much choice is given to the system users to make their own (decentralized)
valuation of system service, and
© the type of system operating mode for which they are intended.
In the normal operation, line flows vary as a consequence of the transactions the
system serves. The proximity to the line flow limits (congestion) varies, but as long
as limits emergency actions are needed. Instead, methods of approach (1) should
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be developed for giving system users sufficient information so that they can adjust
their requests for system services and avoid congestion.
Physical curtailment (management of approach (2)), without any economic con-
siderations should be considered as the last resort option when it is impossible to
wait for the system users to respond according to their economic criteria. This
is equivalent to the emergency condition operating mode in the regulated indus-
try when economic considerations take a back seat to preserving system integrity
[34, 42].
This chapter illustrates how the proposed clustering method could be used to
facilitate creation of an efficient congestion management market under the normal
operating mode. As will be shown, a transaction between any two buses within
congestion clusters 2, 3, and higher has a small effect on power flow on a congested
line and can not help eliminate congestion. As a result, it should not be charged for
congestion.
5-2 Congestion Clusters-based Transmission
Management Markets
Ideas for transmission congestion management in response to the electricity mar-
ket requests range widely.1 The choice of a specific transmission provision method
is not critical when all transactions are physically manageable, i.e., when there is no
transmission congestion. The problem arises when active system constraints pro-
hibit implementation of some market requests. This situation raises both equity
and efficiency questions. Consequently, a system provider should have well-defined
measures for facilitating the most economic transactions first, and, for curtailing
transactions when this becomes absolutely necessary.
The fundamental problem is that neither equity nor efficiency can be uniquely
measured in an electricity market since this measurement is critically dependent on
transmission network provision. For example, depending on the specific objectives
'A critical survey of the transmission congestion management methods can be found in [73, 74].
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of various market participants their needs for transmission vary considerably: To
some system users it is critical to have insurance for near-unconditional use of the
system, independent of what the others are requesting. Some other users are willing
to take the risk of not being served and, therefore, pay less for the transmission
service.
Moreover, a transmission provider typically does not have access to the economic
data associated with the energy market decisions. This makes it quite difficult to
estimate the demand function for transmission by a system provider.
It has been suggested in the literature that one way of getting around this
conceptual issue would be to let system users make decisions themselves as to how
much and what type of insurance for transmission service they would need and
what value would they associate with it. The system provider would then develop
mechanisms for facilitating the needs of the system users, without interfering with
their financial decisions once the two sides have agreed on the price for transmission
service requested. The actual implementation of such concepts could vary again
from
()a transmission provider selling firm transmission rights on seasonal basis, and
have a secondary transmission market develop for trading these rights by the
system users themselves [26],
@ a transmission provider selling priority-based transmission service instead of sell-
ing firm transmission rights, again with an active secondary market for transmis-
sion playing decisive role in efficient real-time use of these rights [25, 109],
@ not having any rights sold but a transmission provider playing a major role in auc-
tioning the use of transmission as the requests evolve; both transmission provider
and system users actively estimating the value of transmission for the contract
duration and iterating to a compromise [73, 74].
These techniques enable system users to value transmission system and adjust their
requests for service accordingly. The earliest ideas suggesting methods of this type
can be found in [26, 113, 53]. A conceptual scheme for this setup in which decisions
for transmission service and its use are decoupled from the electricity market is
shown in Figure 5-1.
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Figure 5-1 Decoupled transmission congestion management and electricity
markets. [59]
Bid(q,pE) Bid(q,pE)
Run/not run j plus Pr
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Figure 5-2 Bundled electricity and transmission management markets. [59]
These methods are in sharp contrast with the bundled, nodal pricing-based ap-
proach to congestion management in which the financial impact of transmission
constraints is generally bundled together with the value of the energy market bids
as illustrated in Figure 5-2.
This qualitatively different approach to transmission congestion management has
been advocated in [46, 20]. A system provider (typically an ISO) performs a bundled
management of energy bids subject to transmission constraints and evolves with a
single price indicator. In this approach energy market decisions and transmission
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market decisions are not separable, and, moreover, no iterations are allowed in which
system users would respond to the transmission charge. Once the bids are made, it
is the ISO who determines which bids are used and at what price.
The basic premise here is that, coordinated or bilateral, the transmission man-
agement market is fully separable from the electricity market, which, in turn, could
have various forms in its own right ranging from tight poolcos to entirely bilateral
forms.
5-2.1 Spot Market for Transmission Congestion
Management
In a general case, for the spot electricity market to be fully decoupled from the
spot market for transmission congestion management, it is assumed to have two
separate bids by the system users, one into the electricity market, and the other
into the transmission management market [43].2
A straightforward use of the congestion clusters proposed would be to have
a separate spot market for short-term congestion management. As done in most
of the restructured organizations, all balanced bilateral requests described earlier
are submitted for approval to the transmission market coordinator. A separate
bidding process for participating in transmission congestion management takes place
in parallel. It is also assumed that a system provider will post the congestion clusters
publicly.
Two types of requests are managed by a transmission market coordinator. Bi-
lateral requests k for implementing transactions Ck as defined in Equation (4-2)
above define the likely status of the system and enable:
) A transmission provider to post on-line likely congestion clusters based on the
requested transactions
@ Groups of participants, Ntr,bids, to bid a form of a supply function pl(AP) for
changing the injection into buses 1 at a price pl(AP), subject to the constraint
that the multi-lateral adjustments form a balanced transaction.
2 This does not preclude LBMP-type designs in which the two markets are bundled.
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Re-dispatch for transmission congestion
After these bids are received, the market coordinator will only take certain bids 1
necessary to facilitate bilateral transactions k, without curtailing the pre-requested
transactions.3
Theoretically, a transmission market provider finds the solution to this problem
by solving the following optimization problem:4
Ntr,bids
min p1(AP)AP (5-1)
subject to
'pT AP + F_ F" i - j all lines
AP{"m < < i APrnax = 1 - Ntr,bids
Ntr,bids
S AP = 0
(5-2)
where AP is the real power adjustment at bus 1 and p, are incremental/decremental
price bids submitted by a generator or by the interruptible loads. These are the
prices at which a generator is willing to adjust its real power output or a load is
willing to curtail/increase the power consumed. Fj is the flow on line i-j caused
by all contracts k requesting transmission service.
It is likely that the number of participants in the transmission congestion market,
Ntr,bids, would generally be much smaller than the number of active trades in the
electricity market. 5
3 Observe that if there is no expected line congestion after implementing all transactions k, no
bids from the transmission market are used and there is no charge.
4 No economic data from the electricity market needed.
5 For example, most of the loads are currently price-inelastic.
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Usage-based transmission charge allocation
The total charge to relieve system congestion is determined as
Ntr,bids
TC = p i( AP)APi (5-3)
This charge is then allocated to all inter-cluster contracts k as well as to all intra-
cluster 1 transactions based on their relative contribution to total flow Fi-j. The
proportionality factor which determines this relative contribution is
-D-jCk F _
Zk Di-jCk EkPZ-
for k C Cinter (5-4)
where Cinter represents the subset of transactions either across different congestion
clusters or within the congestion-sensitive cluster 1. Recall that, by definition, only
transactions in Cinter contribute significantly to the flow Fj; therefore, this formula
greatly reduces the number of critical transactions affected by congestion.
A congestion relief fee, RF, for transaction k is simply the total cost for relieving
the congestion times the allocation factor -yk:
RFk = yk x TC for k E Cinter (5-5)
5-2.2 Congestion Clusters for Transmission Rights
Trading
The second qualitatively different use of the congestion clusters would be devel-
opment of a secondary transmission market based on the on-line congestion cluster
information.
The concept of tradeable transmission rights was introduced in [26] in 1996 and
further advocated in [84]. According to this scheme, the ownership of a line is split
into transmission rights. Those rights can be traded freely by their owners. The link
between the transmission rights and the electricity market activities are established
through forcing market participants to buy the quantity of transmission rights cor-
responding to the amount of flow each of the transaction is causing. Counter-flows
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create new transmission rights, eligible for trade.
The prices are not set by a coordinator in this scheme. Instead, they are result
of a competitive mechanism where the owners of transmission rights actively seek
to maximize the value of their rights. The conjecture is that the evolution of prices
for transmission rights is simply subject to the law of (transmission) supply and
demand.
The minimal information exchange required for practical implementation of this
scheme has always been an issue. The role of publicly available congestion clusters
is just this: a help to system users to determine the value of transmission and to
assist them in trading their transmission rights accordingly.
The implementation of tradeable transmission rights proposed in [26] remains
complex even with the help of congestion clusters. This is because the management
must be done to the individual transmission line level.
5-2.3 Congestion Clusters-based Hybrid Transmission
Management Markets
Another version of a possible congestion market that leaves enough room for
system users to value transmission is based on the concept of a transmission provider
signaling to all users a short-term (hourly) congestion price based on their current
relative impact. The price is proportional to the square of the deviation in flows from
nominal6 caused by their relative contribution to the total flow in a line approaching
congestion. The premise here is that the system users will adjust iteratively (hour by
hour) in response to these signals, and this will prevent congestion from occurring.
The error signals are based on soft, rather than hard transmission constraints [49,
56].
A real-time (hourly) transmission price feedback is based on using the error
vector, E(t), whose elements reflect amount of the individual line flows beyond
6The definition of a nominal flow in a multi-control area under open access remains an open
problem [51, 57].
132
R (F - Fnom) 2
U
Fn n F"a
Line Flow
Figure 5-3 Congestion charge curve.
their nominal values,
Fi_4 - F!1_" if Fi-j > F _T
Ei-j (t) =- -
0 otherwise
for i - j E all lines (5-6)
where FE"jn is a value smaller than the thermal limit Fi'"q by certain safety margin.
Next one can compute vector of transmission congestion charges according to
CC(t) = E (t)T [di ag({ R}1)] E (t) (5-7)
where (diag({R})] is a diagonal matrix. Coefficients in this matrix reflect relative
importance of maintaining flow in various transmission lines within their nominal
values.
The usage-based charge allocation method is still applied as described above by
computing the allocation factors -Yk but now the total charge has become the sum
over all lines
TC = {1}TCC(t) (5-8)
This price feedback design is usage-based in the sense that the transmission
congestion charge to a market participant at bus i' is proportional to the relative
contribution of its injection to the line flow. The larger rate, the faster will system
users respond to the security conditions. However, if the price feedback is too large,
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oscillations may occur. The conceptual use of real-time price feedback to regulate
technical processes is known to potentially have a destabilizing effect [97]. To avoid
these problems, one has to engage into systematic feedback design for regulating
system conditions in response to the expected ranges of system disturbances.
Rather than informing the user that he has to be suddenly disconnected from
the system, the user is given, in real time operation, a price feedback for effecting
security margins. This price, of course, unavoidably depends on all other system
users and all users are expected to adjust to the system conditions over time by
either paying for effecting system security and/or by adjusting power quantities
traded to avoid this charge. 7
5-2.4 Temporal Aspects of the Proposed Transmission
Management Markets
In the spot market for congestion management all system users submit their
requests for service k characterized by Ck (quantity, location and contract duration)
transaction schedules to the market coordinator an hour ahead. At the same time,
a congestion market coordinator posts congestion clusters based on the current
system use. In parallel, on an hourly basis, bids for participating in congestion
management are submitted, a market coordinator determines charges to the users
k, and pays participants in congestion management. The entire process is repeated
on an hourly basis. The concept is that a congestion market coordinator uses the
available resources to relieve the congestion and charge individual system users based
on their impacts on the congested line flow.
In the hybrid market there is no bidding for relieving congestion. On an hourly
basis congestion clusters are posted, the system is well inside the security margin
-close to its nominal line flow F"""; price for use of the congested line is rising while
the power flow on the transmission line is approaching the thermal limit of that line.
The users adjust the next hour in response to this price change and avoid congestion.
Each market participant responds to the congestion price in a decentralized fashion.
7 The transmission charges collected here are best used for future system enhancements to main-
tain F close to F"m.
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Figure 5-4 A simple 5 bus system.
Table 5.1 Per-unit data for 5-bus example.
Line Parameters
G 1-L 4 G 2-L 4 G 2-G 3
0.01 0.01 0.01
0.1 0.1 0.1
G3 -L5 L 4-L5
0.01 0.01
0.1 0.1
5-2.5 Numerical Example 1: Strictly Bilateral
Adjustments
Figure 5-4 shows the 5-bus system used to illustrate the feasibility of the concepts
introduced in the previous section to avoid transmission constraints in real-time
operations. Per-unit data for each transmission line of this system is listed in Table
5.1. Assume that there are two bilateral contracts present on the system, T1,5 ,
between generator 1 and load 5, and T 2,4 , between generator 2 and load 4. In this
simulation, the cost functions for generators 1 and 2 are
CG 1 + PG1 + 0.5 (5-9)
CG2 (PG 2 ) = 21 + 0.5PG2 + 1 (5-10)
and the demand utility functions for load 4 and 5 are
UL4 (PL 4 ) = 360.5PL4 - 10 P 4  (5-11)
UL 5(PL5 ) = 241PL 5 - 5P2 (5-12)
Since, in this case, the transactions are strictly bilateral, PG1  PL5 = T1,5 and
PG2 = PL4 = T2 ,4 ; therefore, the cost/utility functions can be re-written in terms of
line
r
x
G1-G2
0.01
0.1
IFil
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Figure 5-5 Transactions without any transmission constraints.
T1,5 and T2,4:
cG1 (T1,5) ,T5 + T1,5 ± 0.5 (5-13)
cG2 (T2,4) 2T5,4 + 0.5T2,4 + 1 (5-14)
UL4 (T2,4) =350-5T 2 ,4 - 10T 4  (5-15)
UL5 (T1,5) 241T1,5 - 5T, 5  (5-16)
To start with, the scheduled (nominal) values for T1,5 and T2,4 are 8 p.u. and 10
p.u. respectively. Over time, at the end of the first hour, at t =1 hour, T2,4 starts
to deviate from its schedule value in anticipation of an improved profit by G2 and
benefit at L4. The quantity requested for approval by T2,4 adjusts every 15 minutes
and the maximum change is ± 20 % of its nominal value. Around t=2:15 hour, T2,4
settles to its optimal value T2,4 =15 p.u. At t=3 hour, T2,4 starts changing quantity
traded in the same manner and it finally settles to the optimal value T1,5 = 20 p.u.,
Figure 5-5.
Accounting for transmission constraints
Assuming that the thermal limit of line 2-4 is 9 p.u., the line constraint will
be obviously violated in absence of any price feedback reflecting proximity of the
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obvious physical adjustment.
line flow to its limit. Figure 5-6 is the result of an obvious physical adjustment.
After the flow on line 2-4 reaches its limit due to the extra injection of T 2,4 , all the
transaction requests have to be curtailed (case 1).
Next, Equation (5-6) is applied as the price feedback. In this simulation case,
the total congestion charge, TC, can be written as following:
TC = R 2 _4(F 2 -4 -F_ if F 2 _4 > F - (5-17)
0 otherwise
Here, we choose R 2 - 4 = 4 /pu 3 -hour.
Based on the congestion distribution factor described in Chapter 4, the impacts
of T1 ,5 and T 2,4 to the congested transmission line can be calculated.
AF2-4 =0.0912ATi,5 + 0.4360AT 2 ,4
= AF21, + AFT2,4
(5-18)
(5-19)
Then, the transmission charge for T1,5 and T 2,4 are determined by Equation (5-5),
the usage-based charge allocation formula.
Shown in Figure 5-7 is an application of soft-constraints-based price feedback
described in this chapter. Each transaction is given a price signal based on its
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Figure 5-8 Optimal decision makings for bilateral transactions T1 ,5 and T 2 ,4.
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Figure 5-9 A comparison of case 1 and case 2.
relative contribution to the line constraint. It can be seen that since the proximity
to a line flow constraint depends on both transactions, T 2,4 will self-adjust as the
T1,5 changes so they collectively result in an acceptable line flow (case 2). Figure
5-8 shows the optimal decision making of the two bilateral transactions.
In Figure 5-9, a comparison of case 1 and case 2 is summarized. This figure shows
the result of case 2 actually approaching the optimal values when both transactions
are scheduled simultaneously to maximize the total profit subject to a given line
constraint. The optimal value for T*5 is 19.434 p.u.; the optimal value for T* 4
is 13.282 p.u. This figure is an illustration of a self-adjusting process by primary
market participants in response to the system constraints-based price feedback. The
transmission charge for T1,5 and T2 ,4 are shown in Figure 5-10
5-2.6 Numerical Example 2: Congestion Cluster-based
Market Adjustments
The previous example is strictly for bilateral transactions. Here is a more general
setup. Based on the result presented in Chapter 4, IEEE 39-bus system is reduced
to a simpler system as shown in Figure 5-11. Except for buses in cluster 1, buses
within the clusters 2, 3, and 4 are now represented by three aggregate buses with
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Figure 5-10 Congestion charge.
average CDFs, -0.1162, -0.0558, and 0.0668 respectively. For simulation purposes,
we further consider only four active market players in the system: two loads, at
bus 3 and bus 4, and two generators, in cluster 3 and cluster 4. The marginal cost
functions of Gcluster3 and Gcluster4 are (20 + 0.1PGc)uster3 and (10 + 0.05PG te 4 ),
respectively. At the initial stage, Gcluster3 supplies L 4 and Gcluster4 supplies L 3
300MW and 800MW of power, respectively. 8 The line concerned to be critical is
line 4-14 with a 350MW thermal limit and its rate of congestion charge R of 10
(MW) 2 . The congestion charge is activated only when the line flow is larger than its
nominal value F" = 250MW. Here we further assume no market power.
At the third hour, t = 3, the demand at bus 4 starts increasing at a steady rate
of 50MW/hour and finally it reaches 700MW at t = 10. As the demand increases,
flow on line 4-14 is increased and the prices of both generators will change because
of the generation increase. Therefore, L 3 and L 4 need to make decisions on how
much power should be purchased from Gcluster3 and Gcluster4 based on the prices of
electricity and the congestion charge. Since the congestion charge rate R, clusters
and their CDFs are posted on-line, L 3 and L 4 are able to calculate the least expansive
8Note that 300MW and 800MW is the result of economic dispatch according to the given
marginal cost functions.
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Figure 5-11 The initial state of the hybrid transmission market simulation.
way to obtain electricity.
Figure 5-12 shows the optimal decision making process of L 3 and L 4 . At the
beginning of the demand increase, L 4 purchases additional power from both Gcuster3
and GcIuster4. After hour 5, the line flow is beyond the nominal value, 250MW, and
the system provider starts charging L 3 and L 4 for causing congestion. After hour
6, the best way for L 4 to meet its demand is to purchase all power from Gciuster3 to
avoid the high congestion charge. Similarly, because of this transmission charge, L 3
will decrease the amount of power purchased from Gcluster4 even though Gcluster4
offers a much lower price.
Figure 5-13 shows total generation in cluster 3 and cluster 4. In hybrid trans-
mission management markets, system users start noticing congestion and changing
requests for transactions before the line flow actually reaches its limit. System users
gradually change the ways of obtaining electricity by buying from the more expen-
sive generators to avoid causing congestion. In addition, Figure 5-13 also shows that
the system response under this decentralized optimization process (each system user
optimizes its own) is close to the results of centralized Optimal Power Flow (OPF).
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Figure 5-14 is the result of real power flow on line 4-14 under hybrid transmission
management.
Note that rate of charge R determines the steady state value of the line flow.
Therefore, it can be used as a control variable by a transmission market coordinator.
In some emergency cases, i.e., when flow on a transmission line has reached or
gone beyond the security limit, the market coordinator would be able to relieve the
congestion by raising the rate R to discourage the use of the congested line. This
can be viewed as the economic feedback control of line flow for security but this is
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Figure 5-14 Real power flow on line 4-14.
possible only with the help of on-line simple information that tells system users in
a transparent way how to avoid congestion.
These simulations shows that given the right price feedback, the primary market
will adjust in a decentralized way to the near theoretical optimal conditions without
requiring centralized market coordination. System users are likely to learn the value
of their own transactions being implemented and compare this value with what they
are charged for. In theory, assuming perfect market conditions, one will have exactly
the same situations when comparing performance of real-time spot markets.
5-3 Transmission Loading Relief
We have shown earlier that, depending on where the congested line happens to
be, the clusters of system users which contribute equally to its congestion would
only seldom be identical with the boundaries of the control areas. Here, we propose
to develop a TLR market for serving very large areas, such as the entire Eastern
Interconnection of the US system under normal operating conditions, instead of
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basing a TLR procedure on the boundaries of the existing control areas [84, 20]
Depending on the type of a TLR market structure (spot, hybrid, etc.), more
than one solution is possible. A successful implementation heavily depends on a
systematic data management. Congestion clusters introduced here could be used as
one type of on-line information for such solution.
Finally, an important technical detail concerns relations between the clusters
developed here and the computation of the available transfer capability (ATC) at
each control area level, as presently practiced [82, 54]. It is shown in this chapter
that for all practical purposes the boundary of a control area should be immaterial
under open access transmission provision, except for after the fact accounting. The
notion of a control area is in a sharp conflict with the very notion of an open (large)
power network access. It is a serious obstacle to open energy trades beyond the
control area borders and an active effort should be made to develop new tools.
It is shown using the same systems as in the previous section how, depending
on where the congested line happens to be, the clusters of system users which con-
tribute equally to its congestion are generally never identical with the boundaries of
the control areas. This should not be a surprising finding; however, it is important
to emphasize this fact for several reasons. At present so-called ATC is computed at
each control area level for the assumed power flow exchange with the neighboring
areas [82, 54]. The control area boundaries are only an unnecessary complication to
a systematic congestion management. Moreover, their existence could be quite mis-
leading when assessing the degree of congestion in an open access system. A typical
statement is that New England does not have much congestion. This statement is
true for pre-specified import from New York and Canada, for example. Contrary to
this statement, the economic transfers from both Canada and New York are severely
limited by the transmission system design in New England. In other words, the New
England system viewed as an autonomous control area appears not to have much
congestion, but when considered as a part of a larger interconnection it definitely
well-defined congestion patterns.
This points into the direction that one should not define "clusters" relevant for
congestion according to the boundaries of the existing control areas. This leads to
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a conclusion that methods for congestion management which are control area-based
[8, 20] may not be the right starting point for effective congestion management under
open access.
5-4 Observations
5-4.1 Simplified Information Structure
Nodal pricing is considered favorable to large customers that have the ability to
manage a congestion-related risk by dealing with potentially large number of nodal
prices and even take advantage of it. Most of the customers are small and are not
sophisticated enough to do so. On the contrary, in the proposed framework, by
charging congestion relief fees and providing the information of congestion clusters
in real time,9 consumers could easily find their power suppliers that more unlikely to
cause the congestion problems and avoid high congestion charges. Then, congestion
is alleviated automatically while system users trying to maximize their own profits.
5-4.2 Counter Flow Issues
Note that the formula (5-4) sums up the actual values of F _ instead of their
absolute values so negative charges may occur in the usage-based allocation method.
Namely, a transaction may get rewarded if it creates counter-flow on the congested
lines and it helps the line flow stay within the security limits. This provides incentive
for consumers to schedule their transactions that help relieve the existing congestion.
This decreases the probability of congestion.
9 For example, posted on OASIS.
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5-4.3 Incentives to Upgrade the System
In our proposed scheme, transmission lines will only be used and paid up to
their maximum capacities. For a transmission provider, the only way to increase its
profits is to increase the transmission capacity to allow more power flow through
the lines. In this sense, the most valuable investment on the transmission expansion
then will be to increase the capacity of those most frequently congested lines.
On the other hand, the parties benefiting from congestion are those generators
who are holding the locational advantages to relieve congestion. These generators
will be used due to congestion constraints relief even if they are more expensive.
This reveals the locational value of these generators and also provides the incentive
to build new and inexpensive generation at these locations.
5-5 Summary
In this chapter, three market structures for short-term congestion management
are presented. These congestion relief markets are completely separated from the
energy markets. By applying the clustering concepts introduced in the previous
chapter to determine the impact of each transaction on the congestion interface, a
usage-based pricing strategy is developed to serve as the basic pricing mechanism of
these markets. Simulation results demonstrate that if an adequate real-time signal
concerning system security status is given, the market participants will respond
to it and converge to the market conditions under which constraints are directly
coordinated with the primary market processes.
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Temporal
Aggregation:
Probabilistic
Optimal Power
Flow
This chapter introduces an efficient way to solve optimal power flow
(OPF) with respect to given probabilistic real load conditions taking
into account of the line flow limits and other operation constraints. A
two-stage approach for efficient Monte Carlo simulation is proposed. In
the first stage, coarse computations, a discretized load duration curve
is used. At each load level, a constrained AC OPF is performed based
on a typical load distribution pattern. In the second stage, refined
computations, random load deviations from the typical patterns are
taken into account but only the linearized OPF equation is adopted.
Combining the results obtained in the two stages, one can simulate a
large number of example points within reasonable time.
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6-1 Introduction
Based on the derivations of transmission management problems in Chapter 2, it
is possible to identify at least three types of complex computing tools necessary for
assisting a transmission provider in the newly evolving industry. These are:
© Tools for projecting long-term (season, year) system conditions; this is essential
for predicting locations and amounts of transmission constraints.
@ Tools for optimizing short-term decisions so that long-term performance is im-
proved. For example, given that a transmission provider is obliged to sell trans-
mission rights to system users ahead of time, once this is done, he needs to
evaluate in short-term operations the tradeoff between denying short-term re-
quests by the spot market participants and curtailing long-term system users, so
that over the long period he is better off.
@ Tools for long-term optimal decisions, such as periodic optimal investment or pric-
ing long-term users of the grid. These long-term projections are made assuming
optimal short-term decision-making.
In the following of the thesis, we will illustrate possible methods for solving at
least the first two problems. The first method which is going to be introduced in this
chapter is an efficient probabilistic optimal power flow (POPF). In the next chapter,
the second problem is formulated as an inherent dynamic programming problem
which uses the results of the first problem as a cost function to go. Even though
the last problem is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is just a direct generalization
of the second problem in a longer time horizon.
6-1.1 Development of Probabilistic Approaches to
Optimal Power Flow Problems
Over the past several decades, optimal power flow (OPF) analysis has been
adopted as an efficient tool in power systems planning and operations. As the
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power industry is being deregulated, the importance of OPF has increased signifi-
cantly because of its ability to determine static economic equilibrium and calculate
locational-based marginal prices (LBMPs) under the perfect competitive market
assumptions [98, 46, 20].
Conventional OPF analysis is typically used on a snapshot of time basis, i.e.,
for obtaining optimal generation patterns for average or extreme loading conditions
only, and it does not give any information about the degree of importance or like-
lihood of each violation. In actual operating practice, load always deviates away
from these snapshot conditions in a random fashion. In 1993, Carpenter proposed
a security constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF) to determine the optimal real-
time operation points to capture unexpected load deviations [19]. Some extensions
of SCOPF methods and applications can also be found in [18, 103]. In addition, a
complete survey of OPF literature is presented in [47]. In all of these literatures, the
optimal power flow problems are formulated as deterministic optimization processes.
In 1974, Borkowska first proposed a mathematical model for solving load flow
considering the uncertainties of load data [16]. This probabilistic approach is
referred as probabilistic load flow (PLF). PLF provides complete spectrum of
all load flow output variables, such as bus voltages and transmission line flows
[16, 2, 3, 71, 4, 72, 96]. In [16, 2], linearized load flow equations and the convolution
integration are adopted as the basis to evaluate the sum of random variables. In
[3], the discrete frequency domain convolution process is calculated based on the
fast Fourier transform (FFT) that gives greater numerical precision with consider-
ably less computational effort. However, a main assumption made by these methods
based on convolution technique is the complete independence between random loads
at different nodes. This assumption apparently does not agree with the realistic load
patterns that are highly correlated with weather, transmission grid topology and
other environmental factors. In order to remedy this defect, in [71], linear depen-
dence between random loads is included in the computation. In 1991, El-Hawary
and Mbamalu formulated the optimal power flow dispatch problem probabilistically
assuming random and normally distributed perturbations in power demand [37].
The problem becomes even more difficult to solve when some variables reach
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the their technical limits. The first attempt to solve constrained load flow (CLF)
problem probabilistically can be found in [96]. The adopted approach is a piecewise
linear multiple transformation to include the effects of finite voltage control capa-
bility of the voltage control devices producing more realistic mean and variance for
the load flow solution. In [4, 72], particular emphasis is placed in the accurate rep-
resentation of the tail regions of state and output network random variables based
on multilinearisation of the power flow equations and boundary load flow or Monte
Carlo simulation techniques.
In this chapter, we propose an efficient Monte Carlo-based method to solve
probabilistic optimal power flow (POPF) which takes into account transmission
line flow and generation capacity constraints [118, 32]. The emphasis here will be
on managing transmission; therefore, unlink other literatures, the effort will mainly
focus on finding probability distributions of generator outputs, nodal prices, and line
flows etc., and the possibilities of violating transmission capacity constrains. 1 This
kind of information is essential for system users to project the value of a transmission
link and estimate "transmission risk" components in their energy contracts. Another
objective for deriving POPF algorithm is to build foundation for further developing
a priority insurance transmission service that will be introduced in the next chapter.
6-2 Problem Formulation
First, we define the deterministic version of optimal power flow (OPF) prob-
lems. An OPF problem is formulated as a nonlinear optimization problem sub-
ject to equality constraints (load flow equations) and inequality constraints (lim-
its on generator real/reactive power outputs, line flows, voltage magnitudes/phase
angles, etc.). It determines an optimal operation point that minimizes a given
objective function (usually, the total production cost of power generation) 2 while
'The probability distribution of voltage and reactive power generation can also be computed by
using our method.
2 Sometimes, the objective function will include other objectives, e.q., environmental regulation
constraints.
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meeting all the static security requirements. Namely, given a real power load vec-
tor PL = {PLI, '' , PLn1 }T, solve for the optimal dispatch for available generation
resources P = {P,,--- , Pg }T:
NG
P = arg min cGi (PGJ) (6-1)
PG
subject to load flow equations:
Pi = Gi - VV cos 6j) + Bij Vi V sin 6oj (6-2)
Qi = Bi(V 2 - V V cos 6i 3) - GijViVj sin 6ij (6-3)
P = (Pti (6-4)
Qi = ZQij+VBii (6-5)
and other security operation constraints such as:
P 3  < Pax (6-6)
Pi"n" < p < pmax (6-7)
Vin < V V t ax (6-8)
Qnin < Q, < Q" i Eall buses, i 4 j (6-9)
where cGi(.) is the cost function of generator i; P and Qiy are the real power
and reactive power flows on transmission line i-j respectively; Yij = Gij - jBij
is admittance of a branch connecting buses i and j; Vi,6i: load and generator
voltage magnitudes and voltage phase angles respectively; Qi is the reactive power
generated/consumed at bus i.
After the optimal generation dispatch, P , is obtained, the corresponding trans-
mission line flows, F1, and nodal prices, pi can also be obtained as byproducts of
the OPF calculation.
Next, we define the probabilistic version of the optimal power flow problem.
In the previous setup, demands at different load buses are assumed deterministic.
However, the actual demand quantity at each load bus will not be known in advance
but, rather, it will exhibit an inherent random variation.
Here, we develop a POPF-based method for projecting system conditions based
152
on our knowledge of random load demand, PL = {PL1 , **' , PL }T with correspond-
ing joint probability density functions, fPL (PL1 , -. , PLnd), and generation cost func-
tions estimated using public information. Assume that PL = {PLi, ... , PLn1 }T is a
random load vector having a join probability density function, fpL (PL 1 , ''' , PL,,).
Let us denote deterministic OPF as a set of nonlinear functions T(.), i.e.,
{P ,P}T = {I1(PL1 , -,PL nd),-- ,'n(PLI, - PLnd)IT. Then, the basic
POPF problem is the problem of finding the probability density distribution of P,,
fpg (P ,,- - PG.), via a nonlinear transformation between fpL (.) and fp;(.).
For instance, the probability density function of optimal generation Ps,,
fp (Ps,), can be obtained by performing the following calculation:
fpg (P) = - -- f{PL} (PL1,''' , PLJ)
where J is the determinant of the Jacobian matrix
aO'mi 8' 2  ... aIng0 PL1  0 pL, aPL,
a'I, ... 8___
J(PL1 , *, PL) = det 0 PL2  0 PL2  aPL2  (6-11)
aXF1 (9q/2  ... &'I~ng
- DPL .L '9PL &PL1 _
6-2.1 Computational Complexities of Probabilistic
Optimal Power Flow
However, it is not possible to carry out analytically the above integration ex-
actly or even to numerically approximate it within a given accuracy because of the
complexity of load flow equations and the large number of variables. Furthermore,
functions 'J1, T 2 , - - , XFn' usually do not have continuous partial derivatives every-
where because of the inequality constraints imposed; therefore, the above integration
has to be carried out in a piecewise continuous manner. This makes the computation
even more difficult.
Another difficulty results from the interchange between controllable variables
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and output variables while any of technical constraints is reached during computa-
tions. For example, if the voltage magnitude at bus i is maintained constant by the
generator reactive power available at bus i, the fixed voltage is an input to the load
flow equations, and the required reactive power generation is an output variable.
In the process of the iterative solution, if the required reactive power generation
violates the physical limits, then the voltage is no longer considered fixed and is
allowed to vary as an output variable in response to the newly created specified
controllable variable which is taken to be the limit value of reactive power. In the
previous literatures listed in Section 6-1, the linearization and real/reactive power
decoupling assumptions are usually made in order to reduce the complexity. How-
ever, since for the probabilistic problem setup, load flow calculations are carried out
in a wide spread operation range, the results based on these assumptions may not
reflect the reality.
6-2.2 Monte Carlo Simulations
One possibility is to approximate the solutions by means of simulation. For in-
stance, one can generate a sample load vector P - f p , . l) }T and calculate
the corresponding OPF solution P*,). Next, one can generate another sample vec-
tor p(2) correlated to the first one in the way specified by its probability distribution
and, again, compute corresponding OPF solution P* . This process repeats until
an identically distributed random variable has been generated. Therefore, we can
use the distribution of based on (Pff), n = 1, ... ,N) as an estimate of the exact
answer. By the strong law of large number, when the number of sample points is
large enough, N -+ oo, the simulation results converge to the exact solutions. This
approach is called the Monte Carlo simulation approach [94, 93].
Here, we give an example illustrating the use of a Monte Carlo simulation for
solving a POPF problem. A simple 3-bus system shown in Figure 6-1 consists of
two generators and one load. All transmission lines are lossless and have the same
parameters. The marginal cost curves for G1 and G2 are ci (PG1 ) = 10 + 0.05PG1
and c2(PG2 ) = 20 + O-1PG2 respectively. Thus, the real power generation of G1 is
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Figure 6-1 A 3-bus system.
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Figure 6-2 The load duration curve of load L.
less expensive than that of G2.
Assume that demand at bus L exhibits a probability distribution following a
normal distribution with a 1000MW mean and a 200MW variance. The load du-
ration curve, i.e., the cumulative distribution function of PL, of this distribution is
shown in Figure 6-2. Note that, for the purpose of graphical illustration, we plot
the complement of the cumulative distribution function, GpL (PL), i.e.,
GPL (PL) = fPL (x)dx (6-12)
= 1 - GPL (PL)
For example, the values read from the Y-axis of Figure 6-2 indicate the probability
of demand at L exceeding corresponding X-axis value., e.q., 50% probability of load
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Figure 6-3 Monte Carlo simulation - Case 1: No line flow constraint.
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Figure 6-4 Monte Carlo simulation - Case 2: Imposing 600MW line flow con-
straint on line G1 -L.
exceeding 1000MW. 3
In the first case, the system is assumed without any transmission line constraints.
In this study, we generate 1000 sample load points that follow the pre-specified
distribution and solve the OPF result for each point. Then we plot the distributions
of the corresponding OPF solutions as shown in Figure 6-3. Figures 6-3(a), 6-3(b)
and 6-3(c) show the probability distributions of the two generator outputs, the line
flow on line G-L and nodal prices at three buses respectively. Since the system is
lossless and unconstrained, as expected, all three nodal prices are identical.
In the second case, the flow on transmission line G 1 -L is bounded by a 600MW
limit. Figure 6-4 is the Monte Carlo simulation results. Figure 6-4(a) shows that
after the system is constrained, the more expensive generator G2 has to increase
generation to avoid overloading line G-L.4 Figure 6-4(b) shows that the probability
3 This is consistent with the way adopted in the current power industry to depict the load
duration curves.
4 This is so-called "out of merit" generation.
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of line Gi-L being congested is 45%. As illustrated in Figure 6-4(c), the nodal price
at the load bus L has some probability of reaching as high as $200/MW due to the
congestion.
6-3 Two-Stage Approach for Monte Carlo
Simulation
When applying the Monte Carlo method to large power systems, an immediate
problem is the difficulty of constructing probability density functions fpL. Because
of the metering problems, electricity demands at individual load buses are usually
not measured in real-time; instead, usually only the total system demand is recorded.
These historical total load data for different systems are public information and can
be downloaded via the Internet [401. Therefore, one can assume that the probability
density function fprot(POt ) of total system demand is available.
As the system becomes larger, the number of variables increases (generators
and loads) so that more sample points are needed for the Monte Carlo method to
converge. In addition, longer simulation time is needed to obtain the OPF solution
for each sample case. Therefore, applying the traditional Monte Carlo technique
to solve large network cases is apparently a very time-consuming process. Even
though some efficient ways to solve an OPF problem in large power systems have
been proposed [8], it is still not plausible to use brute-force Monte Carlo simulations.
In order to get around these problems, we propose a two-stage approach to efficient
Monte Carlo simulations.
6-3.1 Basic Assumptions
The proposed two-stage approach is based on the observation that at each load
level, there usually exists a nominal load pattern, which represents system load
conditions, for example, peak load pattern, off-peak pattern etc. These load patterns
describe how total system demand is distributed at each load bus. A nominal pattern
can also be interpreted as the mean value of random load conditions at a specific
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Figure 6-5 Membership functions representing the loads of peak load, normal,
and off peak.
load level. Of course, there are deviations from the nominal pattern at all load buses.
The actual system loads are the sum of nominal patterns and zero-mean random
perturbations at individual load buses. In order to further simplify the problem,
following assumptions are made:
- (Al) Which transmission lines are congested and which generator outputs hit the
limits are are decided by solely nominal patterns but not by random deviations.
The system will have the same set of activated constraints before and after the
perturbation.
- (A2) Random load deviations will not cause any voltage/reactive power related
problems.
Then, at the first stage a set of discrete load patterns that represent nominal
system load conditions at different levels of the cumulative load duration curve is
used. Detailed OPF solutions are calculated based on these nominal patterns. These
OPF solutions give a rough approximation of generation probability distributions.
At stage two, random deviations from the nominal load patterns are taken into ac-
count. By using incremental linearized OPF solutions, a large number of simulation
sample points can be obtained efficiently.
6-3.2 Stage One: Coarse Computations
First, we identify several basic load patterns in the system, for instance, peak
load pattern, normal load pattern and off-peak pattern, and ranges of system load
levels for which these patterns are most likely to occur. Based on these, a fuzzy
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Figure 6-6 Discretized load duration curve.
set representing the typical load patterns at different system load levels and their
membership functions r are obtained [87, 68]. As shown in Figure 6-5, if the total
system load is larger than p[ 4 ], it follows peak load distribution; if system load falls
between p[ 2] and P[3 1, it follows the normal load distribution; and if system load
is less than PLl, off-peak load pattern is used to depict the load distribution. The
load pattern between P[ 1 ], p[ 2] or p[ 3], p[ 4] can also be obtained by combining the
two adjacent patterns weighted by their membership functions.
Next, we discretize the system load every hMW starting from PLMW, i.e.,
P"'(k) = P2 + kh, Figure 6-6. Thus, the typical patterns of different load lev-
els can be computed by using the following equation:
p[N] p[OP] p[PK]
P -k] Pot(k) [N L +P [OP] L +P[PK] LSPLk {1}TP[N { TITp[O T PK]
The probability of each discrete load pattern occurrence is
Prob{P k]} = Prob{PL + kh < POt < PL + (k + 1)h}
= GPot(P +(k+1)h)-GPta t (P2 +kh)
/ P+(k+1)h
= PO±kh fptot(PL)dPL (6-14)PO+kh L
Thus, we have computed OPF solutions for each load level. Based on the cor-
responding probabilities calculated in (6-14), the cumulative distribution curves for
these OPF solutions can be constructed.
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6-3.3 Stage Two: Refined Computations
The objective of refined computations is to improve coarse solutions as a better
approximation by including perturbations at each discrete load pattern level. First,
we generate a set of zero-mean random deviation, APL around a nominal pattern,
pkl and use this to compute the incremental changes of OPF solutions. Following
section shows that if generation cost curves are approximated by quadratic functions
(i.e., linear marginal cost curves) under the assumption made (Al), the incremental
OPF solution is simply a linear function of load deviations, 5 i.e.,
AP* = V[k]APL (6-15)
The matrices VEk] can be obtained when computing kth coarse solution. Therefore,
a refined solution is
PG P[] + V[k]ApL (6-16)
Since refined computations are just linear transformations, it is possible to handle
a large number of simulation points. By combining coarse and refined solutions,
we can approximate the continuous load distribution functions within a reasonable
computing time.
6-4 Numerical Examples
To illustrate the idea of the two-stage approach, we have simulated a simple five
bus system and the IEEE 39-bus system.
6-4.1 Numerical Example 1: a 5-bus Example
In this section, a simple five bus system with three generators and two loads
as shown in Figure 6-7 is adopted to demonstrate the proposed Monte Carlo sim-
ulations. Detailed system data for this 5-bus example can be found in Chapter
5.
5 Detailed derivations of a linearized OPF solution is documented in Appendix B.
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Figure 6-7 A 5-bus system.
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Figure 6-8 The total load duration curve for the simulation case.
We assume that the distribution of the total system demand is normal with a
1000MW mean and a 200MW variance, as shown in Figure 6-8, exhibiting two basic
load patterns: (1) peak load pattern, L 4 60% and L5 40% of total demand, and (2)
off-peak load pattern, L 4 50% and L5 50% of total demand. A fuzzy membership
function of the occurrence of the two basic load patterns at different load levels is
shown in Figure 6-9.
In this simulation setup, there are two inexpensive generators, G1 and G2 , with
a generator marginal cost function, Oc(PG) - 0 -1 PG + 10, and one expensive gen-
PG
erator G 3 with a marginal cost function, 9c(Pc) = 0. 2 PG + 20. Also, we assume&PG
that a transmission line G2-L 4 is the one most likely to be congested and its max-
imum capacity is F = 350MW. The other 5 transmission lines are relatively
unconstrained.
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Figure 6-10 Probability distributions of three generator outputs.
At a coarse computation stage, we discretize the total system load every 50MW
starting from 500MW to 1500MW. We use Equations (6-13) and (6-14) to find
the typical patterns corresponding to the discretized load levels and the probability
of the occurrence of each load pattern. Next, at a refined computation stage, we
generate a set of zero-mean random deviations for L 4 and L5 around each load
pattern. These random load deviations could be any type distributions and also
could be independent or correlated. In this case, random deviations are assumed to
be independent and normally distributed with a 2% variance around the nominal
values.
Figures 6-10, 6-11, and 6-12 show the probability distributions of all generator
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Figure 6-13 Probability distributions of nodal price differences for different
node-to-node transactions.
outputs, transmission line flows, and nodal prices respectively. As illustrated in Fig-
ure 6-10, generation of G2 is limited by the transmission flow constraint. Generator
outputs of both G1 and G3 are increased to pick up the excess demand. Figure 6-11
illustrates the probability distributions of the lone flows on the 6 transmission lines
in this system. One can observe that the probability of the system being congested
is around 32%. Furthermore, the constraint causes the nodal price at L 4 to reach
as high as $200/MW, while the nodal price at G2 is always the lowest, Figure 6-12.
The nodal prices at buses G1, G3 and L5 are similar to each other. This means that
generation at these three buses is not constrained because of the topology of the
system.
Next, we take the differences of the nodal prices to evaluate the value of each
transmission path. Figure 6-13 shows the probability distributions of the values of
six possible node-to-node transactions. The result shows that these transmission
paths have non-zero values only when system is congested. As expected, the link
between G2 and L 4 is the most valuable one. However, an interesting fact is that
the link between G1 and L5 has the lowest value even though it is the most distant
path in the system.
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Figure 6-14 39 bus system.
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Figure 6-15 Load duration curve for 39-bus system simulations.
6-4.2 Numerical Example 2: a 39-bus Example
In this section, we use standard IEEE 39-bus system, Figure 6-14, to simulate
the proposed POPF algorithm.
The marginal cost functions of G30, G 31 , G 3 2 , G33, and G 34 are OCGj (PG) _
aPGi
10 + 0.02PGj; and the marginal cost functions of G35, G36 , G 37 , G 38 , and Go are
aCGj (PGj) 20+ 0.0 4 PGj. Under this setup, the later five generators are relatively
aPGj
expensive. Transmission line connecting bus 6 and bus 11 is assumed to be most
likely congested since this line carries more power flow than any other lines in the
system under the normal operating condition.
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Figure 6-16 Three different typical load patterns used in 39-bus system simu-
lations.
The load duration curve of the total system demand is shown in Figure 6-15.
This figure shows the total system demand follows a normal distribution with a
4000MW mean and a 250MW variance. In addition, there are three typical load pat-
terns, peak-load, normal and off-peak, and the load distributions of these three pat-
terns is illustrated in Figure 6-16. The fuzzy membership function is similar to the
one depicted in Figure 6-5 with P[1 ] = 3000MW, P[1] = 3500MW, P[I = 4000MW,
and P[Il = 4500MW. In this simulation, coarse computations are performed every
500MW. A normal deviation at each load bus with 1% variance of the nominal load
value is used for the refined computations.
In the first case, the system is assumed with out any transmission line constraints.
Figure 6-17 shows the simulation result of coarse computations. Figures 6-17(a),
6-17(b), and 6-17(c) are the probability distributions of generation outputs of G30 ,
G3 1 , G3 8 and Go, the line flow on link between buses 6 and 11, and nodal prices at
the corresponding buses respectively. Since this system is unconstrained, the nodal
prices at all buses are similar except some small variances because of transmission
losses.
In the second case, a 350MW line flow constraint is applied on transmission
line 6-11. Figure 6-18 shows the corresponding coarse computation results. Similar
to the results of 5-bus example, the nodal prices these buses become significantly
different due to the constraint. Figure 6-19 shows that how coarse computations use
discretized load distribution curve to approximate the actual load duration curve.
Figures 6-20 and 6-21 are the simulation results after applying both coarse
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Figure 6-17 The simulation result of coarse computations without any line
flow constraint.
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Figure 6-18 The simulation result of coarse computations with a 350MW flow
constraint on line 6-11.
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Figure 6-19 Total demand cumulative distribution function (coarse).
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Figure 6-20 The simulation result of refined computations with a 350MW flow
constraint on line 6-11.
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Figure 6-21 Total demand cumulative distribution function (refined).
and refined computations. Figure 6-20 shows that refined computations improve
the accuracy of coarse solutions which are only calculated at several discrete load
levels. Figure 6-20(b) also shows that the probability of transmission line 6-11 being
congested is around 70%. Moreover, as shown in Figure 6-21, refined computations
obtain a continuous approximation for the load duration curve.
6-5 Uncertain Generator Cost Curves
In the previous derivations, we assumed that all cost functions of generators are
given. However, in a competitive energy market, a generator cost curve is usually
confidential. It is possible, however, to estimate the cost curve of a generator using
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Figure 6-22 Uncertain generation cost curve.
public knowledge concerning the generation technology, the fuel used, the current
fuel prices, etc.; still, estimation errors are unavoidable. As shown in Figure 6-22,
by applying fuzzy theory, an uncertain marginal cost curve can be characterized by
its upper and lower bounds and a most likely band. Therefore, given any possible
nodal price, there will be a corresponding uncertain generation output with the same
distribution shape, Figure 6-22. This way, the uncertain cost curves are mapped
into uncertain generation.
Assume that the membership function of uncertain generation and the corre-
sponding probability function have the same shape. In other words, qi = yj implies
fi = fj. Next, we use P3"r to indicate the uncertain generation output deviating
from its nominal value PGo', ip. G o+Pr. By inspection, the probability
distribution of pa" can be calculated by the following formula, Figure 6-23:
fe,(Pr) = par + Paom (-17)
ffs q( PG 3dPG
G
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Figure 6-23 Uncertain generation output deviation from the nominal value.
Note that this kind of uncertainty results from the imperfect human knowledge
of the marginal cost curves. Introducing this kind of uncertainty in the POPF
computation will decrease the accuracy of the results.
6-6 Large Networks
If the congestion condition in a large network is relatively stable, i.e., if only a
small group of transmission lines is frequently constrained, the clustering algorithm
described in Chapter 4 could be applied to assist the Monte Carlo simulations. The
procedures are as follows: First, we employ coarse computations (stage one) to
identify the most likely congestion interfaces in the system. Once these congestion
interfaces are found, this information is used to construct congestion clusters. As
discussed in Chapter 4, transactions within a cluster are not constrained (except
for cluster 1); therefore, while computing the impacts of the buses belonging to the
same cluster to congestion interfaces, one only needs to consider the net injection
of a cluster instead of individual buses. This greatly reduces the number of random
variables needed in the refined computation stage (stage two) and, therefore, helps
Monte Carlo algorithm converge faster.
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Figure 6-24 An illustration of using clusters to simplify large networks.
6-7 Summary
In this chapter, a method for predicting long-term system conditions using a
probabilistic optimal power flow-based approach is introduced as an essential tool for
long-term decision making. A two-stage Monte Carlo approach is proposed. First,
coarse solutions are the OPF solutions computed based on typical load patterns.
These fuzzy load patterns capture the correlations among different load buses at
different load levels so that this approach could avoid making the independence
assumption usually used in earlier literatures. At coast computation level, we take
into account of all the technical constraints (line flow, generation capacity, and
voltage limits etc.).
Next linearized refined computations are done around each coast solution ob-
tained at the first stage. The objective of this stage is to capture the random
deviations from the typical load patterns. Since refine computation uses linearized
load flow solution, it allows a large number of simulation cases and Monte Carlo
method to converge within reasonable time.
The results of proposed POPF algorithm could be used by transmission service
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provider to efficiently manage congestion in a long term basis. This tool also could
be used by system users to estimate the "transmission risks" while making their
electricity contracts.
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Priority Insurance
Service for Hybrid
Bilateral/ Spot
Markets
In this chapter, a priority pricing scheme for long-term (season, year)
bilateral transactions is presented. This scheme offers a price menu
of different levels of firmness for obtaining transmission services. The
result of a customer self-selection process reveals the value of the trans-
aation. Assisted by the economic information revealed'by customers,
a'system operator manages congestion so as to maximize the benefit
of overall system in a mixed long-term bilateral and short-term spot
markets. The necessary procedures for real-time operation to coor-
dinate these two time-scale contracts when system congestion occurs
is formulated as a dynamic programming problem. By combining pro-
posed priority-based insurance scheme and short-term load forecasting,
this framework allows a system operator to relieve network congestion
efficiently without violating the obligations committed priorly in long-
term insurance contracts.
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7-1 Introduction
Transmission pricing mechanism for long-term bilateral transactions in an open
access environment has been one of the open questions. In a poolco-type market,
operation and pricing for transmission are bundled into the spot energy market
with centralized coordination. Under this market structure, a system operator could
manage congestion economically by dispatching available generation resources based
on the energy bids submitted in this market. However, under a bilateral market
structure, the financial terms of bilateral contracts are usually not disclosed to the
grid operator. Therefore, when the transmission network is congested and some of
existing transactions have to be curtailed to maintain secure operation, it is very
hard to justify both efficiency and fairness in transmission load relieving processes.
The problem becomes even more complex when both short term spot energy trading
and long term bilateral contracts exist in the same market, which is the case for most
of energy markets currently operated in the United States.
Long-term (season, year) bilateral transactions are generally attracted to the
market participants who wants to hedge against congestion-related uncertainties in
real-time spot markets. In recent industry practice, issuing firm transmission rights
are usually adopted as a financial instrument to help system users to reduce the
risks. However, as argued in [85), firm transmission rights may result in efficiency
losses in a competitive market.
In this chapter, a new pricing mechanism for long-term bilateral contracts based
on priority service concepts is introduced. Under this scheme, each node-to-node
transmission service is associated with a price menu that provides choices of dif-
ferent levels of firmness, i.e., 90% or 80%, with different prices. A network user
will purchase transmission service corresponding to the value of its bilateral trans-
action. By choosing a level of priority, network users reveal additional information
o the system operator and this information 6iild be used in real-time congestion
management.
Next, the real-time operation processes while congestion occurs in mixed spot
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and bilateral markets are formulated as a dynamic programming problem. By com-
bining proposed priority-based insurance service and short-term load forecasting,
this framework allows a system operator to relieve real-time network congestion
efficiently without violating the obligations committed priorly in long-term trans-
mission markets.
7-2 Congestion Management for Bilateral
Transactions
The congestion management of bilateral transactions can be viewed as a discrete
event supervisory control problem [911. First, each bilateral transaction is discretized
into several bilateral transaction units. These transaction units are associated with
different levels of firmness and can be denied (curtailed) by a system operator if the
transmission system is congested. In other words, each of these transaction units
could be viewed as controllable events; therefore, a system operator could "enable"
or "disable" some of these transactions to maintain line flows within constraints.
A simple 3-bus example is used to illustrate this idea, Figure 7-1. Assume
that a transmission line between bus 2 and bus 3 is the most likely congested line
(bottleneck) and the three transmission lines have the same parameters. With a
transaction between bus 1 and bus 2, /12, 1 unit of power will flows through the
transmission line whose congestion is in question. With a transaction between bus
3 and bus 2, /32, 2 units of power will flow through the bottleneck of interest. Now,
let us define all possible trading events 3ij between i and j, shown in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Possible bilateral trading events in the 3-bus example.
312, #31 -+ +1 unit line flow increase
#13, #21 -+ -1 unit line flow decrease
#32 -+ +2 units line flow increase
#23 -+ -2 units line flow decrease
Next, the power flow on transmission line 2-3 could be modeled as a queue with
a N-unit capacity limit, as shown in Figure 7-2. Thus, the objective of congestion
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Figure 7-1 A 3-bus example.
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Figure 7-2 The DEDS model for a transmission line.
management is to keep the line flow on the suspected bottleneck within
-Nunits < Fplo. < Nunits (7-1)
This model could be used to develop DEDS methods for curtailing when neces-
sary so that the entire transmission network is operated in the most efficient fashion.
7-3 Priority Insurance Service
The priority service for energy market has been studied and introduced by Wil-
son, Chao and Peck, [25, 109, 110]. In these literatures, priority service are used to
efficiently ration available generation resources and curtail excess demand. In [27],
transmission congestion is taken into account by introducing tradeable transmission
capacity rights that closely match physical power flows in advance and using priority
insurance against interruption due to deviations from the pre-dispatch contracts.
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In this chapter, the idea of priority insurance contracts is applied for managing
transmission for long term bilateral transactions. Unlike these previously proposed
schemes, this priority insurance contract is used exclusively while acquiring trans-
mission services and it is completely separated from the energy contracts.
The feature of this type of pricing scheme is that it specifies an order in which
customers requiring transmission services are served. Therefore, instead of giving
a single price for transmission service, a price menu that lists a set of prices corre-
sponding to different levels of firmness is provided. A customer indirectly reveals
the value of the bilateral transaction to the grid operator by selecting a priority
level for the transmission service. This information in turn helps a system operator
manage congestion more economically.
7-3.1 The Optimal Menu Design Problem
Variable pij is used here as the index of different priority levels. Each pj value
requests random nodal price difference between buses i and j under different load
and generation conditions; namely, it represents the random value of a transmission
path. The definition of pij is:
pi, = Pj - p (7-2)
where pi is the nodal price at bus i.
The value of a transmission path is very volatile in real-time operations. It varies
with the system congestion condition, which is dependent on uncertain loading, gen-
eration market and network outages. The value of each node-to-node transmission
path pij is modeled as a random variable with certain probability density distribu-
tion fij (pi,j). One way to obtain the pirobability density functions is to apply the
probability optimal power flow (POPF)-ehiliii~rese ii the previous chapter.
A price menu, Mi,, for the priority insurance service corresponding to a trans-
mission path from bus i to bus j consists of the following three components:
- Rij(pi,j): The probability of the bilateral transaction being implemented. This
is a function of p,3 for different levels of firmness.
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- Pj(pij): The price for network users to subscribe to level i-,3 transmission ser-
vice.
- Ii, (pi,j): The insurance payment to a network user when the subscribed level pij
bilateral transaction is curtailed by a system operator due to congestion.
If a customer selects a priority level p, the associated marginal willingness-to-
pay, from a menu, then he expects the insured transaction to be implemented when
the random spot transmission value pij falls in the region QG,3 (p9) = : , <
y and to be curtailed when the spot transmission value falls in nig(p ?), the
complement region of Qjj(p '). In other words, if the spot value of transmission
is higher than the profit made by implementing the bilateral transaction, the grid
user is willing to be curtailed rather than pay for access.
Therefore, the probability of implementation with respect to priority level y
can be derived as follows:
Rj(p ) = Prob{pi, yi }
fi- (pi,5)dpjj (7-3)
- G(p?3 )
where G(pi,) is the cumulative distribution function of the random variable pij.
Note that Rij is nondecreasing in pij, since G(pi,j) is nondecreasing, i.e.,
If pig : pf then Rjj(p4) Rjj(p4) (7-4)
Next, consider the insurance payment I,3. This payment is designed to partially
or fully compensate the losses of customers when their insured contracts are cur-
tailed. Therefore, when a customer chooses y as a desired level of priority, the
insurance payment is
I6 (y g) = ap ,g (7-5)
where a is the percentage of loss recovery, i.e., a = 100%, 90%, or 80% etc. Here
we consider the fully insured cases. Thus, equation (7-5) becomes
I, (pi ) =9 (7-6)
Therefore, the expected total charge for a system user to require transmission
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service is Pij (pi,) -- (1-Rij (pi,))Iij (pi,). For proper menu design, the incremental
expected charge should equal the incremental gain/losses incurred when a customer
selects higher/lower priority, i.e.,
Pij (pi,) - (1 - RiJ , (p 3))Iij (p'j) = pij dRi( ) (7-7)
This yields the price for priority insurance service
PiJ (p4,j)= 00pi,dRij(pi,) + (1 - Rij(pij))Iij(pi,5) (7-8)
Note that if a customer signs up for a 100% firm transmission service, the price for
this service is
Pii = J pi dRij (pi,) (7-9)
= E(pi,) (7-10)
The customer is willing to pay the expected spot transmission price.
7-3.2 The Network User's Self-selection Problem
Next, we assume that the value of a bilateral transaction, v, is privately known
by the customer. For example, via the bilateral contract, the transmission service
subscriber is able to get power from a cheap generator located at bus i at price pi
and sell the power to local demand at a higher price pj. Then the value of this
bilateral transaction is pj - pi. This value is usually confidential; however, the
value of the contract will reveal to system operator after the customer self-select its
priority level. This information, then, can serve as a basis for efficient congestion
management.
Based on the insurance mechanism, the expected profit made by implementing
a bilateral transaction with the value v is
E (7r(pi,)) = (7-11)
Rij(pi,)v + (1 - Rig(pi,))Ig (p, 3 ) - Pij(pi,)
The objective of each transmission system user is to choose from the menu Mij
an optimal priority insurance level that maximizes his expected profit; namely, the
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user would solve following problem:
pij = arg max 8 (7r(pi,j)) (7-12)
,lii
Lemma 7.1: Given the price menu for priority insurance, M = {Rj (pi,j), Puj (pi,j),
Iij(pjij)} following rules (7-4) and (7-8), the optimal solution for the user's self-
selection problem is
= v (7-13)
Proof: For an the priority level po, the price is
Pj (Po) = P ijdRj,(pij) + (1 - Rj(p"t))Iij(p"0 ) (7-14)
Thus, the expected profit for the bilateral transaction is
E[7r(p')] = Ri,j(pt0)v + (1 - Ri,j( 1p))Ij(p) -Pi,j(p)
0
= Rij(p 0 )v - fi,jdRi,j(p) (7-15)
= R,4(p 0 )v - Rjj(p )p + f Ri, ( p,)dyjj
Take the first order derivative with respect to po. The optimal solution should
satisfies following relation:
Oto (V - p"o) = 0 (7-16)
Therefore,
p* = v (7-17)
Next, we show that the choice of p* = v is a global optimal solution. Let fl is
an arbitrary choice and A f v. Based on the relation (7-15), we know the expected
profit of choosing insurance level p is
E[r(A)] = Ri, (fA)v - [R2,j(A) - Rjj(ptj)]dpj
Sj 
-
= 0 Ri~j(pij)dy-L,
- [Ri~j(A Ri~j(pi,j) ] dy-,j/A
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Figure 7-3 A 5-bus system for the numerical example.
Since Rij = G(pi,j), the cumulative distribution function, is nondecreasing in pij
as describe above, the last term in the previous equation is always nonnegative, i.e.,
I[Ri,j(t) - Rij(pi,j)] > 0 (7-18)
Then
E[7r(v)] = Rij(v)v + (1 - Rij(v))Ii,(v) - Pj(v)
= Rij (pj,)dpij
> E[7r(f)]
Therefore, the choice of p* = v is the global optimal solution. l
Based on the result of Lemma 7.1, when a network user chooses a priority level
form the designed price menu, he also reveals the value of the bilateral transaction to
the transmission service provider. These information, then, can be used for real-time
congestion management that will be discussed later in this chapter.
7-3.3 Numerical Example
In this example, we use the same 5-bus system shown in Figure 7-3. Assuming
that the random load condition follows the same distribution as in the POPF ex-
ample above, we use the results of the probabilistic optimal power flow calculation
as a starting point.
Here we consider the problem of designing an effective pricing menu for bilat-
eral transactions between nodes 2 and 4. First, we use the distribution curve of
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Figure 7-4 The cumulative probability distribution curve of P2,4
responding reliability levels.
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Figure 7-5 The transmission prices for bilateral transactions from bus 2 to bus
4 for different levels of reliability.
nodal price difference between nodes 4 and 2 to obtain P2,4 values corresponding to
different levels of reliability, Figure 7-4.
Next, by using Equations (7-4), (7-6) and (7-8), one can compute the trans-
mission prices and insurance payments of the bilateral transaction from nodes 2 to
4 with respect to different levels of reliability, Figures 7-5 and 7-6. The optimal
menu design is listed in Table 7.2.
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Figure 7-6 The insurance payments of bilateral transactions from bus 2 to bus
4 for different levels of reliability.
Table 7.2 The price menu for bilateral transactions from bus 2 to bus 4.
Priority Price Insurance
Level ($/MWh) ($/MWh)
99% 15.4989 155.4658
95% 14.6582 96.3301
90% 12.7578 68.1500
85% 10.2656 46.5161
80% 7.3804 29.0937
75% 4.1895 14.6701
70% 1.3544 4.3608
7-4 Hybrid Bilateral/Spot Congestion
Management as a Dynamic Programming
Problem
Once a specific level of the transmission service is subscribed for a bilateral
transaction, both power seller and buyer hold the right to physically implement this
transaction during the period of subscription. However, in real-time (i.e., each hour),
the loads which are not served by long-term bilateral contracts have to purchase
the electricity from spot markets. In this setup, certain procedures are needed to
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coordinate these two different time-scale contracts while the transmission system is
congested. A system operator can relieve the congestion either by curtailing long-
term bilateral transactions or dispatching generation participating in short-term
spot markets.
This section demonstrates how a system operator can manage congestion so as
to maximize the benefit of overall system based the economic values revealed by
network users during the self-selection process in long-term bilateral markets and
the energy bids received in short-term spot markets. The procedures of handling
these two different time-scale processes in order to efficiently relieve the system
congestion is formulated as a long-term optimization problem and it can be solved
by applying dynamic programming algorithm.
7-4.1 Review of Dynamic Programming Algorithm
The dynamic programming (DP) algorithm for discrete-time system under
stochastic uncertainties over a finite number of stages has been well-developed. The
basic problem setup is following: Time is broken down into a series of stages, and a
control decision is made at the beginning of each stage and the system is described
by a discrete-time dynamic equation:
x[k + 1] = f[k](x[k], u[k], w[k]), k = 0,1, , N - 1 (7-19)
where x[k] is the state variable; u[k] is the control or the decision variable; w[k] is
the random disturbance that drives the system.
The control variable u[k] is usually a function of the current state, x[k]; in
addition, it has to belong to a set of admissible controls, i.e.,
u[k] U[k (x[k]) (7-20)
The random disturbance w[k] is characterized by a probability distribution function
and that may depend explicitly on x[k] and u[k] but not on depend value of prior
disturbances.
Let the number of stages is denoted by N. Assume that at each stage k, a
cost g[k] (x[k],u[k], w[k]) is incurred and there is a terminal cost g[N](x[N]) which
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depends on the final values of the state vector. With this problem setup, dynamic
programming is an algorithm to find the optimal policy that minimizes the expected
cost over N stages, i.e.,
J*(x0) = (7-21)
{ N-1minU~]x~] {E J[N] (x [NJ) + N- 9[k] (x[] kw [k])}
u[k] (k](x[k]) k=0
Based on the principle of optimality, a set of optimal policies can be construct in
a piecemeal fashion by repeating solving the truncated policy for "tail subproblem"
that minimizes the "cost-to-go" from time i to time N. Thus, the DP algorithm
takes the form [11]:
J[N](x[N]) = g[N](x[N]) (7-22)
J[k](x[k]) minS{g[k](x[k],u[k],w[k]) (7-23)
u[k]
+J[k+1] (f[k (x[k], u[k], w[k]))}
k =0,1,--N - 1,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability distribution of w[k],
which depends on x[k] and u[k]. If u[k]* is the optimal policy for the kth tail sub-
problem, it is also the optimal policy for the cost minimization problem over the
entire optimization period (N stages).
7-4.2 Real-time Congestion Management Problem
Assume that priority insurance services for transmission are sold seasonally to
long-term bilateral customers and the short-term spot market is cleared hourly. As
the transmission system becomes congested, a system operator will have to relieve
the constrained situation in an efficient way based on the energy bids on the spot
market and the economic values of each bilateral transaction. In addition, since
the priority insurance contracts are committed ex ante, a system operator will have
to manage this process dynamically without violating the contracts over the entire
season, Figure 7-7.
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Figure 7-7 Time line of the real-time congestion management.
Here we choose the state variable xi [k] to represent the number of hours remain-
ing for bilateral transaction i to be curtailed by a grid operator without violating the
priority contract. For example, if a customer subscribes to a 90% firm transmission
service over a season, then there is total of 216 hours during which this transaction
is allowed to be curtailed. Therefore, xi[0] = 216. Let the control variable ui[k]
represent the curtailment decision made by a transmission system operator, i.e.,
Ui [k] = 1 if the transaction is curtailed (7-24)
0 if the transaction is implemented
The state transition equation is simply:
xi[k + 1] = xi[k] - ui[k] (xi[k] > 0) (7-25)
Recall that when a bilateral transaction i is curtailed, the transmission provider
has to pay back the insurance Ii [k]. Therefore, the total insurance paid is
Ntrans
' ui[k]I [k] where Ntrans is the total number of bilateral transactions. Next,
i=1
let MS[k] be the merchandise surplus of hour k which indicates the congestion rev-
enue collected from the real-time spot market [46, 20].
At each stage, we define the social welfare loss function:
Ntrans
L [k] ui[k]Ii[k] + MS[k (u[k], PLk]) (7-26)
i=1
The objective function of the dynamic programming is to minimize the cumulative
welfare loss L[k] over the N total stages. Thus, the DP algorithm becomes
J[NJ(x [N]) = L[N](x[N]) (7-27)
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Figure 7-8 Probability distribution of the load patterns.
J[k] (x[k]) = minS{Lk](x[k],u[k],PL[k]) (7-28)
u[k]
+J[k+1](f[k](x[k],u[k],PL[k]))}
k=0,1,--.,N-1
Since the amount of merchandise surplus will also depend on the generator bids
in a spot market, a perfect competition assumption is made in order to make the
DP problem solvable. In other words, a generator will submit its bid based solely
on the remained capacity that is not yet committed in the bilateral deals, and its
marginal cost curve.
7-4.3 Incorporation of the Effects of Load Forecasting
In the formulation described in the previous section, the expectation is com-
puted assuming that the random load always follows its load duration curve, i.e.,
the probability distribution of a given season. However, in actual practice, people
should be able to predict the system demand much more accurately for the coming
hour. In this section, we incorporate the load forecasting effects into the dynamic
programming formulation.
Assuming that, at hour k, the forecast of total system demand for the next hour,
k + 1, is available, then the transmission grid operator is able to determine the most
possible load pattern by applying the same fuzzy theory used in the coarse compu-
tations (described in Chapter 6). The probability distribution of these patterns are
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Qm , Figure 7-8. Recall that
QM = Prob{PL + mh < PL t < PLO + (m+ 1)h}
/P+(m+1)h
= P+mh f t (PL )d PL (7-29)PS+mh
This forecasting process can be represented by means of the equation:
y[k + 1] = ([k] (7-30)
where y[k + 1] can be the values 1, ... , M, corresponding the the M possible load
patterns; ([k] is a random variable taking the value m with probability Qm .
Once the most likely load pattern is assigned, then the random load is only the
deviations around this pattern, APL. Assume that one can estimate the distribution
of these load deviations, qm Note that this is the same estimation used to do the
refined computations in the previous chapter. Then, the system equation can be
rewritten as following: (x[k +1] x[k] 
-u[k] (7-31)
y[k + 1] } [k]
Thus, the new state variable is { [k] and the new system disturbance is
y [k]
. This DP problem can be solved by reformulating the objective function( [k]
as [11]:
J[N](x[N], y[N]) = L[N](x[N]) (7-32)
J[kJ(x[k], y[k]) = min {L [k](x[k], u[k], PL [k])
u[k]
M
+ E QmJ[kn](f[k](x[k,u[k],PL[k]),)tn y[k]l
m=1
ko =t 1..eN - 1 (733)
Finally, let J[k] = E QmJ[k], then the optimization processes will not depend
M=1
on the new state variable y[k] and make this DP problem more easier to solve [11]:
J[N](x[N]) = L[N](x[N]) (7-34)
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([k](x[k])= Qm min E{L[k] (x[k], u[k], PL [k])
m=1 u[k]
+J[k+l](f[k](x[k],u[k],PL[k])) y[k] = m}
k =0,1,.,N -1 (7-35)
7-5 Summary
In this chapter, we have demonstrated how the long-term transmission provision
method introduced in Chapter 6 could be used by a system provider to design menus
for selling priority insurance service of different firmness for a next season use. Under
this scheme, efficient rationing of scarce transmission resources could be achieved
through an appropriately designed price menu, even though the values of bilateral
transactions to individual customers' are only privately known. The price menu
with several different levels of firmness of transmission service provided for network
user self-selection creates economic signals. This information can be used by a grid
operator while managing congestion in real-time operation.
Once the menus are in place, it becomes necessary to make short-term decisions
concerning tradeoff between denying new short-term requests for using the system
or paying back the owners of priority service for not being served. This problem is
posed as a dynamic programming problem that needs to be solved keeping in mind
cumulative effects of short-term decisions over the entire season.
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Conclusions and
Future Research
8-1 Conclusions
The vast, interconnected electric power system in the United States has been
called the "greatest machine ever created." To ensure the secure operations for this
machine, power flows through thousands of transmission lines must be coordinated.
With the opening of generation markets to competition, centralized generation dis-
patch typically exercised in a vertically integrated utility industry is no longer a
plausible procedure to ensure the security of transmission grids i.e., the line power
flows within their technical limits. A new framework for efficient transmission op-
erations that is suitable for the new environment must be established.
To explore this problem, we have first in Chapter 2 stated a general problem
formulation of dynamic transmission provision by re-visiting this problem in the
coordinated industry. The problem of longer-term transmission management (com-
bining short-term load relieving and long-term planning) necessary to serve the
customer effectively over prolonged periods of time, five years or longer, is formu-
lated as a single stochastic optimization problem. As addressed in Chapter 2, the
ultimate long-term benefits of electricity users should be the index used to justify the
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overall performance of any transmission management scheme. Next, based on the
time scale separation and singular perturbation arguments, this full-blown problem
formulation is, then, divided into two main sub-problems: the congestion manage-
ment problem and the optimal investment problem. The main focus of this thesis
is on solving the first sub-problem. However, the concepts developed in this thesis
can be generalized and applied to the second sub-problem.
Chapter 3 presents general features of the proposed hierarchical congestion man-
agement framework. A near-optimal equilibrium could be achieved by means of
interactions between the decentralized optimization processes performed by individ-
ual market participants and market-based coordination provided by transmission
owners. The main conjecture of this thesis is that it is conceptually possible to
unbundle the transmission services from the generation market and that, further-
more, because of the transmission unbundling, proper economic incentives in terms
of promoting long-run efficiency are created.
In order to successfully implement this framework, a simple, easy-to-understand
information structure which clearly depicts the transmission system conditions has
to be developed. We thus have introduced in Chapter 4 an innovative aggrega-
tion scheme called congestion clustering algorithm which allows transmission system
users to carry out an ex ante estimation of their impacts on the system congestion
taking into account the real-time nature of an increasingly competitive market.
The most novel aspect of the transmission management under restructuring is
the idea of giving economic signals (prices for using transmission) to the trans-
mission system users so that they can evaluate their requests and adjust to the
system conditions. This is an alternative to the operator only taking technical ac-
tions, such as using suboptimal generation to supply anticipated demand, or even
not serving portions of load demand, in order to keep system variables within the
acceptable technical limits. Chapter 5 demonstrates that a price feedback based
only on technical measurements can be used to induce systemwide security in the
real-time operations.
The usage-based pricing mechanism proposed in Chapter 5 makes it possible to
maintain system security in an open access environment while every system user is
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attempting to optimize its own benefit. The charge of congestion relief fee based
on the congested line-dependent clusters defined in Chapter 4, greatly reduces the
complexity of the proposed pricing structure. Instead of using potentially large num-
ber of individual nodal prices, this simple, congestion cluster-based pricing scheme
helps market participants avoid causing congestion while making trades in genera-
tion markets.
Compared to the nodal pricing promoted by Hogan [46], this model does not
rely on the actions of a central pool operation for selecting the most efficient sources
of supply to satisfy prevailing constraints and making financial transactions that
involve payments from consumers and payments to suppliers. All system users can
make bilateral or poolco type deals freely and privately in this market structure.
The last part of this thesis addressed the problems of pricing transmission ser-
vices and managing system congestion on a long-term (a season or a year) basis.
The general lack of dynamic decision-making tools under uncertainties for the coordi-
nated industry is taking on new importance under competition. Tools for long-term
network use are of critical importance. Chapter 6 formulates the basis for developing
such tools.
Chapter 6 presents an algorithm for evaluating the long-term (seasonal, annual)
values of transmission services. The algorithm is based on simulating the probable
line flows ahead of time using probabilistic optimal power flow (POPF). An efficient
Monte Carlo methodology, which computes the value of transmission links and line
flow probability distributions from a given load duration curve and public knowledge
of power plant characteristics is developed by the linearizing the AC OPF equations
at different system load levels.
In Chapter 7, the possibility of valuing transmission services by the users them-
selves is recognized; a recently proposed priority-based transmission service idea
based on a bottom-up auction mechanism to purchasing transmission service is
posed here as a dynamic decision making problem under uncertainties. Theoret-
ically, customers reveal the values of their requested transactions after choosing
different insurance levels. The system operator can, therefore, manage congestion
efficiently by curtailing the less valued transactions with one process. This would
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allow further studies of this process in addition to the theoretical results concern-
ing its properties under idealized perfect market assumptions [85]. The procedures
of coordinating long-term and short-term transmission markets for achieving effi-
cient management of a transmission grid is formulated as a stochastic optimization
problem. A dynamic programming formulations for solving this problem is also
presented.
8-2 Future Research
In this section, we identify several open problems that require further research
and understanding. The framework proposed in this thesis can be the starting point
for answering these questions.
8-2.1 Optimal Investment Problem
As discussed in Chapter 2, the main goal for transmission provision in a com-
petitive industry is to improve the overall system efficiency and to benefit end cus-
tomers over a longer time horizon (five years or longer). Several aspects of the
optimal system expansion problem have been discussed in [69, 70, 74]. However,
given the fact that neither a system provider nor the users are capable of predict-
ing market conditions accurately over the prolonged periods of time, an adaptive
scheme for transmission and generation investments accounting for market uncer-
tainties should be developed. This could be an direct extension of the hierarchical
transmission provision framework developed in this thesis.
8-2.2 Imperfect Market Issues
There are at least three types of strategic behavior that could be exerted by
market participants to influence the price of electricity in an imperfect market: (1)
gaming (2) collusion with other parties and (3) exercising inherent market power
[114, 106]. These issues are even more likely to happen when congestion appears in
195
the system. It has been demonstrated in [114] that transmission constraints could
result in energy sub-markets and local market power. Local generation companies
can raise the energy price due to the limitation of importing power from the un-
constrained areas. How to model these types of market maladies and, furthermore,
how to prevent or mitigate their effect will need future research.
8-2.3 Voltage Support Problem
In a deregulated power industry, all electricity consumers are free to purchase
their real power from the suppliers far away; however, it is likely that major bottle-
necks to power transfers over far electric distances will be voltage-support related.
Most of recent proposals regarding the systemwide voltage support still require the
local transmission providers to provide the voltage support as a part of ancillary
services [65]. For example, NERC proposed that "Each control area shall supply
reactive resources within its boundaries to protect the voltage levels under contin-
gency conditions." How to build a similar framework for efficient on-line voltage
regulation is still under investigation. Preliminary results regarding this topic can
be found in [62, 117].
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Appendix: CDF
Formulae with
Transmission
Losses Included
In this appendix, we demonstrate how to calculate congestion distribution factors
(CDFs) introduced in Chapter 4 but taken into account of transmission losses. Let
us start derivations by considering the power flow on a line connecting buses i and
j.
Fj= Gy[V; - VjVj cos(36 - 6j)] + BijViVj sin(6i - ) ( 1)
where V, 6i are voltage magnitude and phase angle at bus i respectively; Yi=
Gij+ jBij is the complex-valued admittance of the transmission line spanning buses
i and j. Based on the real/reactive power decoupling assumption,1 voltages are not
altered with the phase angle changes [122]. Based on this formula, if Gij # 0 then
the transmission loss on transmission line i-j is
Floss Gj [V2 +V - 2VIVj cos(6i - 6j)] (A-2)
1 Decoupling assumption: governor actions only affect frequency/real power changes and the
excitation systems affect reactive power and voltages only. This assumption is commonly made for
studies of load frequency control/automatic generation control (LFC/AGC) under normal condition.
197
198
An incremental line power flow change can be expresses as a function of phase angle
deviations by taking derivative of Equation (A-1).
= -Gi ViV, sin(6i - 6j) - BijViV cos(6i - 6j) (A-3)
=~-3 GijViV sin(6i - 6j ) + BijViV cos(6i - og ) ( A-4)
= l (A_40 63.
- i
Therefore, the relationship between line flow, Fi-j, deviations and phase angle, 6,
deviations can be expressed in following vector form:
Fij = L iJ (A-5)
Since = -l, like vector Mi-j in the DC version, the relation LT .{1} still
holds.
Next, we use the sensitivity property of Newton-Raphson load flow (NRLF)
Jacobian matrix which is available at the end of a base load flow solution to describe
the relationship between the bus voltage angles and real power injections [105, 88,
77]:
] ap1  ap ... -ap,P, 096 062 a£9
P2  Z ... (
P2 
_ 61 a62 n 2 (A-6)
n _ 062 n 1
P = J6 (A-7)
This Jacobian matrix J, like B in DC version, is singular in nature.
Following the same derivations as in the DC version except replacing [B] by [J)
and replacing Mi-j by Li-j, one can obtain the distribution factors with respect to
a reference bus n, DPtj, i.e.,
- T
[Jr ]-i1 0
Dng= Li-_ (A-8 )1-30 0
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However, unlike DC version, since the transmission loss is not neglected, the slack
bus will absorb not only generation/demand mismatch but also the total trans-
mission loss as well. Even if total generation and total demand are balanced, i.e.,
SPG PLj, the power injection at the slack bus n is not zero. Choosing dif-
ferent slack buses will result in different line flow patterns and, consequently, the
corresponding transmission losses are not the same.
However, a slack bus is a mathematical artifact that does not fully correspond
to the actual operation of electric power systems. In actual power industry practice,
there exist a relatively small group of generating units participate in the load fre-
quency control (LFC) and automatic generation control (AGC) with the purpose of
balancing the interconnected system in response to real-time demand and generation
mismatch and transmission losses.
Assuming that we have the knowledge of these AGC/LFC units, we can modify
our formulae to make them reflect the actual system operations. Let AGC represent
a group of generators participating AGC/LFC. The amount of real power imbalance
in the system is distributed among these units based on participation factors, ai.
They are determined based on combined cost and reliability criteria. They all add
up to unity, i.e.,
an =1 (A-9)
nGAGC
Then we compute the distribution factors with respect to the individual
AGC/LFC units and then add them up weighting by their participation factors,
ai, as following:
Dic = n (A-10)
neAGC
Based on this formula, if any generation/demand mismatch and/or transmission
losses occur in the system, this amount of power will be absorbed jointly by the
AGC units. Finally, we use the same shifting method to get CDFs.
Di-j = Dig l + i } (A-11)
where
Dgc (i) + D?"g(ji~t= - 2-( + - J (A-12)
2
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Appendix:
Linearized OPF
Equations
In this appendix, derivations of linearized OPF equations are presented. This
result is used to do refined computations of probabilistic optimal power flow (POPF)
algorithm described in Chapter 6.
As addressed earlier in Chapter 3, generation cost curves are usually approxi-
mated by quadratic functions of their power outputs:
CG (PG,) = aiP0 + bi PG + ci (B-1)
The load flow constraints at different coast load levels can also be simplified as the
following energy balance equation:
{1} T PG = 1TL t os (B-2)
Based on the assumptions made in Section 6-3.1, only a subset inequality constraints
activated in coarse computations is taken into account. Based on the assumption
(Al), this subset of inequality constraints can be replaced by a set of equality con-
straints: { HqPG + H!§PL + E pmax c (B-3)
PGi = 3m2 ax CgC
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where HP and HL are the coefficients of linearized power flow equations around an
operation point, i.e., distribution factors; eij is a correction factor for the difference
of nonlinear and linearized power flow equations; 1C and gC represent subsets of
constrained transmission lines and constrained generator outputs respectively. It is
possible to write these constraints in following matrix form:
MPG + APL + Q = {0} (B-4)
Then the problem is now to minimize the total generation cost, {1}TcG, subject
to equality constraints (B-2) and (B-4). The ordinary Lagrangian equation can be
written as:
C= {1}T+c +Ao({1}P-{1}T Ploss)
+AT {MPG - NPL - Q} (B-5)
According to the first-order condition, i.e., VPGL = 0 and VAL =
generation distribution is the solution of the following equation:
A C PG 0
+ PL + {j 0}
D w0e
where
2ai
0
0
0, the optimal
(B-6)
0 --- 0
2a 2
0
0 2 ang
bi
b2
49ptot
(1-- loss
PG 2
aPtot
(B-7)
(B-8)
[diag(M)]
-J
(B-9)
B =
C =
D = 1
Ao
Ac
{1}T
H =
0
Then the solution is
P = -A C DA~ C - DAh4B)) +
= VPL + W
Therefore, the solution is a linear combination of loads, PL and
B)
(B-14)
AP = V[k]APL
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(B-10)
(B-11)
(B-12)
(B-13)
,I
0 -=
(B-15)
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